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RESUM DEL PROJECTE
 
 Aquest projecte real
Technical University, forma part d’un treball col·laboratiu dins el departament a llarg 
plaç per a l’estudi i el desenvolupament d’aplicacions software relacionades amb la 
seguretat de les tecnologie
analitzar els punts dèbils ,en quant a mecanismes de seguretat es refereix, dels 
estàndards de telecomunicacions que s’utilitzen per a la comunicació dels electròmetres 
intel·ligents dins del la tecno
de aquests estàndards, s’han inclòs en el projecte estàndards basats en tecnologies 
dispars i diverses com poden ser la ràdiofreqüència, les PLC (PowerLine 
Communications) o els infrarojos.
 Per a cadascuna d’aquestes tecnologies, podem trobar en el projecte una amplia 
descripció dels mecanismes de seguretat utilitzats per a cadascun per a l’encriptació dels 
missatges enviats, la protecció de les claus que utilitza, l’autentificació del terminals d
la xarxa o la identificació per accedir a la xarxa. 
cada estàndard podem trobar una descripció dels possibles atacs que es factible realitzar 
per a vèncer les barreres de seguretat d’aquestes tecnologies. 
les característiques de cadascun dels estàndards, s’inclouen comparacions entre tots ells 
per destacar els punts dèbils i els punts forts vers la resta de tecnologies. I, per últim, 
podem trobar un recopilatori de un ampli ventall de eines ta
hardware, desenvolupades per 
telemàtica, que permeten realitzar varis dels atacs que poden afectar als protocols 
descrits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
itzat en el departament de telecomunicacions de la Czech 
s de Medició Intel· ligent. En aquest projecte es pretén 
logia del Smart Metering. Per tal de veure un ampli ventall 
 
Per acabar la descripció detallada de 
Un cop vist
nt de software com de 
a l’investigació dels professionals de la seguretat en 
e 
es amb detall 
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RESUMEN DEL PROYECTO
 
 Este proyecto realizado
Technical University, forma parte de un
largo plazo para el estudio
seguridad de las tecnología
analizar los puntos débiles,
estándares de telecomunicaciones
electrómetros inteligentes 
amplio abanico de estos estándares
en tecnologías dispares y
(PowerLine Communications
 Para cada una de estas
descripción de los mecanismos
de los mensajes enviados, la protección 
los terminales de la red o
descripción detallada de cada estándar
posibles ataques que es factible realizar
tecnologías. Una vez vistas
se incluyen comparaciones
puntos fuertes hacia el resto de
recopilatorio de un amplio abanico de
hardware, desarrolladas pa
telemática, que permiten realizar
protocolos descritos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
specifications for Smart Metering 
 
 en el departamento de telecomunicaciones de la
 trabajo colaborativo dentro del departamento
 y el desarrollo de aplicaciones software relacionadas con la 
s de Medición Inteligente. En este proyecto
 en cuanto a mecanismos de seguridad se refiere, de
 que se utilizan para la comunicación de los
dentro del la tecnología del Smart Metering
, se han incluido en el proyecto estándares
 diversas como pueden ser la radiofrecuencia,
) o los infrarrojos. 
 tecnologías, podemos encontrar en el proyecto
 de seguridad utilizados en cada uno para la encriptación
de las claves que utiliza, la autentificación de
 la identificación para acceder a la red. Para terminar la
 podemos encontrar una descripción de los
 para vencer las barreras de seguridad
 con detalle las características de cada uno de los
 entre todos ellos para destacar los puntos
 tecnologías. Y, por último, podemos encontrar un 
 herramientas tanto de software como de 
ra la investigación de los profesionales de la seguridad en
 varios de los ataques que pueden afectar a los
 
 Czech 
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. Para ver un 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 This project has been accomplished in
Engineering of the Czech Technical University, as a
the department to long-term study the
security in technologies 
weaknesses, concerned in 
standards that are used for communication
Smart Metering. A wide range
standards based on different
(PowerLine Communications
 For each of these technologies
the security mechanisms 
messages, protect the keys used
to access the network. To complete the
description of possible attacks
of these technologies. Once
next steps for the analysis are the 
weaknesses and strengths 
finally, there can be found
hardware, developed for 
performing various attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
 the Department of Telecommunications 
 part of a collaborative work
 development of software applications
for Smart Metering. This project aims to analyze
terms of security mechanisms, of the telecommunications
 with smart meter technology
 of these standards have been included in the draft
 technologies such as the radio frequency
) or infrared. 
, there can be found an extensive
used for each of them for the purpose of
, authentication of terminals and network
 description of each standard there can be found
 that may make possible to overcome the 
 viewed in detail the characteristics of each of the
comparisons between them to highlight
of each one of them towards the other technologies
 a compilation of a wide range of tools, both
research of security professionals, which may
that can affect the protocols described. 
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1. Introduction 
 Electricity suppliers and researchers have been developing since a few time ago 
communication systems to im
purposes on electricity. Many deployments have been installed already and many 
devices and different technologies have appeared on the market already. This system is 
known as Automated Meter Reading o
 During the past years, meters have been improving a lot and this improvement is 
going to go further by providing more services. Nowadays they are capable of 
performing a lot more functions than they used to, its accuracy has improved and
incorporate capabilities for control configuration and avoiding tampering.
 The goal of smart metering technologies is being capable of collecting data from 
electricity meters automatically as well as sends commands to the meters remotely and 
protecting the energy supplying companies from energy theft or tampering on the 
electricity meters. This way meter measurements can reach the electricity supplying 
company and customers billing can be performed without the need of an operator 
visiting customer’s home either if it is a private user or an enterprise. Obviously, on
metering can be done with this meters too, which is not useless since it may be 
necessary for revising the well performance of the meter and because many information 
can be obtained from smart meters apart from billing. Smart meters register energy 
consumption not only monthly but from their registers energy consumption from short 
periods of time can be obtained which may lead to a wide range of applications both for 
users and for energy suppliers such as 
time-of-use concept for billing or enabling customers to make informed decisions.
 The most important element for implementing such a system is communications 
between meters and energy su
technologies as well as different standards and private system architectures to use these 
technologies are presented and compared between them. The paper is focused on a key 
aspect of these technologies which is its security features and the possible attacks they 
may suffer. Since one of the goals of smart metering technologies is protecting the 
meters from tampering and manipulation of the data on the network, security features 
became one of the most important parts of this technologies deployment.
 Many different technologies are described here including two narrowband PLC 
implementations, PRIME and G3; three radiofrequency implementations Raconet, 
Bluetooth and ZigBee; GPRS and optical infrared 
implementations only implement the physical, MAC, and adaptation layers of the 
system and require application layer protocols such as DLMS/COSEM, which is widely 
used, in order to implement smart metering networks. In the 
radiofrequency technologies, they implement all layers so they can directly implement 
smart metering networks without the need of any other protocols. Finally, regarding to 
the IEC62056-21 protocol it is significantly different from all o
sses of telecommunication 
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protocol permit only local data readout exchange from smart meters. However, by using 
other protocols such as DLMS/COSEM for application implementations, it can lead to 
the deployment of smart metering systems too. Besides, this
used with smart meters when local readout of data is to be made since is very simple 
and quickly to use with a hand held unit in front of a smart meter.
 Finally on this paper, a description about the tools that may be used to p
attacks to the technologies described can be found. Many of them, as well as, tools for 
performing attacks, are tools used by security professionals in order to test the security 
of the networks an enterprise may plan and to study the attacks that m
in order to improve security features.
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2. GPRS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is a service that provides packet 
radio access for GSM users. Its core network allows 
transmit IP packets to external networks such as the 
integrated part of the GSM 
 Taking advantage of these features, GPRS enables the 
packet-oriented multimedia applications and services to mobile users, realizing the 
concept mobile Internet. For the successful implementation of the new emerging 
applications and services over GPRS, security is considered as a vi
because of the fact that wireless access is inherently less secure, and the radio trans
mission is by nature more susceptible to eavesdropping and fraud in use than wireline 
transmission. In addition, users mobility and the universal a
higher security risks compared to those encountered in fixed networks. In order to meet 
security objectives, GPRS uses a specific security architecture, which aims at protecting 
the network against unauthorized access and the pri
mainly based on the security measures applied in GSM, since the GPRS system is built 
on the GSM infrastructure. 
 However, GPRS differs from GSM in certain operational and service points, 
which require a different securit
is an open and wide deployed technology that presents many vulnerable points. 
Similarly to IP networks, intruders to the GPRS system may attempt to breach the 
confidentiality, integrity, availability o
to compromise services, defraud users or any part of it. These attacks threaten network 
operation and data transfer through it, compromising end
 Apart from security implementatio
said. A huge range of different applications can be implemented using GPRS, such as 
the one this document talks about, Automated Meter Reading (AMR). In opposition to 
other technologies described in this document,
data directly from the smart meters. Its propose is incorporating smart meter networks 
that directly extract data from meters, which implemented with short range standards 
such as IEC62056-21 or ZigBee, to Wide Area 
to note that those devices that are named in the GPRS standard as Mobile Stations (MS) 
are the smart meters in AMR applications and they are not mobile in this case.
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2.2 GPRS network 
 The GPRS network has two major p
may be called the network itself, and the mobile stations (MS). The mobile users 
subscribed to network use its service to communicate over the radio interface. In the 
following figure the architecture of the G
 
 
2.2.1 Mobile stations (MS)
 Two major components form a mobile station (MS): the mobile equipment (ME) 
and the SIM module. 
 A personal chip card SIM can be a fixed installed chip (plug
exchangeable SIM module. The SIM is a secure microprocessor
implemented on a credit-card
types of SIM cards are used in GPRS, ID
memory, ROM, RAM, and EEPROM.
 The ROM contains the operating system, the applications, and security 
algorithms A3 and A8, which implements important functions for the authentication and 
user data encryption based on the subscriber identity IMSI and secret keys. RAM is 
used to buffering transmission data and executing. The EEPROM consists of subscriber 
specifications for Smart Metering 
arts, the fixed installed infrastructure which 
PRS system is presented: 
Figure 2.1. GPRS network [1] 
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identification (IMSI, PIN), call number (IMSI and MSISDN), keys K
network-related information (TMSI, LAI), and the equipment identifier IMEI.
 The security features supported by the SIM are authentication of the subscriber 
identity to the network, data confidentiality over the air interface, and file access 
conditions. It can support five access conditions. One of them is PIN which is used to 
control user access to the SIM. [1] [8]
 
2.2.2 The fixed network
From the side of the network, different system and database form it:
• The BSS (Base Station Subsystem):
Station) and the BSC (Base Station Controller) together form the BSS. In the
BSS the radio path is controlled. There, the BTS is responsible the radio 
coverage of a geographical area, while BSC maintains radio connections 
towards MSs and terrestrial connections towards the fixed core network.
• The HLR (Home Location Register):
permanent subscriber data and the relevant temporary data of all subscribers 
permanently registered in the HLR. The IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity) and authentication data are stored in it.
• The VLR (Visitor Location Reg
all MSs which are currently staying in the administrative area of the associated 
MSC. 
• The EIR (Equipment Identity Register):
(supplied by the manufacturer) of the terminals (IMEI).
• The AuC (Authentication Center):
stored and generated in this subsystem.
• The Mobile Service Switching Centre (MSC):
network element responsible for circuit
 The GPRS Support Nodes (GSN), a
data packets between a MS and an external packet data network (PDN). More 
specifically, a Serving GSN (SGSN) is responsible for the delivery of data packets 
from, and to, a MS within its service area. Its task
mobility management, logical link management, and authentication and charging 
functions. A Gateway GSN (GGSN) acts as an interface between the GPRS backbone 
and an external PDN. It converts the GPRS packets coming fro
appropriate packet data protocol (PDP) format, which may be IP, X.25, etc, and 
forwards them to the corresponding PDN. Similar is the functionality of GGSN in the 
opposite direction. The communication between GSNs is based on IP tunnels
the use of the GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP). [7] [8] [9]
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2.3 GPRS protocol stack
 A wide range of specific protocols are used in GPRS to cover the control and 
management of all layers and data transferring. Brief descriptions of their functionali
are presented below: [10] 
• GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP):
through the IP backbone by adding routing information. All other protocols 
described below are encapsulated in it.
• Sub-Network Dependent Convergence Protocol (SN
that maps a network
provides many others functions such as compression, segmentation and 
multiplexing of NWK layer messages to a single virtual connection.
• Logical Link Control 
reliable transfer of user data across a wireless network.
• Base Station System GPRS Protocol (BSSGP):
routing and QoS information for the BSS. It uses Frame Relay Q.922 core 
protocol as its transport mechanism.
• GPRS Mobility Management (GMM):
signalling plane of GPRS and handles mobility issues such as roaming, 
authentication and selection of encryption algorithms.
• Network Service:
between BSSGP and Frame Relay Q.922 core by mapping the first one’s service 
requests to the adequate Frame Relay services.
• Base Station System Application Part
data connections and optimizes paging for
charge of location and routing update tasks as well as mobile station alerts. [10]
• Radio Link Control MAC (RLC MAC):
management of radio resources (frequency and time slots) are used and shared 
by the diverse mobile users. The uplink resources are shared based on a request
reservation mechanism, slotted
 
Figure 2.2. GPRS Protocol stack [77]
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2.4 Security on GPRS
 In order to meet security objectives, GPRS employs a set of security 
mechanisms that constitute the GPRS security architecture. Most of these mechanisms 
have been originally designed for GSM, but they have been modified to adapt to the 
packet oriented traffic nature and the GPRS network components. The GPRS security 
architecture includes the following components:
• Identities 
• Subscriber identity confidentiality
• GPRS Authentication
• GPRS Ciphering
• GPRS backbone security
 
2.4.1 Identities 
 The association of the most important identifiers and their storage locations are 
summarized as follows: Subscriber is identified by IMSI, MSISDN, TMSI, MSRN; 
Mobile Equipment is identified by IMEI; IMSI, MSISDN, and MSRN are stored in 
HLR; The LMSI, MSRN, IMSI, TMSI, MSISDN, and LAI are stored in VLR; The 
IMSI, RAND, SRES, Ki, K
 When registering for service with a mobile network operator, each subscriber 
receives a unique identifier, the 
IMSI is stored in the SIM. A mobile station can only be operated,
IMSI is inserted into equipment with a valid IMSI, since this is the only way to 
correctly bill the appropriate subscriber. The IMSI consists of several parts: mobile 
country code (MCC): 3 decimal digits, internationally standardized
code (MNC): 2 decimal digits, for unique identification of mobile networks within a 
country; Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN): maximum 10 decimal 
digits, identification number of the subscriber in his mobile home network.
 The real telephone number of MS is MSISDN (Mobile Subscriber ISDN 
Number). The VLR responsible for the current location of a subscriber can assign a 
TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) which has only local significance in the 
area handled by the VLR. 
addressing of the MS. This way nobody can determine the identity of the subscriber by 
listening to the radio channel, since this TMSI is only assigned during the mobile 
stations presence in the area of one VLR, and can even be changed during this period. 
The mobile station stores the TMSI on the SIM card. The TMSI is stored on the 
network side only in the VLR and is not passed to the HLR. The association between 
IMSI and TMSI is stored in the 
sses of telecommunication 
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 The MSRN (Mobile station Roaming Number) is a temporary location
dependent ISDN number which is assigned by the local VLR in its area. The 
(International Mobile Station Equipment Identity) uniquely identifies mobile equipment 
internationally. It is a kind of serial number. The IMEI is allocated by the equipment 
manufacture and registered by the network operator who stores it in EIR. By means of 
the IMEI one recognizes obsolete, stolen, or nonfunctional equipment. [1]
 
2.4.2 Subscriber identity co
 Subscriber identity confidentiality includes mechanisms for the protection of the 
permanent identity (IMSI) when it is transferred in signaling messages, as well as 
measures that preclude the possibility to derive it indirectly from listenin
information at the radio path. Subscriber identity confidentiality is mainly achieved by 
using a Temporary Mobile subscriber Identity (TMSI), which identifies the mobile user 
in both the wireless and wired network segments. The TMSI has a loc
and, thus, it must be accompanied by the routing area identity (RAI) in order to avoid 
confusions. Only the MS, the serving VLR and SGSN know the relation between the 
active TMSI and the IMSI. [8]
 The allocation of a new TMSI corresponds 
allocation of the previous one. When a new TMSI is allocated to the MS, it is 
transmitted to it in a ciphered mode. The MS stores the current TMSI and the associated 
RAI in a non-volatile memory, so that these data are not l
off. Further to the TMSI, a Temporary Logical Link Identity (TLLI) identifies also a 
GPRS user on the radio interface of a routing area. Since the TLLI has a local 
significance, when it is exchanged between the MS and the SGSN, 
accompanied by the RAI. The TLLI is either derived from the TMSI allocated by the 
SGSN or built by the MS randomly, and, thus, provides identity confidentiality. The 
relationship between the TLLI and the IMSI is only known by the MS and the SG
[1] [7] [8] 
 
2.4.3 GPRS Authentication
 When a MS starts a connection to GPRS network, it has to be authenticated 
before it is allowed to access to the network services. GPRS authentication procedures 
must be started as soon as one of the following sce
• A routing area update
• A GPRS attach or detach
• A GPRS packet transfer
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 The GPRS operator wants to know who is trying to initiate a connection with the 
network. The aim of the authentication process is to identify that the user has a correct
SIM card with a valid Ki key. This process must be verified without sending K
radio interface. The authentication process is initiated and controlled by SGSN, 
supported by AuC and MS. During GPRS attach process, SGSN sends a message 
containing the IMSI of the subscriber to the AuC and requests triplets, as shown in 
Figure XX. A triplet is composed of three keys called RAND, SRES and K
explained below: 
• RAND: It is a randomly generated 128 bit number used for providing 
triples always different.
• SRES (Signed RESponse):
algorithm and used as digital signature of MS.
• GPRS-Kc: It
used for encrypting data between MS and SGSN.
 A3 and A8 security algorithms both use Ki and RAND as input parameters. A3 and A8 
algorithms are deployments are illustrated in Figure 2.3. After getting triplets from AuC, 
SGSN sends RAND number to MS for authentication. SIM generates SRES based on 
RAND and Ki by using A3 algorithm. The MS transmits its SRES value to the SGSN that 
compares it with SRES from AuC. If both values agree, the authentication is successful. All 
this procedure is shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
 
Figure 2.3. A3 and A8 algorithms [78]
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 Each execution of the algorithm A3 is performed with a new value of the RAND 
which cannot be predetermined; in this way recording the channel transmission and 
playing it back cannot be used to fake an identity. Security conscious users worry that if 
someone manages to intercept RAND and SRES as they are transmitted over the radio 
interface, and if this person knows the algorithm A3, it may be possible to reverse the 
calculation to derive Ki. In fact the algorithms used in GSM/GPRS are designed to make 
extremely difficult to calculate the input K
which is completely necessary because by using K
key GPRS-Kc which influences data confidentiality of the subscriber.
Figure 2.4. GPRS Authe
2.4.4 GPRS Ciphering
 When authentication process is successfully completed, SGSN sends a message 
“Authentication is successful”. 
a response message to SGSN and starts cip
 Ciphering process in GPRS needs a ciphering key and a ciphering algorithm. On 
the fixed network side, SGSN has GPRS
ciphering algorithm. The SGSN receives GPRS
while the MS generates GPRS
 Although GPRS system uses the same ciphering key and similar algorithm as in 
GSM, there are some differences between ciphering in GSM and GPRS. In GSM, 
ciphering is performed between MS and BTS and uses one of three versions of A5 (A5
0, A5-1 or A5-2), depending on the level of ciphering permitted. In GPRS, ciphering is 
performed between MS and SGSN and it uses a new version of A5 developed especially 
for packet transmission (A5
algorithm GPRS-A5 does not use only GPRS
two additional parameters defined as 
confidentiality. If GPRS K
(Ciph-S) would be the same for every GPRS session. One of input parameters is the 
specifications for Smart Metering 
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At the time of receiving that message from MS, it sends 
hering the text as shown in Figure 2.4.
-Kc key as ciphering key and GPRS
-Kc key as part of the triplet from AuC, 
-Kc in SIM after receiving RAND from network.
-3) which is also known as GPRS-A5. GPRS ciphering 
-Kc key during ciphering, but it also uses 
input and direction to protect subscriber data 
c was the only input parameter, the ciphering bit sequence 
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LLC layer frame number; the other parameter, 
direction. As a result, each LLC layer frame is ciphered with a different Ciph
the same length as the LLC layer frame being ciphered. The length of the LLC layer 
frames is variable and may be up to 1523 octets long. [6]
Figure 2.5. GPRS A5 algorithm [6]
 
2.4.5 GPRS backbone security
 The GPRS backbone network includes the fixed network elements and their 
physical connections that convey user data and signaling information. Signaling 
exchange in GPRS is mainly based on the Signaling System 7 (SS7) technology, which 
does not support any security measure for the GPRS deployment. Similarly, the GTP 
protocol that is employed for communication between GSNs does not support security. 
Thus, user data and signaling information in the GPRS backbone network are conveyed 
in clear-text exposing them to various security threats. In addition, inter
communications (between different operators) are based on the public Internet, which 
enables IP spoofing to any malicious third party who gets access to it.
 The responsibility for s
network communications belongs to mobile operators. An operator utilizes private IP 
addressing and Network Address Translation (NAT) to restrict unauthorized access to 
the GPRS backbone. He may also 
network in order to protect it from unauthorized penetrations.
 Firewalls protect the network by enforcing security policies. Using them the 
GPRS operator can make sure that only traffic initiated from th
through a firewall. This is done for two reasons:
• To restrict traffic in order to protect the MS and the network elements 
from external attacks
sses of telecommunication 
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• To protect the MS from receiving un
 Since firewalls do not provide privacy a
Network (VPN) technology is used to complement the firewall protection. It is used for 
the authentication and the authorization of user access to corporate resources, the 
establishment of secure tunnels between the c
encapsulation and protection of the data transmitted by the network. The border 
gateway, which resides at the border of the GPRS backbone, is a network element that 
provides firewall capabilities and also maintains static, pre
peers. [8] 
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2.5 Attacks on GRPS security
2.5.1 Mobile Station and SIM
 MSs mostly operate in public places where the concentration of people is high 
and physical access controls are omitted. These facts incre
the MS usage and enable adversaries to perform various attacks. However, not only the 
MS but also the SIM module can be targeted by adversaries. Since the SIM module is 
implemented on a smart card, any vulnerability of smart c
the security of the information stored in the SIM. [8]
 
2.5.1.1 Attacks on the SIM card
 The security model of GPRS is based on the secret key, K
SIM-card. If an attacker is able to retrieve this key, 
between the MS and the SGSN, or he can produce a clone of the original SIM card, and, 
thus, engage in transactions, which are billed to the original subscriber. The 
implementation of A3 and A8 the COMP128, which is an example
in the GSM memorandum of understanding, may be used. Although never officially 
published, COMP128 description was found and crypto
to find the shared key (Ki) of the MS and the network.
 The attack is achieved by sending a set of chosen challenges to the SIM
analyzing the responses. This attack exploits the lack of diffusion, since there is a 
narrow pipe inside COMP128. Specifically, after the second round of the first iterative 
loop the bytes 
depend only on the input bytes
 Two of these bytes are key bytes, namely
X[i]=Ki[i] and X[i+8]=K
 Therefore, performing a chosen challenge attack, it is possible to find a collis
four bytes after the second round. Once a collision occurs on the second round, it 
propagates right through the hash function until the end of the last round. Comparing 
the MACs that are sent back by the SIM
performing a 2R-attack, which is the term of differential crypto
of the secret key involved in the collision are recovered. This attack can be iterated for 
each pair of key bytes, and, thus, the whole secret key K
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 Another type of attacks against the SIM
attacks allow an adversary to obtain sensitive information from side
cryptographic implementations, mainly, in constrained devices such as the SIM
In view of these exposures, some vendors of cryptographic systems employ a variety of 
software and hardware countermeasures to harden their implementations against side
channel attacks. However, many of these measures are inadequate in cases that an 
algorithm implementation employs large table lookups. The COMP128 algorithm, 
which is used for the implementation of A3 and A8 in the SIM
lookup of large tables. This lookup on simple devices, such as the SIM
be achieved in a complicated way resulting in the leakage of sensitive information into 
the side channels. An improved class of side
attack implementations that may otherwise resist some side
partitioning attacks. The partitioning attack on COMP128 exploits weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in the implementation of table lookups, which introduce non
a very effective way. Specifically, the entire 128
SIM card using less than 1000 invocations with random inputs, or 255 chosen inputs, or 
only 8 adaptively chosen inputs. Thus, an adversary who possesses a SIM card for a 
minute can easily extract the key.
 Finally, a peculiar attack on smart cards, which is called optica
was revealed by Skorobogatov and Anderson. They exposed to light the microprocessor 
circuit, embedded in a smart card, by scraping most of the protective coating from its 
surface. By focusing the light on individual transistors within th
sequentially changing the values of the transistors used to store data, they were able to 
reverse engineer the memory address map, which allows them to extract the secret data 
from the smart card. [8] 
 
2.5.2 Access network 
 The interface between the MS and the SGSN is amongst the most exposed 
elements of the GPRS architecture. The GPRS system protects this part of the network 
by employing a set of security mechanisms that ensure authentication of mobile users, 
confidentiality of users identit
exchanged. However, exploiting some weaknesses that these mechanisms present, an 
adversary may perform the following attacks: [8]
 
2.5.2.1 Denial of Service (DoS) attack
 One of the attacks that may
networks is the DoS attack. This attack aims at preventing transmission of user data, 
specifications for Smart Metering 
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and signaling and control information over the air interface, disrupting communication 
and network operation. It can b
• Jam user data and signaling traffic using special devices called jammers
• Induce specific protocol failures
• Impersonate as network elements and then prevent data traffic, either 
user traffic, signaling traffic or c
 
2.5.2.2 Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack
 GPRS is vulnerable to a MitM attack, which allows an attacker to impersonate a 
false base station to a victim MS and, at the same time, impersonate the victim to a real 
network. It is assumed that the attacker has a device capable of emulating a BS, which is 
integrated with a MS with a valid GPRS network subscription as shown in Figure XX. 
 This attack can be performed because the MS is authenticated to the network, 
but the network is not authenticated to the MS. In order to mount this attack, the 
attacker forces the MS to connect to a false base station by broadcasting the network 
code of the subscriber’s home network in best signal quality. Then, the false base 
station impersonates the MS to the GPRS network. In the subsequent authentication 
process, the attacker can either simply forward the authentication traffic between the 
MS and the real network, or he can be authenticated to the network using his own 
subscription discarding the MS authentication data.
 
Figure 2.6. Man
 Since the encryption between the MS and the network (SGSN) is not mandatory 
and the related signaling data are exchanged unencrypted without origin authentication, 
the attacker can request to turn off the encryption between the MS and the false base 
station. Additionally, if the attacker chooses not to be authenticated to the network, he 
can disable the encryption between the false base station (him) and the network by 
sending false information about his encryption capabilities (his device) to the network. 
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Thus, the attacker mediates in the communication between the MS and the network 
allowing him to eavesdrop on, insert, and modify traffic. In case that the attacker has 
been authenticated to the network using his own subscription, he pays the transaction. 
Otherwise, the transaction is paid by the victim MS. Besides the deactivation of the 
encryption process over the air interface, the MitM attack may result in the retrieval o
the encryption key used. In this form of the attack, the attacker listens to the GPRS
RAND sent by the network to the MS under attack for authentication purposes. Then, 
the attacker impersonates a voice network that initiates a radio session with the MS,
starts the authentication procedure using the GPRS
a GSM-voice RAND). 
 After authentication completion, the attacker asks from the MS to start 
encrypting with A5/2, which is a weak version of the A5 algorithm that is
By receiving a few encrypted voice traffic (4 frames), the attacker is able to recover the 
corresponding encryption key, K
than a second, and ends the voice
Kc, the attacker is able to decrypt the GPRS traffic exchanged between the MS under 
attack and the legitimate network. Alternatively, the attacker can record this traffic, and 
performs the impersonation attack in order to retrieve the
recorded data can be decrypted, at any later time.
 In case that A5/2 is not supported by the MS, but A5/1 is supported, which is a 
stronger version of A5, then, the aforementioned attack against A5/1 and GPRS can be 
performed using cryptanalysis of A5/1, instead of A5/2. Since many network operators 
initiate a new authentication process, rarely, and use the key created in the last 
authentication, the attacker can use the retrieved key to intercept more than one session 
between the MS and the GPRS network. [8]
 
2.5.3 Attacks on the GPRS core network
 The GPRS backbone network, which connects the fixed nodes of the GPRS 
architecture, is also threatened by malicious actions. These actions refer to both IP and 
SS7 technologies that are e
the GPRS backbone. [8] 
2.5.3.1 Attacks on the IP technology (G
 The IP technology is used to connect the SGSN and the GGSN of the same 
network operator (Gn interface). This connection ma
existing IP network, which is not dedicated to the GPRS traffic. Therefore, traffic that 
originates from outside of the GPRS network shares the GPRS backbone links with the 
GPRS traffic. The latter is conveyed in clear
protocol, which is employed for both signaling and user data, does not support any 
specifications for Smart Metering 
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security measure. The above situation might cause performance problems to the GPRS 
backbone and expose the GPRS traffic to security th
spoofing, compromise of confidentiality and privacy etc., that the public Internet 
encounters. 
 Since the IP network that is used as a basis for the GPRS backbone is not 
dedicated to it, a malicious third party may present it
GPRS network by spoofing the address of a GPRS network. By executing commands 
that normally a legitimate network component does, the attack remains undetected until 
its results are noticeable. One of these attacks is relate
specifically to the exploitation of the GTP commands like PDP context create, PDP 
context delete, PDP context update, etc.. The attacker, who has access to the GPRS 
backbone network, is able to get information regarding the 
monitoring the GTP traffic, which is unencrypted. Possessing the appropriate 
information, the attacker may create and forward to the GGSN of the network PDP 
context create, delete and update commands.
 These commands overload the GG
contexts of the mobile users that are currently served by the network, resulting in DoS. 
In addition to malicious third parties that get access to the GPRS backbone network, the 
mobile users may represent a threat t
is located between the GGSN and the public Internet, they may get access to the 
network elements of the GPRS. Having access to these elements, a malicious MS may 
perform various attacks such as DoS, IP spo
privacy, etc. In addition, once the malicious MS gets access to the GPRS network, it 
may send massive amounts of data to unsuspecting users. Since the GPRS is a usage
based service, the mobile users under attack are
request for. [13] 
 Finally, a malicious MS in cooperation with a malicious server, which is located 
outside of the GPRS network, may also perform an over billing attack to a legitimate 
mobile subscriber. The malic
and invokes a download from the malicious server. Once the downloading begins, the 
malicious MS exits the session. The legitimate MS receives and gets charged for traffic 
that never requests for. The 
broadcasts of unsolicited data to legitimate mobile subscribers. The result is still the 
same: the subscribers are billed for data that they did not solicited and might not have 
wanted. [2] [8] 
 
2.5.3.2 Attacks on the SS7 technology
 If an attacker gets access to the GPRS backbone, he may also gain access to the 
signaling part of the network, and consequently to the network components that are 
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connected through it, such as the AuC, the HLR, the VLR
signaling part of the network, the attacker is able to listen to critical information for the 
mobile subscribers and the network operation such as the permanent identities of mobile 
users (IMSI), temporary identities (TMSI, TLLI
triplets (RAND, SRES, Kc), charging and billing data, etc. This is feasible because the 
signaling network (SS7), used in GSM/GPRS, does not support security measures.
 While listening to the critical information exch
perform DoS attacks to the GPRS signaling components or try to retrieve the sensitive 
information that they hold. For example, the AuC contains authentication information of 
the subscribed home users. A similar attack to that
SIM-card can also be carried out to retrieve the K
answer to a request made by a GPRS network component and returns valid triples to be 
used in the authentication procedure of the involved 
of authentication and integrity protection mechanisms in SS7, a malicious party may 
present itself as a network element and retrieve critical information that should be kept 
confidential. [8] [13] 
 
2.5.3.3 Attacks on the interface between network operators (G
 The Gp Interface is also vulnerable to attacks. This interface supports users 
roaming and conveys: 
• GTP traffic between a local network and the home network of a roaming 
user. 
• Roaming information between a G
Exchange (GRX) operator, which provides roaming services to cooperating 
networks. 
• Domain Name Server (DNS) information.
 The security threats to the G
resources and services, the authentication and authorization of users and actions, and the 
integrity and confidentiality of the data transferred. A vital security issue of the G
interface is the lack of security measures in the GTP protocol. [13]
 Trust and reliability between 
the level of security that each operator supports. A malicious operator has the ability to 
generate a sufficient amount of traffic directed at the border gateway, the SGSN or the 
GGSN of an operator under at
useless and unwanted traffic that consumes the majority of processing and 
communication resources. This may result in preventing subscribers from being able to 
roam, to be attached to the GPRS network, to 
addition, the attacker might perform attacks that target the GTP protocol, such as 
deleting or updating PDP contexts. These actions remove or modify the GTP tunnels 
specifications for Smart Metering 
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between the SGSN and the GGSN that are used for 
creating a DoS attack to users service.
 Since the GTP protocol provides no authentication for SGSNs and GGSNs, a 
malicious operator or an attacker with access to the G
SGSN. The bogus SGSN may c
GGSN. After the establishment of such tunnels, the network, where the legitimate 
GGSN belongs to, provides unauthorized Internet access to the attacker and, possibly, 
access to cooperating networks. In addi
context request messages to a legitimate SGSN, which is handling the GTP sessions of a 
mobile subscriber. In this way, the bogus SGSN takes the responsibility for handling the 
GTP sessions of the user. Thus, the att
the sessions, compromising end
 
2.5.3.4 Attacks on the interface to the public Internet (G
 The Gi interface connects the GPRS network to the public Internet and service 
providers that provide services to mobile subscribers. Since the applications of mobile 
subscribers can be whatever is carried by the Internet technology, the G
carry any type of traffic. 
 This fact exposes the GPRS network elements and the mobi
variety of threats that the public Internet encounters, such as viruses, Trojan horses, 
worms, and other malicious network traffic. A Trojan horse is a malicious piece of 
software hidden in a program that performs normal tasks. When sta
behaves as expected by the user and, then, stealthily executes the Trojan horse payload. 
On the other hand, worms are self
propagate from one computer/device to another via a network link. T
a Trojan horse or a worm usually is a DoS attack. This kind of attacks represents the 
largest threat to the Gi interface. Attackers may be able to flood the links that connect 
the GPRS network to external packet data networks with usele
prohibiting legitimate traffic to pass. The flood traffic might target to the MSs or the 
network elements causing availability problems to the followed network paths and the 
involved components. [13] 
 Apart from harm to the network ava
unprotected over the public Internet enabling anyone to read and/or manipulate them, 
and, thus, compromising user data confidentiality and integrity. In addition, an 
adversary may exploit the unprotected user related i
GPRS users. This is feasible because the GPRS billing system is based on the amount of 
traffic transmitted and received. The overbilling attack can be achieved by sending large 
e-mails from a malicious external network 
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transferred to the MSs. A virus may have the property to send dummy packets from the 
infected MS to a malicious server, without any notice to the user. [2] [8]
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2.6 GPRS solutions for smart 
 Many corporations dedicated to the smart meters development include a 
GPRS/GSM modem in the communication module of their smart meters. The following 
are some examples. 
 
2.6.1 AEM Three-phase electricity meter Enerlux T
 
 Some of its mechanical and equipment characteristics are the following: The 
meter operates in the 45 to 65 Hz frequency range in conditions of temperature between 
-40 to +60ºC. It includes sealable buttons for maximum demand reset and for blocking 
parameters changing for ensuring security goals according to the IEC 62056
standard. 
 The Enerlux T meter enables tariffying the energy in up to 4 time zones whose 
metering program is annual. The time zones metering program is annual. There can be 
defined up to 12 seasons i
defined, it being made up of 7 types of days chosen from the 24 types of days which can 
be defined. Every day there can be defined up to 12 switchings for each of the two 
sequences of the daily progr
 This meter is meant for 
electric energy metering either for 
residential consumers or for 
commercial and industrial agents 
that use multi-tariff systems for 
electric energy billing on lo
medium and high voltage networks. 
It is able to measure electrical 
consumption in both directions of 
energy circulation. 
 It is optionally provided 
with the GPRS modem since it can 
operate directly through the optical 
port and current loop according to 
the IEC 62056-21 standard for 
direct local data exchange. 
sses of telecommunication 
 
metering 
       
n a year. Within each season, the weekly program will be 
am. The programming resolution is of 30 minutes. The 
w, 
 
 
-21 
36 Theoretical analysis of security features and weaknesses of telecommunication 
 
meter is also provided with 8 cumulative registers for 8 demands which can be 
programmed with 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 or 60 min measuring time interval. [44]
 
For further information on the Enerlux T meter go 
 
2.6.2 Digital Multi-tariff meter DMTZ
 The DMTZ-XC is a multi
industrial applications. It incorporates an integrated tariff switching clock with an 
accuracy of +/-5ppm synchronize
meter operates in 50 Hz frequency within a 
it presents a class 1 accuracy according to IEC 62053
Interfaces 
 The plugable communication module for
implements many communication technologies. The GPRS/GSM is the first one and 
permits connection with the worldwide GSM network. Another option that can be used 
as its communication protocol is the IEC62056
complemented with DLMS/COSEM protocol for implementing the application layer. In 
any case, 19200 is the maximum baud rate that can be reached. [46]
 
For further information on the DMTZ
 This meter operates 2 tariff registers 
but it can implement up to 4, it is an optional 
feature offered by the manufacturer. 
optional to incorporate a four
display for simultaneous presentation of two 
of those energy registers. Finally, another of 
the options to incorporate is the maximum 
demand measurement and load profile 
making possible to perform up 
registering with a registering period length of 
15 minutes with three different types of 
registering: power, energy or energy feed.
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3. ZIGBEE/802.15.4
 
3.1 Introduction 
 ZigBee is a trademark of the ZigBee Alliance, an association of companies set 
up by Philips Honeywell and Ivensys working together to enable reliable, cost
low-power, wirelessly networked, monitoring and control products 
global standard. 
 The ZigBee specification provides a low
networking technology. The low cost allows this technology to be widely deployed in 
wireless control and monitoring applications such as Automated Met
(AMM) which is the one we are interested in, the low power
with smaller batteries, and the mesh networking provides high reliability and larger 
range. 
 As shown in figure below, ZigBee specifies the upper layers and I
standard specifies the lower protocol layers: the physical layer (PHY), and the medium 
access control (MAC) portion of the data link layer (DLL)
end manufacturer has to define the final application software for impleme
application. 
 
Figure 3.1. ZigBee/802.15.4 Communication stack [80]
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3.2 Physical layer overview
 The physical layer of 802.15.4 standard establishes different operative frequency 
bands within the ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical) band 
geographic area as it can be seen in the following chart:
 
Figure 3.2. Operational frequency bands on 802.15.4 PHY [36]
 
 The ZigBee standard uses the 868 MHz channel, which is exclusively used in 
Europe at a 20 Kbps rate. Its center fre
comprises from 868 MHz to 868.6 MHz. It employs direct sequence spread spectrum 
(DSSS) with binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) used for chip modulation of 15
obtaining a 300 kchip/s rate and differential encod
following the whole process for each bit from the PPDU (PHY Protocol Data Unit) as 
the following figure shows:
 
Figure 3.3. Modulation and spreading functions [35]
 
 The PHY provides an interface between the MAC sublayer
channel, via RF firmware and hardware. It includes a management entity called the 
PLME (PHY Layer Management Entity) that provides management service interfaces 
through which layer management functions may be invoked. It is also maintaining 
database of managed object belonging to the PHY called the PHY PAN Information 
Base (PIB). The following figure shows the described structure: [35]
 
specifications for Smart Metering 
 
depending of the 
 
quency is at 868.3 MHz and its bandwidth 
ing used for data symbol encoding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-chip PN 
 
 and the radio 
a 
39 Theoretical analysis of security features and weakne
specifications for Smart Metering
 
 
Figure 3.4. PHY reference model [35]
Two services are provided by the PHY accessed through two SAPs:
• The PHY Data SAP (PD
between peer MAC sublayer entities.
• The PHY Management Service (PLME
capability for transporting management commands between the MLME of the 
MAC and the PLME of the PHY.
All characteristics and functions provided by the PHY can be summarized into:
• Transmitting and receiving packets through the radio channel
• Channel selection
• Energy detection
• Activation and deactivation of the radio transceiver
• The Link Quality Indicator (LQI) w
quality of the received packets using signal
• The Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) for reporting the current state of 
the radio channel in order to know when it is free [35]
 
 
3.3 MAC layer overview
 The MAC sublayer handles all access to the physical radio channel and is 
responsible for all the following tasks:
• Generating the network beacons if the device is a coordinator
• Synchronizing to the beacons
• Supporting PAN association disassociation
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• Supporting device security
• Employing the CSMA
• Handling and maintaining the GTS mechanism
• Providing a reliable link between to MAC peer entities
 
 The MAC sublayer provides an interface between the Service Specific 
Convergence Sublayer (SSCS) and the PHY. It includes a management entity called the 
MLME that entity provides the service interfaces through which layer management 
functions may be invoked. The MLME is also responsible for maintaining a database of 
managed objects pertaining to the MAC sublayer called the MAC sublayer PIB.
Figure 3.5. MAC sublayer reference model [35]
 As it can be seen in the previous figure, the MAC sublayer provides two 
services, accessed through two SAPs:
• The MAC data service
Sublayer (MCPS) data SAP (MCPS
protocol data units (SPDUs) between SSCS peer entities.
• The MAC management service
allows the transport of management commands between 
and the MLME 
 These two services provide the interface between the SSCS and the PHY, via the 
PD-SAP and PLME-SAP interfaces. In addition to these external interfaces, an implicit 
interface also exists between the MLME and the MCPS tha
the MAC data service. [35]
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3.4 Network layer overview
 Two entities are conforming the ZigBee Network layer as seen in the following 
figure each one with its own functions:
• The Network Layer Data Entity (NLDE):
transmitting NPDUs to the appropriate device which is either the final 
destination or the next step towards the final destination in the communication 
chain 
• The Network Layer Management Entity(NLME):
many operations which are:
 
 Establ
 Joining and leaving a network
 Configuring the stack for operation of a new device
 Assign addresses to devices joining the network (only for Full 
Function Devices (FFD))
 One-
 Routing frames to their destinations (only for Full Function 
Devices (FFD))
Figure 3.6. ZigBee Network Layer [36]
 As it can be seen in figure 3.7, a ZigBee wireless meter
of two parts: the Database Management System and the cluster 
composed by routers, end devices and a network coordinator. The topology of the 
ZigBee network may be mesh or star rather than a cluster tree if it fits better the 
objectives of the network designer. The routers and coordinator must be 
devices (FFD) while the end devices can be reduced function devices (RFD). [35]
 After collected the required information from users, an end device transports it 
to the relevant FFD. A FFD acts as a router whose function is to synchronize ser
other devices/FFD and one of them shall be the overall coordinator of the network. End 
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devices and the collector intermediately form a star network locally. The collector that 
can be connected with 254 end devices at most is responsible for the ma
star network. Data stored in collectors is transported to the coordinator, which manages 
the overall ZigBee network such as initialization, association and disassociation of 
devices. The coordinator communicates with computer 
Figure 3.7. Architecture of wireless meter
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3.5 Application layer overview
 The ZigBee Application layer consists of the Application Support sublayer 
(APS), ZigBee Device Object (ZDO) and Application Framework contai
manufacturer-defined application objects each interfacing an endpoint indexed from 1 to 
240. The following figure shows the describe scheme:
Figure 3.8. ZigBee Application Layer [80]
 The Application Support sublayer (APS) provides an inte
network layer and the application layer through a general set of services and is formed 
by two parts: 
• The Application Support sublayer Data Entity (APSDE):
the data transmission service for the transport of application PDUs b
or more devices of the network, supports fragmentation and reassembly of 
packets and provides reliable data transport.
• The Application Support sublayer Management Entity (APSME):
provides security services, binding of devices, establishment a
group addresses and also maintains a database of managed objects
 The Application Framework is the environment for hosting manufacturer
defined application objects on ZigBee devices. It uses the APSDE
executing standard network functions and managing protocol layers in the ZigBee 
device. The application objects that it contains, represent different application types that 
can be defined in a ZigBee device, each one of them addressed by an 8
These application types can either be profiles or objects. The first ones, are agreements 
for processing actions that enable applications to create an interoperable application 
between applications that reside in different devices and they are identified with a 
clusterId. The application objects (APOs), encapsulate a set of attributes and provide 
functionalities to implement an application.
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 The last part of the layer is the ZDO. It implements in all network nodes and 
provides a base class of functionality that provides an inter
objects, the device profile and the APS implementing a four
communication functions: Device and Service Discovery, end device bind and unbind, 
binding table management and network management.
 During the Device Discovery ZigBee devices initiate queries either broadcast or 
unicast to discover other ZigBee devices on the network. On the other hand, on the 
Service Discovery process, services available on endpoints at the receiving device are 
discovered by external devices. [37]
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3.6 Security on ZigBee
 
3.6.1 802.15.4 MAC layer security
 The 802.15.4 security layer is handled at the MAC layer, below application 
control. The application specifies its security requirements by setting the appropriate 
control parameters into the radio stack. If an application does not set any parameters, 
then security is not enabled by default.
 An application has a choice of security suites that control the type of security 
protection that is provided for the transmitt
set of security properties and guarantees, and ultimately different packet formats. The 
802.15.4 specification defines eight different security suites, presented below. We can 
broadly classify the suites by t
(AES-CTR), authentication only (AES
(AES-CCM). Each category that supports authentication comes in three variants 
depending on the size of the MAC that 
security suite and has its own name. The MAC can be either 4, 8, or 16 bytes long. The 
tradeoff is a larger packet size for increased protection against authenticity attacks. 
Additionally, for each suite th
replay protection. 
 An application indicates its choice of security suites based on source and 
destination addresses. 802.15.4 radio chips have an access control list (ACL) that 
controls what security suite and keying information to use. Compliant devices may 
support up to 255 ACL entries. When replay protection is invoked, the security material 
also includes a high water mark of the most recently received packet's identifier. As a 
part of the interface for sending packets, the application must specify a boolean 
indicating whether security is enabled. If no security is requested, the packet is sent out 
as it is. If security is enabled, the MAC layer looks up the destination address in its ACL 
table. If there is a match ACL entry, the security suite, key, and nonce specified in that 
ACL entry are used to encrypt and/or authenticate the outgoing packet, and the flags 
field on outgoing packet is set accordingly. If the destination address is not listed in
ACL table, a default ACL entry is used instead; the default ACL entry is similar to the 
other ACL entries except that it matches all destination addresses. If the default ACL 
entry is empty and the application has requested security, the MAC layer ret
error code. On packet reception, MAC layer consults the flags field in the packet to 
determine if any security suites have been applied to that packet. If no security was 
used, the packet is passed as it is to the application. Otherwise, MAC layer 
similar process to find the appropriate ACL entry, this time based on the sender's 
address. It then applies the appropriate security suite, key, and replay counter to the 
incoming packet, presenting the application with an error message if no approp
ACL entry could be located. [35]
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3.6.1.1 Security objectives
There are four defined objectives in the 802.15.4 MAC layer security:
• Access control:
devices from which can receive frames. This mechanism
unauthorized devices to communicate to the network.
• Data encryption:
encryption algorithms. Only the devices that are sharing the network secret key 
are able to decrypt messages and commun
• Frame integrity:
invalid intruder and to provide assurance that the messages from the source 
device have not been manipulated by an invalid intruder.
• Sequential freshness:
accepted by the receiver and to ensure that the frame that has arrived is the 
recent one and not a replayed one. This is achieved by which a receiver checks 
the recent counter and rejects the frame which has the coun
less than the previous obtained counter value. [35]
 
3.6.1.2 Security modes 
 Three security modes are defined in the specification to achieve different 
security objectives: unsecured mode, ACL mode, and secured mode. Figure 3.9 shows 
the format of the ACL entry, and an ACL list includes multiple ACL entries. In Figure 
3.9, the address field is composed of the source and the destination addresses. The last 
Initial Vector (IV) and the replay counter are the same except that the last IV i
the source device when it sends the packet, and the replay counter is used by the 
destination device to maintain the high water mark to avoid the replay attack. The key is 
a symmetric key shared between the devices. [35]
The three available security modes are described as follows:
• Unsecured mode:
applications that do not require any kind of security at all.
• ACL mode: 
as in Figure 3.9. In the ACL mode, limited security services are provided via the 
ACL. In this mode only frames received from devices present in the ACL are 
accepted. However, no cryptographic encryption of the data is provided in ACL 
mode so only the first field of the ACL entry is used in this mode.
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Figure 3.9. ACL entry format [30] 
 
 This mode is to be used for those low cost 
 
In this mode each device includes its own ACL with en
 
 prevents the 
 
s used by 
 
tries 
 
47 Theoretical analysis of security features and weakne
specifications for Smart Metering
 
 
• Secured mode: 
the corresponding security suite in use. It provides the confidentiality of the 
frame along with the message integrity, access cont
All ACL entry field are used and the security suite on the entry is the one 
implemented. [35] 
 
3.6.1.3 Security suites 
 Security suites may be used when a device is operating in secured mode. A 
security suite consists of a set
security services. The security suite name indicates the symmetric cryptography 
algorithm, mode, and integrity code bit length. The bit length of the integrity code is 
less than or equal to the block siz
probability that a random guess of the integrity code would be correct. This bit length 
does not correspond to the strength of the underlying algorithm. For all security suites in 
this standard, the algorithm
device that implements security shall support the AES CCM
or more additional security suites. Each security suite is specified by a 1 octet value as 
shown in following table; an identifier of 0x00 indicates that secured mode is not used.
 
Identifier Security suite name
0x00 None
0x01 AES-CTR
0x02 AES-CCM
0x03 AES-CCM
0x04 AES-CCM
0x05 AES-CBC-MAC
0x06 AES-CBC-
0x07 AES-CBC-
Figure 3.10. 802.15.4 Security suites [35]
 
3.6.1.4 AES-CTR suite 
 This suite provides confidentiality protection using
counter mode. To encrypt data under this mode, the sender break the cleartext packet to 
be sent into 16-byte blocks p
ci = pi (+) Ek(x
sses of telecommunication 
 
This mode provides all the security services according to 
rol and sequential freshness. 
 of operations to perform on MAC frames that provide 
e of the symmetric algorithm and determines the 
 used shall be advanced encryption standard (AES). Each 
- 64 security suite and zero 
 
Security services
Access 
control 
Data 
encryption 
Frame 
integrity
    
 X X  
-128 X X X 
-64 X X X 
-32 X X X 
-128 X  X 
MAC-64 X  X 
MAC-32 X  X 
 
 the AES block cipher with 
1..pn and computes it the following way: 
i) where xi is each block varying counter
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The recipient recovers the original plaintext by computing:
 Obviously, the recipient needs the x
original payload. This counter, also called nonce, is composed of a static field, the 
sender’s address and 3 separate counters: a 4 byte counter frame that identifies the 
packet, a 1 byte key counter field and a 2 byte block counter that numbers the 16 byte 
blocks within the packet as shown the following figure: [35]
 
Figure 3.11. Format of the input x
 The frame counter is maintained by the hardware radio. The sender increments 
this counter after encrypting a new packet. As soon as it gets to the maximum value, the 
radio returns an error code and no more encryptions ar
one byte counter under the application’s control. It can be incremented in the case that 
the frame counter reaches its maximum possible value. The requirement is that the 
nonce must never repeat within the lifetime of any s
and key counter is to prevent nonce reuse. The 2 byte block counter ensures that each 
block will use a different nonce value and it is not necessary for the sender to include it 
in the packet because the receiver can in
 
Figure 3.12. Formatting of the data field for AES
 To sum up, as shown in the previous figure, the sender includes the key counter, 
the frame counter and the encrypted payload into the data payload field of t
The complete scheme of the CTR mode implement
specifications for Smart Metering 
 
pi = ci (+) Ek(xi) 
i counter value in order to reconstruct the 
 
i to the block cipher for the AES
 
e possible. The key counter is a 
ingle key, and the role of the frame 
fer its value for each block. [35]
-CTR [30]
 
ation is shown in Figure 3.13.
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3.6.1.5 AES-CBC-MAC suite
 In this security suite the cryptographic operations consist on performing AES
CBC-MAC authentication on the
128 bit integrity codes. Access control and frame integrity are provided in this suite. 
 The CBC-MAC algorithm makes use of an underlying block cipher to provide 
data integrity on input data. The block c
output vectors of the block size using a cryptographic key. Being 
once a key has been selected. The vector of length equal to the block size, 
the output of the block cipher wh
represented as follows: 
O = e(D) 
 The data to be authenticated is grouped into contiguous blocks, 
each one with length equal to the block size. If the number of data bits is not a multip
of the block size, then the final input block will be a partial block of data, left justified, 
with zeroes appended to form a full block. The calculation of the MIC is given by the 
following equations where (+) represents the XOR of two vectors. [35]
O1 = e(D1) 
O2 = e(D2 (+) O1) 
sses of telecommunication 
 
Figure 3.13. AES-CTR suite [35] 
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O3 = e(D3 (+) O2) 
….. 
On = e(Dn (+) On–1) 
 The MIC is selected from 
capable of selecting the leftmost 
a multiple of 8. A block diagr
 
Figure 3.14. AES
 
 
 
3.6.1.6 AES-CCM suite 
 The CTR-CBC-MAC (CCM) is an authenticate
using a block cipher with 128 bit block size (AES). The CCM 
elements: the payload, to be both encrypted and authenticated, 
header, to be authenticated but not encrypted, and 
and the associated data. The CCM provides both the authentic
specifications for Smart Metering 
On. Devices that implement CBC
M bits of On as the MIC, where 32 < M 
am of the MIC generation is given in the following figure:
-CBC-MAC suite [35] 
-and-encrypt block cipher mode, 
requires three input 
associated data as the 
a nonce to be assigned to the payload 
ation and encryption and 
 
-MAC shall be 
< 128 and M is 
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uses the techniques of the CTR for encryption and the CBC
The CCM is composed of two methods: 
generation of the MIC first and then the encryption, and 
requires first the decryption of the ciphertext and then the verification of the MIC.
 A sender requires an input of {
N is a nonce of 15 – L octets, 
where 0≤l(m)<28L to be encoded in a field of 
data consisting of a string of l(a) octets where 
authenticated, but not encrypted, and are not included in the output of thi
Furthermore, they can be used to authenticate plaintext headers that affect the 
interpretation of the message. For authentication, the authentication field 
using the CBC-MAC. [35] 
 From B0, B1, ... Bn being a sequence of blocks for th
block of: 
 where F is one octet in length with the information:
F={Reserved
 N is the nonce with 
Adata-bit is 0 if l(a) = 0 and
M, the size of the authentication field, and 
4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, or 16 octets, has an encoding field of 
off between message expansion and the probability that an attacker can undetectably 
modify a message. L can either be 2 to 8 octets, has an encoding field of 
requires a trade-off between the maximum message size and the size of the nonce based 
on applications. If l(a) > 0 and consequently 
authentication data are added including 
l(a) < 216-28, the length field is encoded as 2 octets. If 216
field is encoded as 6 octets consisting of the octets 0 x ff, 0 x fe, and 4 octets encoding 
l(a). If 232≤ l(a) < 264, the length field is encoded as 10 octets consisting of the octets 0 
x ff, 0 x ff, and 8 octets encoding 
 The blocks encoding 
with a and splitting the result into 16 octet blocks, padding the last block with zeroes if 
necessary. These blocks are appended to the first block 
authentication blocks have been added, add th
formed by splitting the message 
zeroes if necessary. If m 
sequence of blocks B0, B1, ... 
sses of telecommunication 
 
-MAC for authentication. 
generation-encryption that requires the 
decryption-
K, N, m, a}, where K is the AES encryption key, 
m is the message consisting of a string of 
L octets, and a is additional authenticated 
0≤l(a)<264. Additional data 
e CBC-MAC. Consisting a 
B0={F, N, l(m)} 
 
-bit, Adata-bit,(M-2)/2, L-1} 
15-L octets in length, and l(m) has L octets in length. The 
 1 if l(a) > 0. The CCM mode has two parameter choices: 
L, the size of the length field. 
(M-2)/2, and involves a trade
Adata-bit=1, one or more blocks of 
l(a) and a encoded in a reversible manner. If 0 < 
-28≤ l(a) < 232, the length 
l(a). 
a are formed by concatenating the string that encodes 
B0. After the additional 
e message blocks. The message blocks are 
m into 16 octet blocks, padding the last block with 
is an empty string, no blocks are added. The result is a 
Bn. The CBC-MAC is now computed by: 
X1= Ek(B0) 
verification that 
 
l(m) octets 
a are 
s mode. 
T is computed 
M can either be 
-
L-1, and 
l(a) 
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 The CTR mode is used for encryption, and key stream blocks are defined as 
follows: 
where 
and 
F={ Reserved
 N is the nonce with 
The message is encrypted by XORing the octets of message 
octets of S1||S2||S3, ... , and note that 
authentication value is obtained as follows: 
is m(+) S||U. 
 For decryption, the receiver needs the encryption key 
additional authenticated data 
the key stream is generated to recover the message 
additional authentication data is then used to re
check T. If the T value is not correct, the receiver sh
except for the fact that T 
decrypted message, the value 
 
3.6.1.7 PIB Security material
 The information stored in the MAC PIB is
suite selected. The symmetric key is the AES key for this ACL entry that shall be used 
to perform exactly one of (CTR encryption) or (CCM encryption and authentication) or 
(CBC-MAC authentication).
 The frame counter i
field in the MAC payload of the MAC frame. This counter is incremented each time a 
secure frame is transmitted. This counter will not roll over. This value helps to ensure 
that the CCM nonce is un
freshness. 
 The key sequence counter is a counter that is fixed by the higher layer and that 
shall be included in the payload field in the MAC payload of the MAC frame. The key 
specifications for Smart Metering 
Xi+1= Ek(Xi(+)Bi) for i = 1, ... , n 
T= first-M-octets(Xn+1) 
Si = EK(Ai) for i = 0, 1, 2, ... 
Ai ={F, N, Counter i} 
-bits (2 bits), 0 (3 bits), L-1 (3 bits)} 
15-L octets in length, and Counter has L 
m (+) S, where S=
S0 is not used to encrypt the message. The 
U= T (+) first-M-octets(S0). The ciphertext 
K, the nonce 
a, and the encrypted and authenticated message 
m and the value T. The message and 
-compute the CBC-MAC value and 
all not reveal any information 
is incorrect. In particular, the receiver shall not reveal the 
T, or any other information. [35] 
 
 dependent on the individual security 
 
s the running counter that shall be included in the payload 
ique and allows the recipient to use the counter to ensure 
 
octets in length. 
l(m) 
N, the 
c. First, 
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sequence counter can be used, for instance, if the frame counter is exhausted. This value 
helps to ensures that the CCM nonce is unique and allows the recipient to use the 
counter to ensure freshness.
 The optional external frame counter and optional external key sequence cou
are fields that may be stored in the ACL entry that represent the values of the last 
received frame counter and key sequence counter, respectively, in secure frames 
corresponding to this ACL entry. If the optional external frame counter and optional 
external key sequence counter fields are included in the ACL entry, the MAC will use 
them to verify the sequential freshness of received secure frames. [35]
 
3.6.2 ZigBee specification security
 
3.6.2.1 Security keys 
 128-bit symmetric keys are used by ZigB
network. For unicast communication between APL entities two ZigBee devices share a 
Link Key (LK). It is used as the basis of security services in High Security mode (HS). 
All the devices on the network share a Network 
broadcast communications. The NK is used as the basis of security services in Standard 
Security mode (SS). A Master Key (MK) is used to establish a key and it is shared 
pairwise between two ZigBee devices.
 The security keys
establishment, key transport or pre
Center of the network sends the key to the device. Key Establishment is the method that 
is used to establish a pairwise key between two devices. Note that for this method, a 
pre-shared key is required between two devices. Pre
device acquires the key before joining the network.
 In order to avoid reuse of keys across different securi
derive different keys from the LK. Uncorrelated keys can be derived using a one
function so that execution of different security protocols can be logically separated. 
Three types of secret keys can be derived from a LK: a
or a Key-Load Key. The derivation of these keys, except Data Key, requires 
computation of a Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication Code (HMAC). All the 
derived keys must share the associated frame counters. [29]
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3.6.2.2 Trust center 
 In each secure ZigBee network, there exists a unique Trust Center (TC) 
application which is trusted by all the devices in the network. TC distributes keys as 
part of network and end-to
applications devices are using MK, whereas in low
using NK to initiate secure communication with TC. MK and NK can be obtained by 
either pre-installation or a kind of key transport which is called in
transport. The interaction between a ZigBee device and the TC for different purposes is 
given in the table at next page: [29]
Figure 3.15. ZigBee device and TC interaction [29]
 Security Modes TC can be configured to operate in either Standard Security 
mode (SS) or High Security mode (HS). In SS mode, the TC is required to maintain the 
SNK and control the policies of network admittance. In HS mode, the TC is required to 
maintain a list of all the devices in the network, all the relevant keys (MKs, LKs, 
HSNKs) and control the policies of network admittance. As a result, the required 
memory of the TC grows with the number of the devices in the network in HS mode, 
but not in SS mode. In addition, the implementation of the Symmetric
Exchange and the Mutual Entity Authentication protocols are mandatory in HS mode. 
[29] 
 
3.6.2.3 Network layer security
 When a NWK layer frame needs to be secured, it is secured by using AES 
encryption/authentication in the CCM mode of operation. The upper layers control the 
security processing operations by setting up the security keys, frame counters and the 
security level. 
 As shown in Figure 3.16, the secured NWK layer frame is the one that includes 
an Auxiliary header, and it is indicated in the Frame Control field of the 
header.  
 The Auxiliary Header includes the Frame Counter, which has the purpose of 
providing frame freshness and preventing processing of duplicate frames. A Secured 
Payload does not need to have an encrypted payload in the case only integrity pro
is applied. 
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 The Security Level field in the Security Control part of the Auxiliary Header 
indicates which security level is applied. The level can be None, MIC (integrity 
protection only, with three different MIC lengths: MIC
(encryption only), and ENC
different MIC lengths: ENC
Integrity Code (MIC) is computed using the NWK header, the Auxiliary Header and the 
encrypted payload. 
 An interesting security precaution here is hiding the security level in the last step 
of Outgoing Frames Processing. Although the rationale behind this action is not defined 
in the specification, it is clear that it is not a significant protectio
eight choices. [29] 
Figure 3.16. NWK layer secured frame structure [29]
 
3.6.2.4 Application layer security
 When an APL layer frame needs to be secured, the APS sublayer is in charge to 
cover those security requests and it is secu
in the CCM mode of operation. The APS provides an interface between NWK and APL 
layers through a general set of service for use of ZDO and Application Objects. The 
upper layers issue primitives to APS sublayer to 
Security includes the following services:
• The Establish Key
Link Key (LK) between two ZigBee devices. The method used for key 
establishment is Symmetric
(MK) is the trust information used in the key establishment.
• The Transport Key
transport either a NK, LK or MK.
• The Update Device
ZigBee router in order to inform the TC about an update on a device status.
• The Remove Device 
his children should be removed from the network.
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red by using AES encryption/authentication 
use its services. The APS Layer 
 
 service, which is the mechanism for establishing a 
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• The Request Key
or the end-to-end application MK from another device.
• The Switch Key
devices to switch to the alternate NK.
• The Entity Authentication
devices based on a sha
• The Permission Configuration Table (PCT) 
which devices have authorization to perform which commands and if security 
based on LK is necessary.
 The services of the APS sublayer are issued in APS Command Frames. The 
structure of the APS Command Frames is given in Figure. XX. The first two fields of 
all the frames, the Frame Counter and the APS Counter, form the APS Header. The 
remaining fields form the APS Payload, whose first field APS Command Identifier 
indicates the type of the command frame.
 There are some important points regarding the APS command frames. Key 
Establishment command frames are sent unsecured. The Status field of the Update
Device command indicates the security mode (SS/HS), the security of the frame 
(Secured/Unsecured), and the type of the join (Join/Rejoin); unless the device is 
leaving. Partner Address field of the Request
type is NK or TCLK (TCLK means LK of the TC). The MK/LK pairs and the relevant 
information are stored in the APS Layer Information Base (AIB). [29]
Figure 3.17. APS Command frames [29]
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3.6.2.4.1 Symmetric-Key Key Establishment Protocol
 In the Symmetric-Key Key Establishment (SKKE) protocol, an initiator device 
U establishes a LK, or LK
MKUV. In the first two messages, the devices exchange their 16
last two messages, the devices exchange the data they have computed using the 
challenges and the device identities. N
takes two parameters: the shared secret bit string, and the length of the keying data to be 
generated. After verifying that they received the correct values, they use another value 
as the LK that both of them can compute. The Data field in a SKKE frame stores the 
value of either a challenge or a MAC tag. [29]
Figure 3.18. SKKE Protocol (H: Hash function, MAC: HMAC function, ||: 
Concatenation, 0x: Hexadecimal) [29]
 
3.6.2.4.2 Mutual Entity Authentication pro
 In the Mutual Entity Authentication (MEA) protocol, an initiator device U and a 
responder device V mutually authenticate each other based on a secret key (NK). The 
devices authenticate each other by using random challenges with responses based on a 
sses of telecommunication 
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NK. In the first two messages, the devices exchange their challenges. Note that, OFC 
stands for the Outgoing Frame Counter of the device. In the last two messages, the 
devices exchange the data they have computed using their information and their frame 
counter values. They use the frame counter values they received and their previous 
knowledge to verify that they received the correct values, and thereby authenticate each 
other. [29] 
Figure 3.19. MEA Protocol (MAC: HMAC function, ||: Concatenation, 0x: 
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3.7 Possible attacks on 802.15.4 security
 
3.7.1 Same-nonce attack
 There is a chance that in a sender’s ACL entry table, there are entries with the 
same key and the same nonce. If such a thing happens, a security attack is pos
Note that the nonce is also used as the frame counter. The risky scenario happens when 
there are two plaintexts (P1
and the same nonce (N), and an attacker can obtain C
P2. Then the adversary can obtain P
and the keys are the same although the adversary does not know the key. The adversary 
may obtain much useful information from P
situations such as power failure, sleep mode, and etc. Same keys happen in many 
situations too such as using broadcasting key, using grouping key, and etc. [31]
 
3.7.2 Replay-protection attack
 In the IEEE 802.15.4 specification, the replayed mess
replay protection mechanism known as sequential freshness. This is achieved by which 
a receiver checks the recent counter and rejects the frame which has the counter value 
equal to or less than the previous obtained counter. However
mechanism is subjected to another attack, called Replay
kind of Denial-of-Service attacks. Replay
attacker is capable of sending many frames containing diff
a receiver, who performs replay protection and raises the replay counter up as the 
largest frame counter in the receiver so far. Then, when a normal station sends a frame 
with a reasonable size of frame counter that is smaller
maintained at the receiver, the frame will be discarded for the replay
and consequently the service will be denied. [31]
 
3.7.3 ACK attack 
 There is no integrity protection provided on ACK frames. When a sender s
frame, it can request an ACK frame from the receiver by setting the bit flags in the 
outgoing data frame. 
 The eavesdropper can forge the ACK frame by using the un
number from the data frame. If an attacker does not want a particu
received by the receiver, he can send interference to the receiver at the same time when 
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the sender is sending the data frame. This leads to reject the frame. The adversary can 
then send a forged ACK frame fooling the sender that the receiv
the frame. Therefore, a sender cannot be sure if the received frame came from the 
receiver or another node even if the receiver received the ACK frame. [31]
 
3.7.4 Jamming attack 
 A jamming attack is the wireless equivalent of a De
It is simple and effective, especially in single frequency networks. It aims to weaken or 
zero-out the availability of system services. At PHY layer, a jamming attack can be 
easily carried out by continuously sending out radio
transmission power. All needed is a PHY compliant transmitter. What makes the 
ZigBee networks even more vulnerable to jamming attacks is their extremely low 
transmission power. [33] 
 
3.7.5 Exhaustion 
 Exhaustion attacks are a
availability. One common exhaustion attack is to exploit some initiation or connection 
procedures, like association procedures, that require both nodes involved to store some 
state values in their memory.
within its reach, notwithstanding the protocol demands that each device be associated 
only with one coordinator. [33]
 A more powerful attack can be launched by a compromised coordinator, who 
allures large number of nodes to associate with it by appearing to be a coordinator with 
high link quality (LQ) or low level in the tree. After that, it can simply send out 
deliberately configured beacons to force all the devices to stay active for most of the 
time, resulting in quick battery depletions at those devices. [33]
Figure 3.20. Exhaustion attack [33]
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 type of DoS attacks from the point view of service 
 A device can try to associate with all the coordinators 
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3.7.6 Collision 
 Collision attacks are often launched by deviating from the protocols rather than 
blindly as in the jamming attacks. An attacker can sele
especially to some sensitive control and management frames. For example, collision 
with an ACK frame will cause the sender to back off exponentially; collision with an 
association response frame will force the device to start the
procedure from the very beginning; and collision with several beacon frames from a 
beacon enabled coordinator will cause its children to get orphaned. By creating 
collisions selectively, an attacker can make the attacks look like ran
 
3.7.7 Unfairness 
 Unfairness attacks can substantially degrade the network performance, though 
normally not shut down the whole network. Media access points are one of the most 
vulnerable places where unfairness attacks can be launched. Unslotted CSMA
used for channel access in non
access during the contention access period (CAP) in beacon enabled mode. In beacon 
enabled mode, a cheating nod
beacon, by simply skipping the back
beacon enabled mode, a cheating node can also get some priority in accessing the 
channel by using smaller back
messages one after another, a cheating node has a good chance of keeping the control of 
the channel. Other nodes have little chance of transmitting their messages before the 
cheating node finishes all its transmi
sses of telecommunication 
 
ctively create collisions, 
 multistep association 
dom collisions. [33]
 
Figure 3.21. Collision attack [33] 
 
-beacon enabled mode and slotted CSMA
e can capture the channel immediately after it receives a 
-off process as well as the CCA process. In non
-off period and/or CCA duration. By transmitting 
ssions. This problem comes because of the fact 
 
-CA is 
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that, unlike in 802.11, no strict mechanism is used in 802.15.4 to prevent other 
transmission from happening between a frame and its corresponding ACK. [33]
Figure 3.22. Unfairness attack [33]
 
3.8 Possible attacks to ZigBee NWK layer
 
3.8.1 Route disruption in the cluster
 As shown in the figure below, an attacker can repeatedly send association 
requests to a coordinator, each time with a different forged IEEE device address. The
coordinator under attack will soon reach its 
association request will be rejected by the coordinator. Such attacks are especially 
powerful when launched at a small level of the tree, as closer as possible to the roo
the tree. [33] 
Figure 3.23. Route disruption in the cluster tree attack (compromised device) [33]
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3.8.2 Route disruption in the cluster
coordinator 
 A compromised coordinator can perform another type of attack. The coordinato
A can capture the devices around it by announcing itself as an extremely good 
coordinator if possible at very small level in the tree. After attracted large number of 
devices, the coordinator can then perform various attacks such as dropping or 
selectively dropping packets, broadcasting specially configured beacons to keep all 
those devices from entering low energy consumption states, and controlling the sub
formation. In the figure at next page, this kind of attack is illustrated.
 
Figure 3.24. Route disruption in the cluster tree attack (compromised coordinator) [33]
 
3.8.3 Loop in the cluster
 A tree is normally loop
to form a loop among its children. The problem lies in the fact that
power to assign a short address (together with other cluster
Lm and current level Li) to the device asking for association. This is necessary for 
forming a useful cluster-tree, but problems including routi
 In the figure below, the left part is the logical structure of a cluster
= 2 and Lm = 4, the middle part is the logical structure of a cluster
Lm = 3, and the right part is the physical structure of a 
numbers within the circle are the short addresses assigned during associations. In the 
right part, the malicious coordinator (with short address 1) can manipulate the 
associations and assign short addresses 9, 10, 13 to the th
believe that they have the triplet (parent, 
3), respectively. All the triplets are valid with respect to cluster
algorithm, so the devices cannot find anything abnor
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-free. However, it is possible for a malicious coordinator 
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-tree parameters such as 
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-tree with 
certain network area. All the 
ree devices, and make them 
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The Cm and Lm are values passed down from coordinator, and no authentication or 
verification is required. Therefore, all the triplets are just good enough to all the devices. 
After the associations of all the three devices,
sending a packet to any of the three devices, indicating the destination short address is 
14 or 15. According to cluster
devices. [33] 
Figure 3.25. Loop in the clus
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-tree routing, the packet will loop among the three 
ter-tree [33] 
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3.9 ZigBee solutions
3.9.1 Freescale solution
3.9.1.1 Freescale electronic three
 Polyphase electricity meters are used both in residential and commercial smart 
metering applications and they represent an important part of smart grids deployment. 
These meters are capable of measuring active, reactive and apparent energy and include 
flash upgrade, connectivity and anti
Figure 3.26. Polyphase electricity m
 As shown in the previous figure, only some of the parts of the complete metring 
diagram are provided by Freescale, but they are the most important ones:
• MCF51EM256:
V1 MCU with embed
peripherals 
• 56F802X: A digital signal controller in PLM
• MC13224V:
external antenna in order to implement a ZigBee application.
 The smart meter mete
and includes tamper detection features and a high
Its comprehensive reference design contains all necessary hardware and software 
resources to make smart metering ap
 
For further information on Freescale ZigBee solution go to: 
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-phase electricity meter 
-tampering security features. 
eter diagram [39] 
 A smart meter 32-bit SoC. It is equipped with ColdFire 
ded LCD controller, 16-bit ADC and metrology specific 
 
 A RF Low Power platform in package that needs only an 
 
r is specially optimized for smart metering applications 
-precision Real Time Clock (iRTC). 
plications deployment quick and easy. [39]
www.freescale.com
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3.9.2 Texas Instruments solution
3.9.2.1 CC2530 ZigBee SoC solution
 The CC2530 is a low 
point to point and star or ZigBee PRO mesh network applications. There are four 
different version of this SoC: CC22530
corresponding amount in KB of flash 
performance RF transceiver and an industry
 
Figure 3.27. CC2530 block diagram [42]
 Many benefits make this SoC a great option for implementing a smart metering 
solution. It is capable of supporting ZigBee, ZigBee PRO, ZigBee RF4CE, 6LoWPAN 
and all solutions based on IEEE 802.15.4. It performs a very low current consumption 
either on RX or TX ensuring a long lifetime for its battery. Its design was thought for 
many applications such as remote controls, home/building automation, industrial control 
and monitoring, low-power wireless sensor network and the one we are interested on 
smart energy and automated meter reading. [42]
specifications for Smart Metering 
     
 
power SoC solution specifically designed for IEE 802.15.4 
-F32/64/128/256, each one equipped with the 
memory. It is equipped with an integrated high
-standard enhanced 8051 MCU.
 
 
 
 
 
-
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 The CC2530 System
following chart: 
Figure 3.28. CC2530 general characteristics [42]
 
For further information in CC2530 SoC go to: 
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4. Raconet 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 EMH metering has developed an innovative and future orientated meter readout 
system which operates on the basis of short range radio. It operates in the ISM 
(Industrial, Scientific and Medical) free license band in the 868 MHz frequency.
 Raconet is a dynamic, easy
communications between the data collector and EMH smart meters, both described in 
section about EMH metering solutions for Raconet. The electricity meters are equipped 
with a radio transceiver whose consumption is saved centrally and independent of the 
measuring station. Moreove
and organizing the network. Through telephone or mobile radio network the 
consumption data can be retrieved by the control center comfortably and at all times. 
This means that there no need to make
meters and that on site read outs are no longer required.
 Meanwhile communications between devices inside Raconet network are 
performed through wireless radio links, the energy supplying company has access to all
information stored in the data collector via an electrical interface which can be either 
RS485, RS232 or CL0. Additionally, the data collector is equipped with the D0 optical 
data interface for reading out on site. [53]
 
Figure 4.1. Raconet network exam
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 any appointment for reading out data from 
 
 
ple deployment [53] 
 
 
-directional 
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4.2 Raconet network global performance
 The raconet network is ruled by the data collector. It the central interface 
through which any communication inside the network passes. Besides, the data collector 
configures controls and monito
network for any changes such as the attachment or detachment of a device and respond 
to the changes independently and flexibly. A layout of the raconet network is depicted 
in the following figure: [53]
 
Figure 4.2. System layout of a raconet network [53]
 During the network start
broadcast message to all meters in its range and these meters respond with their 
identifier and the RSSI value (Received Sign
This RSSI value specifies the quality of the signal strength received by the meter from 
the data collector. Afterwards, the data collector creates an overview including a list of 
all meters detected, their RSS
have been depicted in the network overview, are requested one by one to search for 
additional meters than may be found in the area but not reachable from the data 
collector and receive their identif
this information a new network overview is created. In regular time intervals the 
network is reviewed and checked for new devices.
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rs the entire network. It is capable of checking the 
 
 
-up process performance, the data collector sends a 
al Strength Indication) to the data collector. 
I value and the communication path. Then, all meters than 
iers and RSSI values. Once the data collector receives 
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 Once the start up process is finalized, the meters are able to begin 
metering purposes and they sent their collected data to the data collector. The data 
collector in responsible for accumulating all metering data from meters and sending it to 
the control center of the power supplying company for billing purposes.
 In consequence of the previous described management process, any changes that 
may happen in the raconet network are quickly detected and a flexible response is 
presented by the data collector. Hence, the network does almost not even require 
maintenance. By means of network management software, the network can be 
configured and managed manually using the software tools provided by EMH metering 
and describe in the section about EMH
 
4.3 Raconet layers 
 Since it is a proprietar
possible to found specific information about how they different layers are implemented. 
Moreover, we cannot even be sure if they are implemented following the OSI model 
although most communication technolog
follow this model for making adaptation with other protocols easier.
 However, from the procedures performance during its start
deduced that the network topology is based on a cluster tree as it c
ZigBee. 
 Regarding the physical layer, what we know about it is that it operates with 
wireless radio links using the 868 MHz frequency inside the ISM (Industrial, Scientific 
and Medical) free license band. 
 
4.4 Security on raconet
 As well as in raconet layers description, no information can be obtained about 
security features in raconet networks. Although customers cannot get to information 
about it without contracting EMH metering services, this fact makes raconet more 
secure as a consequence that potential attackers are not able to obtain information about 
raconet over the net. 
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4.5 Attacks that may be performed on raconet
 Although no information about security features on raconet could be found, as it 
is a wireless technology ope
power transmission, the network is susceptible of suffering many different types of 
attacks. 
 The data collector is the center of all communications and management of the 
networks and an attack to it may 
device in the network. 
 Many of the attacks described on the ZigBee section taking advantage of the 
wireless radio links and the low power transmissions may be performed to the raconet 
data collector too which are: jamming, exhaustion, collision and unfairness. As well as 
to the data collector, these attacks may also be performed to meters which are acting as 
a bridge to permit data collector control them even when they are out of its range.
 Finally, a similar attack to one described in the ZigBee section may be 
performed in the network too. Coordinating all the raconet network from the data 
collecor represents a wide range of advantages but it results in some weaknesses too. A 
route disruption in the clus
attacker may try to capture the devices around it by announcing itself as a data collector 
and presenting a better signal rate that the real data collector for the raconet network 
deployment. It illustrated in the following figure:
Figure 4.3. Route disruption in the cluster tree attack (compromised coordinator) [33]
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4.6 EMH-metering Raconet solution
4.6.1 Raconet repeater RNRE
 
 The repeater operates within 50 to 60 Hz frequ
range conditions from -25 to +55ºC. Its flexible housing antenna is 90mm length and 
incorporates N-socket for connection GP900C for operating distance increasing 
supplied antenna cable of 2 m. [52]
 
 
4.6.2 Data collector RND
 
 The Raconet repeater RRNE has been designed 
order to extend Raconet networks to obtain long
in outdoor installations. It is equipped with an antenna and can 
be optionally equipped with an external antenna to longer 
range. 
 The repeater servers as a connection link between 
raconet devices which cannot reach another device of the 
network due to long distances or constructional barriers.
 The Data collector RNDC of the RacoNet network, 
been deployed to read out  up to 90 residential meters via short 
range radio and saving the meter data, implementing a 
transparent bi-directional communication w
 The data collector is the most important part of the 
RacoNet network. It is the central interface for all 
communications which are performed inside the network. 
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this, the data collector is in charge of tasks management of the network, such as 
configuration, control and configuration of the whole network performance. It checks 
the network for any changes, detecting newly added or removed meters in the network
responding to them independently and flexibly.
 The device operates within 50 to 60 Hz frequency range in a temperature range 
from -25 to + 55ºC. Its Real Time Clock (RTC) has a +/
reserve battery for over 20 years and it can 
These data interfaces the concentrator operates with are the D0 optical data interface, 
RS485 and RS232, all of the operating with IEC62056
rate. 
 The concentrator integrated radio 
band. Some of the functions controlled from the radio module are meter remote readout 
via-bidirectional communication, online mode, transferring of commands or automatic 
network build-up. [49] 
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4.6.3 Raconet MAUS RNMA
 
 The Raconet MAUS is an easy operation device designed for help with planning 
raconet networks. It used for analyzing the quality of radio connections within the 
installation area as well as reading out the already installed meters. I
connected to be connected to a PC or notebook through a USB 1.1/2.0 interface for 
operating. 
The raconet MAUS software includes three specific functions: [50]
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Raconet MAUS functions [50]
 The MAUS integrated radio module operates in 868 
MHz license free ISM-band. The functions controlled from the 
radio module are meter remote readout via
communication, online mode or transferring of commands.
 The device operates in a temperature range from 
to + 55ºC. It incorporates a 90 mm flexible hous
and operates with Windows 2000, XP, Vista or 7 for software.
Quality analysis of 
all radio connections 
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4.6.4 Raconet Gateway RNMB
 
 The device operates in the frequency range from 50 to 60 Hz in an 
environmental condition from 
types of data interfaces, the raconet radio module and the M
13757-2, -3 both operating in a transmission rate up to 9600 baud.
 The Gateway is equipped with four different functional LED
functions are: 
• Ready: Informs about the availability of the Gateway to operate
• COM: Inform on communications on the M
• Overload: It is On when short
bus is overloaded by too much meters
• Init: It is Off when initialization of radio module is finished, but remains 
On when an error during the initialization of the radio module has happened
 
Figure 4.5. Raconet network system connection through RNMB Gateway [51]
 
 The M-Bus is a field bus for the registration of consuming data. Transfer takes 
place serially on a polarized two
Gateway. As shown in the figure above, besides for electricity meters the raconet 
Gateway can be used also for water, thermal and gas meters. The data is transferred at 
different rates depending on cable diameters and cable lengths as shown in the 
following chart: [51] 
 The raconet RNMB Gatew
internal raconet radio module and long
supply and it is thought to be able to connect up to 25 
M-Bus measuring devices while DIN
device is capable of self-configuration.
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Figure 4.6. Dependence on cable diameters and cable lengths of data transfer rates [51]
In the following figure, the M
transferring from the Gateway to the meters is depicted:
Figure 4.7. M
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-Bus technical specification from bi-
 
-Bus Bit-transfer [51] 
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4.6.5 Digital Multi-Rate Meter 
 
 The device operates at 50 Hz frequency within the 
range. Its Real Time Clock (RTC) has a +/
for over 10 years and it can be sync
incorporates an additional display for supervision of the following functions:
• Status information on phase failure
• Energy direction
• Tariffs 
• Meter start-up
• Manipulation
• Communication
• Running reserve of 
 The meter integrated radio module operates in 868 MHz license free ISM
Some of the functions controlled from the radio module are meter remote readout via
bidirectional communication, online mode, transferring of commands o
network build-up. Besides, the D0 optical interface is implemented, working in Mode C 
with a transmission baud rate up to 4800 baud and the RS485 electrical interface 
working at up to 9600 baud.
 Optionally, the meter can be equipped with furth
recognition: registration of the number of manipulation attempts and the start of the last 
manipulation attempt, supervision of the phase and neutral current for fraud detection in 
the two-wire distribution system and internal 
 
 
 
 The ED2000 meter is capable act
and optional –A and |A|, always for billing purposes and with 
a class 2 accuracy according to IEC62053
accuracy according to EN 50470
tariff registers plus one tariffless register for every mea
type each. 
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4.6.6 Raconet software tools
 Three software tools for configurating and managing the raconet network from a 
PC are provided by EMH-metering:
• Meter communication
• EMH-COM Control center
• Meter communication and configuration program EMH
MASTER 2000 [76]
 
4.6.6.1 Meter communication
 EMH-COM is a modular developed software which allows and enables 
communication between a PC and EMH meters. Due to the modular 
can be tailored directly to the customer requests. The software is planned in particular 
for start-up and data read out of the meter and also for changing basic settings. Its main 
functionalities are: 
 
4.6.6.2 EMH-COM Control Cente
 The EMH-COM-control center is a program module from EMH
control centre an unlimited number of meters can be integrated. With help of the control 
centre it is possible to automate tasks such as data readout, sending of emails etc. Its 
main functionalities are: 
• Reading out meter data
• Graphical load profile display
• Setting of the clock
• Mode, function (optional)
• Tariff settings for individual meter types 
(optional) 
• Send write commands (optional) [76]
• Reading out of data (tables, load profile)
• Administration of customer and meter data
• Automated accomplishment of fixed tasks
• Setting of the clock
• Management of up to 1000 meters
• Access or SQL database [76]
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4.6.6.3 Meter communication and configuration program EMH
MASTER 2000 
 The EMH-COM-control centre is a program module from EMH
control centre an unlimited number of meters can be integrated. With help of the control 
centre it is possible to automate tasks such as data readout, sending of emails etc.
For further information about raconet solutions go to: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Reading out of the meter data
• Graphical load profile display
• Configuration of meters from the 
LZQJ 
• Setting of transformer ratios with meters 
from the series LZQJ
• All functions of the EMH
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5. Bluetooth 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The Bluetooth wireless technology provides short range, wireless connectivity 
between common devices. The key features of Bluetooth technology are robustness, low 
power, and low cost. Different applications can be built based on these spontaneous, ad
hoc networks such as the one we are interested in smart meters networks. The Bluetooth 
wireless technology system contains a set of 
messages and procedures (generally termed 
specifications. This gives an unambiguous description of the air interface for specified 
services and use cases. Working groups within the Bluetooth SIG define these profiles. 
The Security Expert Group (BSEG) provides the Bluetooth SIG and associated working 
groups with expertise regarding all aspects of Bluetooth security.
 The security requirements for Bluetooth applications will vary based on the 
sensitivity of the information involved, the market, and the needs of the user. There are 
some applications that do no
high levels of security. Risk analysis and trade studies need to be conducted prior to 
implementing new applications using Bluetooth wireless technology. The current 
Bluetooth System specification d
security is not specified, allowing application developers the flexibility to select the 
most appropriate security mechanisms for their particular application. [57]
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t require any security and others which require extremely 
efines security at the link level. Application level 
Figure 5.1 Bluetooth stack [58] 
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5.2 Bluetooth RF layer overview
 The Bluetooth transceivers operate in the 2.4 GHz free license ISM (Industrial 
Scientific and Medical) frequency band. Although there is a specific regulation for a 
few countries such as France, in most of them the range of th
band is from 2.400 to 2483.5 MHz. 79 RF channels are implemented with 1 MHz 
spacing and lower and upper guard bands are reserved with 2 and 3.5 MHz respectively. 
For the transmitters, three power classes are defined Power Class 1, 2 a
maximum output power of 20, 4 and 0 dBm respectively and the reference sensitivity 
level at reception is -70 dBm. The modulation used is GMSK (Gaussian Frequency 
Shift Keying) with BT = 0.5 and a modulation index between 0.28 and 0.35. All
leads to a symbol rate of 1 Ms/s.
 A transceiver may support power
strength of the received signal and determine if the transmitter on the other side of the 
link should increase or decrease its output pow
Indicator (RSSI) makes this possible. The RSSI measurement compares the received 
signal power with two threshold levels, which define the Golden Receive Power Range. 
The lower threshold level corresponds to a received p
above the actual sensitivity of the receiver. The upper threshold level is 20 dB above the 
lower threshold level to an accuracy of +/
power control is mandatory in Power Class 1 devices
 
Figure 5.2. RSSI dynamic range and accuracy [57]
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5.3 Bluetooth Baseband layer overview
 The Bluetooth specification uses a combination of circuit and packet switching. 
For full duplex transmission, a Time
support an asynchronous data channel, providing up to 723.2 kb/s asymmetric (and still 
up to 57.6 kb/s in the return direction), or 433.9 kb/s symmetric.
 The Bluetooth system consists of a radio unit, a link control unit, and a support 
unit for link management and host terminal interface functions, as depicted on the figure 
below. The Bluetooth link controller carries out the baseband protocols and other low
level link routines. Link layer messages and control are performed by the Bluetooth link 
manager. [57] 
 
Figure 5.3. Functional blocks of the Bluetooth system [57]
 The Bluetooth system provides a point
multipoint connection. In the point
among several Bluetooth units. Two or more units sharing the same channel form a 
piconet. One of them acts as the master of the piconet, whereas up to 7 other units act 
as slaves. In addition, many more slaves can remain locked to the master in a passive 
state, not active but synchronized to the master. Both for active and parked slaves, the 
channel access is controlled by the master.
 Multiple piconets with overlapping coverage areas form a 
piconet can only have a single master. However, slaves can participate in
piconets on a time-division multiplex basis. In addition, a master in one piconet can be a 
slave in another piconet. The piconets shall not be frequency synchronized. Each 
piconet has its own hopping channel. [57]
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Figure 5.4. Piconets with a 
 
 In this layer the control over the physical layer, links, device operational modes 
and states is performed. Also security features of the specification are procee
Bluetooth Baseband and will be described on the section specified for security on 
Bluetooth. Here a brief description of the functionalities of this layer is described:
• Two types of physical links
Connection-Oriented (SCO) link and the Asynchronous Connection
link. The first one is a symmetric point
slave where packets are sent in regular intervals and never retransmitted. In the 
asynchronous link, a packet
slaves in the piconet is provided. Packet retransmission for data integrity is 
applied here. 
• Data packets
synchronization, DC offset compensation and id
containing link control information for addressing, flow control or error 
checking; and up to 2745 bits of payload including a CRC code and a payload 
header. 
• Three error correction schemes
and ARQ system. It is flexible to use them in the payload or not bit the header of 
the packets is always protected with the first one.
• Data scrambling
order to randomize the data from highly redundant patt
bias in the packet. The whitening word is generated with the 
and is subsequently EXORed with the header and the payload.
• States control
operate in two possib
is the default low power state when only the native clock works and no 
communication with other devices is possible. On the Connection state 
communication is possible and four possible operational m
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single slave operation (a), a multi-slave operation (b) and a 
scatternet operation (c) [57] 
 can be established, the Synchronous 
-to point connection between master and 
-switched connection between master and active 
 consist of 3 entities which are a 72-bit access code 
entification; a 54
 which are 1/3 rate FEC, 2/3 rate FEC 
 
 is performed on the packets before transmission in 
erns and to minimize DC 
g(D
 
 is also performed in this layer. A Bluetooth device may 
le states which are Standby and Connection. The first one 
 
ded in the 
 
-Less (ACL) 
used for 
-bit header 
) = D7 + D4 + 1 
odes can be 
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performed, the active mode for devices actively working in the piconet and three 
power-saving states: Sniff Mode, Hold Mode and Park Mode.
• Bluetooth addressing.
48-bit Bluetooth device address (B
standard. The address is assigned to slaves depending on their states, so there are 
three types which are an Active Member Address (AM_ADDR), Parked 
Member Address (PM_ADDR) or Access Request Address (AR_ADDR). [57]
 
5.4 Link Manager Protocol layer overview
 The Link Manager carries out link setup, authentication, link configuration and 
other protocols. It discovers other remote LM’s and communicates with them via the 
Link Manager Protocol (LMP). To perform its service provi
services of the underlying Link Controller (LC). The Link Manager Protocol essentially 
consists of a number of PDU (protocol Data Units), which are sent from one device to 
another, determined by the AM_ADDR in the packet header. L
as single-slot packets and the payload header is therefore one byte. [81]
 
5.5 Host Controller Interface (HCI) layer overview
 The HCI provides a command interface to the baseband controller and link 
manager, and access to hardware s
provides a uniform method of accessing the Bluetooth baseband capabilities. The HCI 
exists across 3 sections, the Host 
sections has a different role to
up into 3 separate parts: 
• HCI Firmware
commands, link manager commands and registers.
• HCI Driver
notifications of HCI events, HCI events are used for notifying the Host when 
something occurs. When the Host discovers that an event has occurred it will 
then parse the received event packet to determine which event occurred.
• Host Controller Transpo
the communication via for the two previous entities. It should provide the ability 
to transfer data without intimate knowledge of the data being transferred. 
Several different Host Controller Layers can be use
defined initially for Bluetooth:
useful important for smart metering usage, specially the last one which is a 
widely used interface in all smart meters. [81]
specifications for Smart Metering 
 
 Each Bluetooth transceiver is allocated a unique 
D_ADDR) derived from the IEEE802 
 
der role, the LM uses the 
M PDUs are always sent 
 
 
tatus and control registers. Essentially this interface 
- Transport Layer - Host Controller. Each of the 
 play in the HCI system. The HCI is functionally broken 
 located on the Host Controller. It implements the HCI 
 
 located on the Host. The Host will receive asynch
rt Layer located in Intermediate Layers. It is 
d, of which 3 have been 
 USB, UART and RS232. All three of them very 
 
 
 
ronous 
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5.6 Logical Link Control and A
layer overview 
 L2CAP provides connection
layer protocols with protocol multiplexing capability, segmentation and reassembly 
operation, and group abstractions. L2CAP permits high
applications to transmit and receive L2CAP data packets up to 64 kilobytes in length. 
The L2CAP Specification is defined for only ACL links and no support for SCO links is 
planned. [81] 
Figure 5.5. L2CAP within protocol layers [57]
 
5.7 RFCOMM protocol layer overview
 RFCOMM is a simple transport protocol, which provides emulation of RS232 
serial ports over the L2CAP protocol. The protocol is based on the ETSI standard TS 
07.10. Only a subset of the TS 07.10 standard is used and an 
extension is added, in the form of a mandatory credit based flow control scheme. The 
RFCOMM protocol supports up to 60 simultaneous connections between two BT 
devices. The number of connections that can be used simultaneously in a BT devi
implementation-specific. For the purposes of RFCOMM, a complete communication 
path involves two applications running on different devices (the communication 
endpoints) with a communication segment between them. RFCOMM is a simple 
transport protocol, with additional provisions for emulating the 9 circuits of RS
serial ports. [81] 
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5.8 Profiles overview
 The profiles have been developed in order to describe how implementations of 
user models are to be accomplished. The user models describe a number
scenarios where Bluetooth performs the radio transmission. A profile can be described 
as a vertical slice through the protocol stack. It defines options in each protocol that are 
mandatory for the profile. It also defines parameter ranges for each
concept is used to decrease the risk of interoperability problems between different 
manufacturers products. [57]
Figure 5.6. Bluetooth Profiles [81]
 The Bluetooth profile structure and the dependencies of the profiles are depicted
above. A profile is dependent upon another profile if it re
implicitly or explicitly referencing it. Dependency is illustrated in the figure: a profile 
has dependencies on the profile in which it is contained either directly
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 protocol. The profile 
 
 
-uses parts of that profile, by 
 or indirectly. [81]
 
 of user 
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5.9 Security in Bluetooth
 
5.9.1 Security services
The following are the three basic security services specified in the Bluetooth standard:
• Authentication: 
authentication is not 
using PIN. 
• Confidentiality (Encryption): 
caused by eavesdropping by ensuring that only authorized devices can access 
and view data. 
• Authorization: 
device is authorized to use a service before permitting it to do so. [55]
 
5.9.2 Security modes 
 The various Bluetooth versions define four security modes in which each device 
must work on: 
• Security Mode 1:
authentication, authorization nor encryption. Both devices and connection are 
vulnerable to attacks.
• Security Mode 2:
manager controls access to specific services an
security manager maintains policies for access control and interfaces with other 
protocols and device users. Varying security policies and trust levels to restrict 
access may be defined for applications with different security re
• Security Mode 3:
devices initiate security procedures before the physical link is fully established. 
Bluetooth devices operating in Security Mode 3 mandates authentication and 
encryption for all connections to and from the device. The authentication and 
encryption features are based on a separate secret link key that is shared by 
paired devices, once the pairing has been established.
• Security Mode 4:
security procedures are initiated after link setup. Secure Simple Pairing uses 
Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) techniques for key exchange and link 
key generation. Device authentication and encryption algorithms are identical to 
the algorithms in Bluetooth earlier versions. [55]
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
 
verifying the identity of communicating devices. User 
provided natively by Bluetooth and it is commonly done 
preventing information compromise 
allowing the control of resources by ensuring that a 
 In this mode no security measures are applied. No 
 
 It is a service level-enforced security mode. A security 
d devices. The centralized 
quirements.
 It is a link level-enforced security mode. Bluetooth 
 
 It is a service level enforced security mod
 
 
 
 
e in which 
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5.9.3 Bluetooth security chain of events
The chain of the events is described here as well as depicted in the figure below:
• 1. Each device calculates its own Unit Key (K
• 2. When they meet, devices begin wit
• 3. From PIN, derive K
• 4. After KINIT
• 5. Link Key Exchange using K
• 6. KA or KAB
Figure 5.7. Bluetooth security 
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A and KB). 
h PIN. 
INIT. 
 derivation, Pairing process takes place. 
init : KAor KB, or a more secured one, K
 are used in Authentication and Encryption. [55]
chain of events [59] 
 
 
AB. 
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5.9.4 Security entities 
 Many different entities are used for security procedures in Bluetooth, they are 
presented in the figure below. As it can be seen, among them there are a device address 
and PIN, 5 different keys and 4 different 
authentication. The last two, SRES and ACO, are used to check accordance for 
authentication. [55] 
Entity 
PIN 
BD_ADDR 
Kinit 
K1 / K2 
Klink 
Kmaster 
KC 
IN_RAND Random number for generating K
LK_RAND Random number for generating K
AU_RAND Random number for authe
EN_RAND Random number for generating K
SRES 
ACO 
Figure 5.8. Bluetooth security entities [59]
 
5.9.5 Bluetooth security types of keys
Five different keys of 128 bits are used 
• Initialization Key (K
no prior agreement or previous communication meet. It is discarded afterwards.
• Unit Key (K
resources. 
• Combination Key (K
provided by Devices A and B.
• Master Key (K
to multiple slaves. 
• Encryption Key (K
viceversa. [59] [55]
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random numbers for key generation or 
Description 
Personal identification number 
Bluetooth device address 
Initialization key 
Unit key 
Link key 
Master key 
Encryption key 
init 
link 
ntication 
C 
Authentication result 
Authenticated ciphering offset 
 
 
for different security procedures in Bluetooth:
init): Created once from PIN when two devices with 
1 and K2): created once for a device that has 
link): created from the combination of inputs 
 
MASTER): Created for the purpose of broadcasting packets 
c): Used to change plain text into
 
Length (Bits) 
8, 16, …, 128 
48 
128 
128 
128 
128 
8, 16, …, 128 
128 
128 
128 
128 
32 
96 
 
 
low memory 
 cipher and 
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5.9.6 Algorithms in Bluetooth security
 All algorithms used in Bluetooth are based on Secure and Fast Encryption 
Routine (SAFER+). A Symmetric Block Cipher operating on fixed length groups of bits 
(blocks). They are the following:
• E22 for deriving K
• E21 for deriving K
• E1 for applying authentication procedures.
• E3 for deriving K
• E0 for Cipher Stream generation. 
 
Figure 5.9. SAFER block cipher 
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init as initialization key. 
1/K2 and Klink as link keys. 
 
C as encryption key. 
[55] 
[100] 
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5.9.7 Link Key (LK) generation
 Associated devices simultaneously derive link keys during the initialization 
phase when users enter an identical PIN into one or both devices, depending on the 
configuration and device type. The PIN entry, device asso
depicted conceptually in Figure 5.10. Note that if the PIN is less than 16 bytes, the 
BD_ADDR is used to supplement the PIN value used to generate the initialization key. 
The E
x 
boxes represent encryption algorithms that are
association and key derivation processes.
 After initialization is complete, devices automatically and transparently 
authenticate and initiate the encryption procedure to secure the wireless link, if 
encryption is enabled. The PIN code used in Bluetooth devices can vary between one 
and 16 bytes. The typical four
longer PIN should be used for devices that require a higher level of security. [55]
Figure 5.10. Link Key g
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
ciation, and key derivation are 
 used during the Bluetooth device 
 
-digit PIN may be sufficient for low-risk situations; a 
eneration [55] 
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5.9.8 Bluetooth Authentication
 The Bluetooth device authentication procedure is in the form of a challenge
response scheme. It validates devices by verifying the knowledge of the link key. The 
authentication scheme is shown in figure 5.11. 
designed to be different for every transaction and is derived from a pseudo
process within the Bluetooth device. The steps in the authentication process are as 
follows: 
 
• Step 1. The verifier transmits a 128
to the claimant. 
• Step 2. Both entities the E
response using his unique 48
inputs. Only the 32 most significant bits of the E
authentication purposes. The remaining 96 bits are used later to create the 
Bluetooth encryption key.
• Step 3. The claimant returns the most significant 32 bits of the E
as the computed response, SRES, to the verifier.
• Step 4. The verifier compares the S
that it computed. 
• Step 5. If the two 32
successful. [55] 
Figure 5.11. Bluetooth Authentication [55]
specifications for Smart Metering 
 
Note that the random challenge is 
-bit random challenge (AU_RAND) 
1 
algorithm to compute an authentication 
-bit BD_ADDR, the link key, and AU_RAND as 
1 
output are used for 
 
 
RES from the claimant with the value 
-bit values are equal, the authentication is considered 
 
 
-
-random 
1 
output 
 
93 Theoretical analysis of security features and weakne
specifications for Smart Metering
 
 
 The Bluetooth standard allows both one
performed. For mutual authentication, the above process is repeated switching roles. If 
authentication fails, a Bluetooth device waits an interval of time, exponentially 
increased, before a new attempt is made to prevent an adversary from att
access by trial-and-error with different keys. [55]
 
5.9.9 Bluetooth confidentiality
 Bluetooth provides a separate confidentiality service to thwart eavesdropping 
attempts on the payloads of the packets exchanged between Bluetooth devices.
Bluetooth has three Encryption Modes, but only two of them actually provide 
confidentiality. The modes are as follows: 
• Encryption Mode 1: 
• Encryption Mode 2: 
based on individual link keys; broadcast traffic is not encrypted.
• Encryption Mode 3: 
based on the master link key.
Figure 5.12. Bluetooth encryption procedure [55]
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-way and mutual authent
 
 
 
No encryption is performed on any traffic.
Unicast traffic is encrypted using encryption keys 
 
All traffic is encrypted using an encryption key 
 
 
ication to be 
empting to gain 
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 As the figure above, the encryption key pr
produced using an internal key generator (KG). It produces stream cipher keys based on 
the 128-bit link key, a 128-
produced during the authentication procedure.
 The Bluetooth encryption procedure is based on a stream cipher, E
stream output is exclusive-OR
This key stream is produced using a cryptographic algorithm based on LFSR. The 
encryption function takes the following as inputs: the master BD_ADDR, the random 
number EN_RAND, a slot number, and an the K
the LFSRs before the transmission of each packet, if encryption is enabled. The slot 
number used in the stream cipher changes with each packet; the ciphering engine is also 
reinitialized with each packet while the other variables remain static.
 The encryption key K
eight bits to 128 bits. The key size neg
slave devices. In product implementations, a minimum acceptable key size parameter 
can be set to prevent a malicious user from driving the key size down to the minimum 
of eight bits. [55] 
 
5.9.10 Trust levels, Service Levels and Authorization
 The two Bluetooth levels of trust in Bluetooth are trusted and untrusted. A 
trusted device has a fixed relationship with another device and has full access to all 
services. An untrusted device 
Bluetooth device, which results in the untrusted device receiving restricted access to 
services. 
 Three levels of security have been defined for Bluetooth services. These levels 
allow the requirements for authorization, authentic
configured and altered independently. The service security levels are as follows:
• Service Level 1: 
access is granted only to trusted devices; untrusted devices need manual 
authorization. 
• Service Level 2: 
necessary. Access to an application is allowed only after an authentication 
procedure. 
• Service Level 3: 
Access is granted automatically.
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ovided to the encryption algorithm is 
bit random number (EN_RAND), and the 96
 
-ed with the payload bits and sent to the receiving device. 
C key, which when combined initialize 
 
C is generated from the current link key and may vary from 
otiation process occurs between the master and 
 
does not have an established relationship with another 
ation, and encryption to be 
Requires authorization and authentication. Automatic 
Requires authentication only; authorization is not 
Open to all devices, with no authentication required. 
 
 
-bit ACO value 
0. A key 
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 The Bluetooth architecture allows for defining security policies that can set trust 
relationships in such a way that even trusted devices can get access only to specific 
services. [55] 
 
5.10 Possible attacks to Bluetooth
 Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible to general wireless 
networking threats that have been described in previous wireless technologies, such as 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, eavesdropping, man
modification, and resource misappropriation. Additionally, Bluetooth devices are also 
threatened by more specific Bluetooth
 
5.10.1 BlueSnarfing 
 BlueSnarfing enables attackers to gain access to a Bluetooth
exploiting a firmware flaw in old
Bluetooth device, allowing access to data stored on the device and even the device’s 
international mobile equipment identity (IMEI). The IMEI is a unique identifier for each 
device that an attacker could pot
device to the attacker’s device. [56]
 
5.10.2 BlueBugging 
 RFCOMM emulates serial RS
60 connections (RFCOMM channels) via RFCOMM may get established 
simultaneously for one device. RFCOMM emulates a virtual serial connection between 
two communication endpoints. What an attacker needs to know of a vulnerable device is 
the BD_ADDR. The attacker connects to RFCOMM channel 17, where vulnerable 
devices provide an open backdoor which requires no authentication procedure. By using 
AT commands the attacker is able to perform remote control of communication devices, 
like analog or ISDN modems. The attacker is able to execute most tasks as normal user 
is able to do, like gathering the victim’s private data. [56]
 
5.10.3 Fuzzing attacks
 Bluetooth fuzzing attacks consist of sending malformed or otherwise non
standard data to a device’s Bluetooth radio and observing how the device reacts. When 
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-in-the-middle attacks, message 
-related attacks. [55] 
-enabled device by 
er devices. This attack forces a connection to a 
entially use to route all incoming calls from the user’s 
 
-232 interfaces via Bluetooth connections. Up to 
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a device’s response is slowed or stopped by these attacks, this indicates that a serious 
vulnerability potentially exists in the protocol stack. [56]
5.10.4 HeloMoto 
 HeloMoto is a combination of BlueSnarf and BlueBug attacks, exploiting a 
flawed implementation of trusted devices 
attacker connects to an OBEX push profile, as it is done in BlueSnarf. If there is no 
vulnerable implementation of OBEX that would allow a BlueSnarf attack, HeloMoto 
makes use of the trusted devices feature, defined 
attempts to send a vCard to the target device and immediately cancels the request. In 
consequence of the HeloMoto vulnerability, his device remains within the trusted 
devices history, while the owner of the target device is 
Finally he uses the status of a trusted device to execute AT commands. [56]
5.10.5 BlueSmack 
 BlueSmack is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The adversary sends an L2CAP 
echo request (ping) of large size, approximately 600 byte
limited hardware resources. Those devices reserve an input buffer of fixed length 
(around 600 bytes). When receiving such a malicious ping request, the input buffer 
overflows, which normally leads to a segmentation fault and, b
knock-out of the target device. On a linux computer, this can be done simply using the 
bluez-utils’ l2 ping command with 
5.10.6 Relay attacks 
 In relay attacks, the attacker 
posing as A. All authentication messages that 
conveys these messages from 
performed: two-sided, and one
impersonated. In a one-sided attack, only one victim is impersonated. Relay attacks are 
similar to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. There exists an adversary located 
between the sender and receiver, but the only activity of t
information that it receives from one to another without changing the content. Three 
conditions are needed by the attacker to be able to perform this kind of attack which are:
• Actual communication between sender and receiver is dis
they cannot listen to each other anymore.
• Network infrastructure does not have a global infrastructure for routing 
and locating its users.
• Attacker is capable enough to impersonate each of the victims to the 
other, even if the victims are loc
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in some Motorola devices. At first, the 
in Bluetooth. The adversary now 
not aware of being attacked. 
s to a Bluetooth device with 
y this, to the immediate 
-s <num> option, defining the packet length. [56]
C talks to victim A posing as victim 
C needs are generated by real 
A/B to B/A. Two types of relay attacks may be 
-sided. In a two-sided relay attack, both victims are 
he adversary is to relay 
 
 
ated in distant locations. [61] 
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5.10.6.1 Two-Sided Relay attack
 A real Bluetooth device 
establishment process starts with the paging procedure. 
thinking that it is real B. After the paging procedure, 
command to the attacker. The attacker 
attacker pages B and initiates a connection establishment procedure posing as 
both A and B use the same frequency hopping order with different offsets and do not 
hear each other. 
 The current link key between 
connection. The attacker does not need to know this key. Thus, changing the link key or 
using the current one do not cause any problem in attack setting. If the link is to be 
changed, then the next step is the exchange of combination key contributions (the 
random numbers which are encrypted by XORing with the current link key). 
encrypted random number RAND_NR
this encrypted random number to real 
B sends out its encrypted random number RAND_NR
attacker forwards it to real 
real A and real B compute the same combination key K
new link key. [61] 
 
Figure 5.13. Two
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
A wants to establish connection to B. The connection 
A first pages the attacker device
A sends connection request
accepts the connection request. Meanwhile, 
A and B may or may not be changed at each 
A to the attacker who, using its 
B as if it is sent by A. After receiving this number, 
B to the attacker interface
A using his other interface. After these message rounds, both 
link and this key is assigned as 
-sided relay attack [61] 
 
 
the 
A. Thus, 
A sends its 
interface, relays 
, and the 
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 The next steps are for authenticati
number AU_RANDA. After
authentication response SRES
know the current link key, but using
as if A requests authentication of 
SRESA to A as the authentication response. After that 
but the truth is that the attacker device 
that they authenticated each other, but the fact is
them. [61] 
 
5.10.6.2 One-Sided Relay attack
 In this attack, the attacker
requested by the attacker. 
and then sends connection request
time the attacker pages A 
After the first step, the attacker
real A requests authentication and sends back the corresponding authentication response 
SRESA. Having sent SRES
attacker. The attacker should obtain SRES
AU_RANDB, so he sends out AU_RAND
that B requests authentication, and calculates and sends SRES
forwards it to real B. The connection setup is completed by mutually sending 
completion. These steps authenticate 
attacker sends a detach command to end its communication with real 
needed anymore. [61] 
Figure 5.14. One
specifications for Smart Metering 
on. A sends to the attacker the 1
 sending AU_RANDA, A expects the corresponding 
A. The attacker cannot calculate SRESA, since it does not 
 his other interface can forward AU_RAND
B. The response of real B contains SRES
A thinks that B 
is authenticated.  At the end, both 
 that the attacker impersonated both of 
 
 impersonates A to talk to B. Communication is 
In order to make new connection the attacker
 to B. B accepts the connection request. At the same 
and starts the connection establishment procedure with 
 sends the random number AU_RAND
A, B sends its authentication challenge AU_RAND
B, which is the SRES corresponding to 
B to real A using its interface. Real 
B to the attacker and then
Ac to B as if Ac were the real A
A
-sided relay attack [61] 
 
28 bit random 
A to real 
A. C forwards 
is authenticated, 
A and B think 
 first pages B 
A. 
A. B thinks that 
B to the 
A thinks 
 
setup 
. At the end the 
, since A is not 
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5.10.7 Attack to the pairing process
 In order to perform this attack, an attacker needs to be able to eavesdrop the 
whole communication within the pairing process between two Bluetooth devices. Now 
the attacker is able to do an exhaustive search within the space of possible Bluetooth 
PINs. Knowing IN_RAND and BD_ADDR, the adversary feeds E
together with the PIN candidates, chosen by his brute force algorithm, receiving a 
hypothesis for Kinit. Subsequently, the attacker decrypts the first two messages within 
the mutual authentication process, resulting in a hypothesis for LK_RAND
LK_RANDB. Due to LK_RAND
used in E21 to calculate the link ke
 After that, the attacker is able to use the last few messages to prove, whether his 
hypothesis for Klink is correct or not. He feeds E
respectively AU_RANDB 
SRESB message. This process is repeatedly done until the correct Bluetooth PIN used by 
A and B is found. Additionally, the attack is rather efficient. Due to some algebraic 
optimization of needed computations, cracking
IV 3GHz takes approximately 63 milliseconds. [61]
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22 with those values, 
A and LK_RANDB being the only secret information 
y, the attacker computes a hypothesis for K
1 with the challenges AU_RAND
and compares his result with the corresponding SRES
 a 4-digit Bluetooth PIN with a Pentium 
 
A and 
link. 
A, 
A or 
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5.11 Solution for Bluetooth
 
5.11.1 Three phase remote disconnection and re
RDC3   
 
 This meter has been designed in acc
11[2003], IEC62053-23[2003] & BS5685. It operates in the 50 Hz frequency within 
environmental conditions of temperature between 
synchronized daily if its error is larger than 30 second
for over 10 years. Its accuracy is class 1 for active energy and class to for reactive 
energy. 
 Its communication module operates with Bluetooth vE2.1 through either HHU 
or PDA for local data reading and disconnection/re
Additionally, RS232 interface (In accordance with IEC 61107) and optical port interface 
(In accordance with IEC 62056
 
 
For further information on this meter go to: 
 
 
 
 
 The Eis RDC3 is a three
and reconnection meter. It is remotely controlled using a 
handheld unit (HHU) or PDA through a
communication interface module. It can also send the energy 
usage information to a customer’s mobile phone. The Eis 
RDC3’s features include tamper proof casing, impulse 
output, testing via LED pulse output, forward and reverse 
energy measurement, large LCD display, backlight and 
Bluetooth communication BS5685.
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-connection meter Eis 
      
ordance with IEC 62053
-10 and 45ºC. Its internal clock is 
s and can have a battery life time 
-connection switch and data retrieval. 
-21) may be used for data readout. [60] 
www.kigg.com  
-phase remote disconnection 
 Bluetooth 
 
 
  
 
-21, IEC62052-
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6. PRIME 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 PRIME stands for PoweRline Intelligent Metering Evolution and defines the 
lower layers of a solution for Power Line Communications in the CENELEC
using OFDM modulation. Its purpose is
narrowband communication channel for many applications such as Automated 
Management (AMM). Its design is based on IEC 61334, IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 
802.16 standards with specific modifications and improvements in 
with the Power Line Communications environment.
Figure 6.1. PRIME low voltage sample scenario [65]
 The PRIME project was started by Iberdrola in 2006 and in order to cover all the 
different activities involved many other members from 
were added including: 
• Advanced Digital Design
• Current Technologies International
• Landis & Gyr
• ST Microelectronics
• USyscom 
• ZIV Medida [65]
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 to provide an open, low cost, very robust 
order to get along 
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-A Band 
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6.2 Architecture of the system
 PRIME comes up with an open, non proprietary, royalty 
communications solution that could fit a telecommunication layered architecture.
 
Figure 6.2: PRIME Layers definition [65]
 
 The service-specific Convergence Layer (CL) classifies traffic associating it 
with its proper MAC connection.
to be properly included in MAC SDUs. It may also include payload header suppression 
functions. Multiple Convergence sublayers are defined to accommodate different kinds 
of traffic into MAC SDUs. 
 The MAC layer provides core MAC functionalities of system access, bandwidth 
allocation, connection establishment/maintenance and topology resolution, as long as 
the PHY layer transmits and receives MPDUs between neighbor Nodes. [17]
 
6.3 Physical layer overvie
 This layer is implemented using Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
(OFDM) in the CENELEC
modulation technique because of its adaptability in the presence of frequency selective 
channels, its robustness and its capacity for achieving high spectral efficiencies. 
Different modulation schemes are used in combination with three possible 
constellations: DBPSK, DQPSK and D8PSK. [17]
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 This layer performs the mapping of any kind of traffic 
w 
-A band as defined in EN50065-1. OFDM was chosen as the 
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The following figure shows the PHY layer transmitter block diagra
Figure 6.3. PHY Layer transmitter block diagram [17]
 
 On the following chart many physical parameters relative to the PRIME Physical 
Layer are presented: 
Base Band Clock (Hz)
Subcarrier Spacing (Hz)
Data subcarriers
Pilot subcarriers
FFT interval (µ
FFT interval (samples)
Cyclic Prefix (µ
Cyclic Prefix (samples)
Symbol interval (µ
Symbol interval (samples)
Preamble period (µ
 
Convolutional Code (1/2)
Information bits per subcarrier
Information bits per symbol OFDM
Raw data rate
MAX MSDU length (bits)
MAX MSDU length (bytes)
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Figure 6.4 PRIME PHY layer parameters
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6.4 MAC layer overview
 MAC layer takes inspiration from meshed systems, whilst considering that the 
available bandwidth will be limited. Simplicity, low cost and flexibility are the main 
goals of the design. 
PRIME MAC specification has been provided with different characteristics to fulfill the 
following goals: 
• Low complexity on metering devices
• Connection ori
• Range of optional features (retransmission, security, packet aggregation, 
...) 
• Different complexity levels: IPv4 vs. simple metering options, optional 
features, … 
• Readiness for demand management applications
 PRIME system is composed of subnetworks, which are composed of a 
transformer substation and its meters. Each subnetwork can be formed by many nodes: 
one Base Node, which is the Master of the subnetwork and provides connectivity to it, 
and the Service Nodes. These Servic
where metering is performed or as Switching Nodes that establish connection between 
the Terminal Nodes and the Base Node. All devices are working in a shared 
communication medium (LV PLC) and will use a channel 
scheduled along with Time Division Multiplexing (TDD).
 Information in MAC Layer is structured in Packet Data Units (PDUs) organized 
in three different types: 
• Generic PDU
control information.
• Beacon PDU
subnetwork of its parameters
• Promotion Needed PDU
received, to search for help in reaching the Base Node [17] [18]
 
 
6.5 Convergence laye
 This layer opens MAC and PHY to upper layers and applications. It classifies 
the traffic associating it with the proper MAC connection, mapping the traffic into 
MAC SDUs, providing access to the MAC core functionalities.
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The convergence layer is divided into two convergence sublayers:
• The Common Part Convergence Sublayer (CPCS) 
service common to any SSCS as Segmentation and Reassembly.
• The Service Specific Convergence Sublayer (SSCS)
that are specific to one ap
PRIME, IPv4 convergence layer as universal access to PRIME, and IEC 61334
4-32 as a link to metering systems. [17] [18]
 
6.6 Security on PRIME
 In PRIME protocol, security functions provide the MAC lay
authentication and data integrity through a secure connection method and a key 
management policy. All data packets transferred on the network must use the specific 
security profile on the MAC level. However, REG and SEC control messages, and 
Beacon PDU and Promotion Needed PDU
 
 Two different security profiles are specified on the current version of the 
standard in order to be used depending on the needs of the network manager. In 
addition, the standard leaves scop
versions. [18] 
 
6.6.1 Security Profile 0
 When using Security Profile 0, security is supposed not to be much necessary 
and all packets are transferred without any encryption. This profile shall be used
communication that does not have strict requirements on privacy, authentication or data 
integrity. [18] 
 
6.6.2 Security Profile 1
 In the case that data protection is needed, Security Profile 1 is used. It is based 
on 128-bit AES Encryption and the ass
all security requirements which are privacy, authentication and data integrity:
• Privacy is guaranteed by the encryption itself and by the fact that the 
encryption key is kept secret.
• Authentication
secret key known only by the node itself and the Base Node.
• Data integrity
encrypted. [18] 
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6.6.3 Negotiation of the Security Profile
 Both MAC signaling PDUs and
is negotiated during the device registration. In the REG_REQ message the terminal 
indicates the Security Profile it can support in the field REG.SPC. The Base Node 
decides then whether to accept or reject the
provided is acceptable or not. If the registration is accepted the Base Node sends back a 
REG_RSP message with the same value on the REG.SPC field. On the other hand, if 
the registration is rejected, the REG.
0 is the one to be used. 
 It is recommended that terminal first attempt to register using the Security 
Profile 1, if it is performed like this, Security Profile 0 will be used only when the Base 
Node rejects the registration request and it is assured that data that needs to be 
encrypted will be encrypted always.
 The following sections are to be applied only on the case of Security Profile 1, 
as long as no encryption is used if the system is working on 
 
6.6.4 Cryptographic algorithm
 The cryptographic algorithm used in PRIME is AES as defined in FIPS197, 
from the NIST, the organization in charge of the technology standards from de US 
Department of Commerce. The algorithm is d
possible key sizes. The 128
supposed to present a  level of security for preserving privacy up to 2030 and beyond, as 
specified in SP800-57, page 66, table 4.
 AES is used according to the so
specified in SP800-38A, using block
128-bit blocks. In the case that the last block is smaller than 128 bits, padding is 
implemented with the addit
reach a length of the string to be encrypted as a multiple of 128 bits. Encryption is 
performed one block at a time, using the same working key for all the data. [18]
 
6.6.5 Algorithm for key deriv
 The method used for obtaining the working keys from the secret keys is very 
simple. AES algorithm is applied on a constant (C) as it was plain text and the 
generation key (Gk) as it was an encryption key. If the constant is a word shorter than 
128 bits, the padding is added for alignment to the LSB. The convention followed for 
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derivation equations of each one or the keys used is presented in the following lines: 
[18] 
Figure 6.5. Key derivation algorithm [19]
 
Generated Key = AES_enc (Generation Key
 
6.6.6 Key Hierarchy 
 A set of three working keys are used by Service Nodes and Base Nodes for all 
data encryption. The three keys and their usage are the following:
Initial Working Key (WK
REG.SNK and REG.AUK fields of the REG_RSP message. It is used by the Service 
Node in a disconnected state and is derived using the following formula:
WK0 = AES_enc (USK, 0)
Working Key (WK): This key is used to encrypt all the unicast data th
from the Base Node to a Service Node and viceversa. Each registered Service Node 
would have a unique WK that is known only to the Base Node and itself. The WK is 
derived using the following formula:
WK = AES_enc (USK, Random sequence rece
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ived in SEC.RAN) 
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Subnetwork Working Key (SWK): 
security of the key is ensured because it is never transmitted over the physical channel. 
Instead of that, it is derived from other keys which are transmitted e
and non-encrypted in SEC control packets. It is used to encrypt the following:
• Broadcast data, including MAC broadcast control packets
• Multicast data
• Unicast data that is transacted over direct connections, i.e. not involving 
the Base Node 
 
The Subnetwork Working Key is derived using the following formula:
SWK = AES_enc (SNK, Random sequence received in SEC.SNK)
 The WK and the SWK have a limited validity time in relation to the random 
sequence generation period. This sequence is generated a
network by the Base Node every 
packets. If a device does not receive a new random sequence within 2 times the MAC 
Random Sequence Change Time, it considers the keys it is using as n
 The process for key derivation was designed to be indirect and with multiple 
stages in order to ensure its protection. The parameters involved in this process are the 
ones described in the following lines.
Master Keys (MK1, MK2): 
with different usages. The first one is used to derive the Device Secret Key and the 
second one to compute the Key Diversifier. Both of them are administered on the Base 
Node. Having two Master Keys turns th
deriving The DSK and KDIV in the first stage and in the second stage derive the USK 
from those two. It is important to note that both DSK and KDIV are unique for each 
registering Service Node. 
Device Secret Key (DSK): 
is hard-coded in the device during production. The DSK is constant for the entire life of 
the Service Node. The Base Node uses MK1 to derive Service Node
using the following equation:
DSK = AES_enc (MK1, UI
Key Diversifier (KDIV): 
opposition to DSK, it does not have to be a fixed constant for the entire life of the 
Service Node. The Base Node computes device
equation: 
KDIV = AES_enc (MK2, UI
specifications for Smart Metering 
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This key is unique to each Service Node on the network and 
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Unique Secret Key (USK)
above equations. The USK is in turn derived by applying AES to KDIV, using DSK as 
the generation key, as shown in the foll
USK = AES_enc (DSK, KDIV)
Unique Identifier (UI): The UI of a Service Node shall be its EUI48, which is one of 
the three possible configurations used by IEEE for the device MAC address. [18]
 
6.6.7 Key distribution and management
 The Base Node defines the Security Profile that will be used for MAC control 
packets that will travel on the network. Any node that tries to attach to the network has 
to adapt to the Security Profile advertised by the Base Node BPDU, which cannot be 
Security Profile 0 because MAC control packets must be encrypted. Any Terminal 
Nodes on a subnetwork that transit to Switch functionality as a result of a promotion 
should also advertise the same Security Profile as the Base Node in their BPDUs.
 During a device registra
all time indicated by REG control packet specific fields for each device. All connections 
from/to the device must follow that Security Profile and any connections involving the 
same device cannot be a difference, in exception of the Base Node. 
 The SWK used to derive a working key for non
connections is never transmitted non
broadcast messages transmitted by the Base Node at 
keys for both unicast and non
response from the Base Node contains the random sequence used to derive WK for 
unicast traffic. The REG message is followed by a unicast SE
Node to the registering device. [18]
 
6.6.8 Data encryption algorithm
 Any connections working on Security Profile 1 always transmit a SCRC 
(Security CRC) with all packets. It is calculated over the unencrypted packet payload. It 
is the confirmation for the data contained in the packet for when it is decrypted at the 
receiving end. It is calculated by the generator polynomial g(D)=D8+D2+D+1 of the 
polynomial D8 multiplied by the unencrypted packet payload.
 The data block obtained by the
packet and the SCRC is padded with a 1 and as many zeroes as necessary to make it a 
multiple of 128 pack and divided into 128
start of the padding at the rece
sses of telecommunication 
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AES algorithm using the Working Key and the result is the encrypted payload of the 
packet. Afterwards the packet header is added as the final operation of the process. [19] 
[18] 
Figure 6.6. Encry
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
specifications for Smart Metering 
ption algorithm [19] 
 
 
111 Theoretical analysis of security features and weakne
specifications for Smart Metering
 
 
6.6.9 Transmitter MAC Security Module
 When a packet is being sent from MAC layer, the Transmitter Module first gives 
DMA-AES block a control signal indicating the address for the header and SRAM 
response fixed bytes to Transmitter Module through the DMA
Transmitter Module analyses the header and aggregates information such as payload 
and the fact that it must be encrypted or not, the kind of key should be used for 
encryption or the size of the data. This 
Figure 6.7. Transmitter Module Architecture [19]
1. Get address for Header
2. After getting Head, TX module has to analyze the Head information, then 
deciding the associated packet would encrypt or not, meanwhile, i
payload’s address. 
3. Get Header Words, and send to TX to analyzing
4. Read payload
5. Send payload to TX block encrypted or direct
 Aggregating control signal would be re
one or several cyclic times. DMA
when the payload need encrypted. Meanwhile, DMA
sentences from SRAM with indicating address, and 32
time based on the bus width. After encryption, DMA
back to TX module each time. [19]
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6.6.10 Receiver MAC Security Module
 When a packet from PHY is received, its associated information is analyzed and 
a decision is taken about whether it should be decrypted or not, which is needed for 
decryption and where it is going to be stored in the SRAM. After all this process DMA 
gives the Receiver Module a control signal indicating that it is ready for receiving a new 
packet. All the procedure is shown in the following figure:
Figure 6.8 Receiver Modu
 
1. Read Header from PHY and decide either to encrypt or not indicating 
address in SRAM 
2. Store Head to SRAM
3. Control signal
4. Get payload 
5. Send payload to DMA decrypted or direct
 After analyzing by RX module, address which indicates in the SR
attained, and the packet would directly send to SRAM through DMA module if the 
packet needs no decryption. Then DMA module gives RX a control signal indicating 
that it has capability to receive next packet. [19]
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6.7 Possible attacks to PRIME
 Although AES-128 algorithm is supposed to give complete cryptographic 
protection when implemented, methods to break the algorithm and being capable of 
unencrypt the information protected with it may be attempted. If this scenario is 
reproduced, security issues 
other kinds of attacks may be performed to get over security procedures implemented in 
PRIME. 
 
6.7.1 Exposition of the keys
 PRIME security does not provide Perfect Forward Secrecy. Compromise of 
the keys leads to compromise of recorded past sessions, consequently, if this 
compromise is not accomplished, this may enable an attacker to impersonate a Base 
Node and this may lead to attacker to attempt to obtain critical information from the 
Service nodes. 
 PRIME security procedures provide no protection against a legitimate device 
sharing its keys with a third party. Then, not permanently but during the period while 
the working are valid, an attacker may be capable of using the working to get access to 
the network and eavesdrop information from it. Since the attacker owns the valid 
working keys he may obtain this information unencrypted.
 
6.7.2 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
 One of the attacks that may be performed if an attacker is able to gets access 
the network is the DoS attack. This attack aims at preventing transmission of user data, 
and signaling and control information over the network disrupting communication and 
network operation. It can be achieved by malicious third parties who:
• Try to flood the network with big amounts of irrelevant information in 
order to make it collapse
• Induce specific protocol failures
• Impersonate as Base Nodes and then prevent data traffic, either user 
traffic, signaling traffic or control traffic, from being transmit
 
 
 
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
on PRIME will no longer be accomplished. Besides of that, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ted
in 
 
114 Theoretical analysis of security features and weaknesses of telecommunication 
 
6.7.3 Identity protection
 Since it was chosen to restrict to a single cryptographic primitive from 
symmetric cryptography, namely, the block cipher AES
possible to provide reasonable identity protection without faili
goal. 
 If only symmetric cryptography is used, only a weak form of identity 
protection may be offered, namely, pseudonym management. In other words, the peer 
and the server agree on pseudonyms that they use to identify each other 
change them periodically, possibly in a protected way so that an attacker cannot learn 
new pseudonyms before they are used.
 With pseudonym management, there is a trade
pseudonym resynchronization (thanks to a permanent
active attacks (in which the attacker forges messages simulating a pseudonym 
desynchronization). Because pseudonym management adds complexity to the protocol 
and implies this unsatisfactory trade
 However, PRIME security procedures may trivially provide some protection 
when the concern is to avoid the "real
attack can very simply be thwarted, merely by not providing users with an iden
allows easy recovery of their real
is not correlated to a real-life identity is used, no valuable information leaks because of 
the fact that not specific identity protection procedures 
 It is worth noting that the Base Node systematically discloses its identity, 
which may allow probing attacks. This may not be a problem as the identity of the 
server is not supposed to remain secret. On the contrary, users tend to want to
whom they will be talking in order to choose the right network to attach to.
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6.8 PRIME solutions for smart metering
 
6.8.1 Landis+Gyr E450
 
 There are many possible communication channels for the E450 smart meter. The 
optical channel can be used over the IEC62056
HDLC and DLMS/COSEM for upper layers. Also the standard RS485 channel can be 
used but the main one is the PRIME standard through the PLC modem incorporated into 
the smart meter using DLMS/COSEM for application layer. In this case, a full
communication system is implemented following the EN 50065
 
For further information on this smart meter go to: 
 
 
 
 The E450 Landi
has been designed to cover a wide range of 
different functions on the smart metering in 
the future. The E450 communication 
interfaces are based on the PRIM
on the MAC and PHY layers and 
DLMS/COSEM on the application layer. 
This fact makes it capable for combining 
many applications on its infrastructure and 
making them fully interoperable.
 It operates on the 50 Hz +/
temperature range from 
class 2 precision for reactive energy. It also 
incorporates a high precision clock without 
need for supply maintenance for up to 6 
years. 
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6.8.2 ADDM2102 Modem board for PRIME
 The ADDM2102 PRIME Modem Board provides a platform to develop a 
complete PRIME meter. It implements a PRIME certified ADD1021 System on Chip, 
isolated PLC coupling circuitry and power supply, programmin
and serial USB connection. The ADDM2102 board is included in ADD Semiconductor 
development kits, which are provided with a complete implementation of ADD 
Semiconductor’s certified PRIME software stack.
 The ADD1021 is a low
PLC with the PRIME standard for smart metering. It can reach a baud rate up to 128 
kbps in the CENELEC A band. It counts with hardware units specifically designed for it 
such as the 8051 enhanced microcontroller an
block for security implementation. Besides, the optimized Analog Front End (AFE) 
incorporated to it, allows an outstanding coupling with low cost BOM. All these 
benefits come as a result that it was specifically design
grid applications. 
 This PRIME fully digital solution has a very good performance at high 
temperatures as well as an outstanding performance against noise over the physical 
channel. Moreover, it presents a high efficiency in
consumption. [43] 
Figure 6.9. ADD1021 SoC block diagram [43]
 
For further information on this ADD PRIME solution go to: 
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7. PLC G3 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 PLC G3 is a PLC OFDM standard of communication system for m
purposes that was developed by ERDF and Maxim. The design of the standard was 
developed to accomplish the aims of robustness, simplicity, flexibility, security, 
openness and scalability. The layers stack implemented to fulfill these goals is formed
by: 
• A robust high
adapted to PLC environment
• A MAC layer of the IEEE type, well suited to low data rates
• IPv6, the new IP generation and the 6LoWPAN adaptation 
sublayer taken from the internet world to adapt IPv6 to
the best possible way
• Application layer comprising two broad classes of applications: 
the metering application based on DLMS/COSEM and the Application 
ensuring the management of the meter
 The following figure gives an overview of the PLC
communication profile when it is used to implement applications for Automated Meter 
Management (AMM) with the DLMS/COSEM protocol at the application level.
Figure 7.1. PLC OFDM G3 metering communication profile [22]
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7.2 Physical layer overview
 The PLC G3 works between the 35.9 kHz to 90.6 kHz frequencies of the 
CENELEC-A band. An OFDM combined with either DBPSK or DQPSK modulation 
scheme is chosen to reach 33.4 Kbps data rate in normal conditions operation of the 
system. This makes the design of the receiver circuitry simple because there no need for 
coherent detection for the carriers phase. Instead of that, adjacent symbol is used for 
detecting the phase of the carriers of the current symbol.
 The system has two possible works modes, n
Normal mode, the FEC is composed of a Reed Solomon Encoder, either with 8 or 16 
Bytes of parity, and a convolutional encoder. In the Robust mode the FEC is composed 
of Reed Solomon and convolutional encoders followed by a R
repeat each bit four times, making the system more robust to channel impairments. In 
the following figure can be seen a block diagram of the OFDM transceiver: [24]
Figure 7.2. OFDM Block transceiver [24]
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 As seen before, two poss
with OFDM. Moreover, also the Robust Mode for protecting the data against a noisy 
transmission medium may be used when necessary. For these possible modes of system 
operation, all basic physical paramete
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Figure 7.3. PLC G3 PHY layer parameters [24]
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7.3 MAC layer overview
Two functional blocks composed the MAC layer in PLC G3:
• The MAC Common Part Sublayer (M
communication with neighbouring nodes. Its numerous functions are the 
following: 
 
o  Generation of the MAC Protocol Data Units (MAC PDUs) which 
can be data frames, check frames or beacon frames
o  Regulation of the CSMA/CA Access Medium me
treatment of QoS
o  Reliable data transfer to the immediate neighbours using ACK 
mechanism 
o Encryption in AES
various Group Session Keys and an Anti
o PAN selection and addressing of the different nod
format or 16 bits short address used for the LBP protocol of the 
6LoWPAN layer
• The MAC Layer Management Entity (MLME) 
management of the MAC sublayer. The sublayer functions are:
 
o  Active scan of neighbouring nodes when a nod
connect to the network or after the detachment of a node. The EAP 
protocol whose packets are encapsulated into 6LoWPAN packets is in 
charge of this process
o  Management of the MAC level parameters that constitute the 
MAC Information Base
o  Initialization and re
[22] 
 
7.4 6LoWPAN Adaptation layer overview
Three functional blocks can be identified within the 6LoWPAN Adaptation Layer:
•  The common processing operations block
end communications within PLC PAN. It is based in the 6LoWPAN Information 
Base and its Routing Table, which contains the 16 bit addresses of neighbor 
nodes. It has a lot of important functions: Upper levels header compression, 
fragmentation, generation of the
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•  The routing function
using the LOAD protocol, which is a compact version of the AODV protocol 
adapted to 6LoWPAN
• The Security and Initial Configuration function.
6LoWPAN Bootstrapping Protocol (LBP) encapsulating the EAP authentication 
protocol. Its function is an authentication process before the shared keys can be 
exchanged between the network nodes [22]
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7.5 Security on PLC G3
 Many security services are provided on the PLC G3 OFDM network, all of them 
based on the EAP protocol. This protocol is very flexible and supports a wide range of 
EAP methods for different purposes. Each one of these methods is characterized by its 
credentials (shared secret, certificate, SIM cards, etc) and by its signature and 
encryption algorithms. 
 In the case of PLC G3 the method chosen is EAP
France Telecom R&D in 2003
goals that were taken into account in this method design:
• Simplicity: EAP-
Restriction to such a primitive, and in particular, not using asymmetric 
cryptography like Diffie
understand and implement while avoiding cryptographic negotiations. It can also 
be described as lightweight and well suited for any type of device, especially 
those with little processing power and memory. However, this prevents EAP
PSK from offering advanced features such as identity protection, password 
support, or Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). This choice has been deliberately 
made as a trade-off between simplicity and security. For the sake of simplicity, 
EAP-PSK has also chosen a fixed mess
(TLV) design. 
• Security: Since the design of authenticated key exchange is notoriously 
known to be hard and error prone, EAP
cryptographic mechanism. It attempts instead to build on
protocols that have been reviewed by the cryptographic
• Extensibility:
its protected channel. Thanks to this mechanism, the EAP
to provide more sophisticated security services when the need to do so arises. In 
th3 PLC G3 case, it is easily extensible to the Group Key distribution.
• Wide applicability:
any network, and in particular over IEEE 802.11 wi
 
7.5.1 Access Control and Authentication
 An End Device (ED) cannot access the network before passing a preliminary 
Identification and Authentication process. This stage is based on two parameters that 
characterize every ED: 
• A EUI-48 MAC 
domain address. It may be easily converted into EUI
802.15.4 standard published in 2006 and its related documents.
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-PSK, which was developed in 
-2004. It was chosen in order to accomplish the following 
 
PSK relies on a single cryptographic primitive, AES
-Hellman key exchange, makes EAP
age format and not a Type
-PSK tries to avoid inventing any new
 existing primitives and 
 community.
 It provides a mechanism to allow future extensions within 
-PSK method will be 
 EAP-PSK should be suitable to authenticate over 
reless LANs. [23]
 
address as defined in [802-2001] considered as a public 
-64 as required in the 
 
 
-128. 
-PSK easy to 
-
-Length-Value 
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• A 128-bit shared secret
credential during the authentication process. It is shared between the ED and the 
authentication server. The mutual authentication is based on the assumption that 
the other part knows the PSK. From this PSK the Authentication Key (AK) is 
derived, a key used only for the purpose of authentication, which makes this part 
cryptographically independent from other aspects of the EAP protocol.
 These Authentication and Identification procedures are activated when an ED 
restarts and can be also activated at any tim
so. Embedding the EAP protocol, the 6LoWPAN Bootstrapping Protocol (LBP) carries 
the related material. These two protocols have been designed to be relayed by 
intermediate nodes. Then , during the Bootstrappin
have not yet acquired a routable 16
Coordinator (aka LBS) they can directly communicate. Otherwise, they must use an 
intermediate node (aka LBA) located at 1
 
 The LBP protocol has been designed to fit two different authentication 
architectures: 
• The authentication function is directly supported by the LoWPAN 
Bootstrapping Server (LBS), and in this case all the authentication material 
(access lists, credentials, etc.) must be loaded in the LBS.
• The authentication function is supported by a remote and centralized 
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server, and in this case, 
the LBS is only in charge of forwarding the EAP messages to the A
over a standard AAA protocol.
 
 In this case, the AAA protocol used is Remote Authentication Dial in User 
Service (RADIUS), an IETF standard whose server is usually a background process 
running in a UNIX or Windows server. The protocol works on t
level using UDP and its procedure is simple: the user sends a request to a Remote 
Access Server (NAS) to gain access to a network using access credentials. After that, 
the NAS requests access for that user to the RADIUS server includin
credentials and the RADIUS server checks the user identity via EAP procedures.
 
 After the EAP procedures, the NAS sends back to the user either one of three 
possible answers: the Access Accept granting the access for the user, the Access Reject
denying the user access or the Access Challenge for requesting additional information 
from the user such as a secondary password or PIN. In response, the user may ask for a 
reason for the rejection, send a welcome message for the acceptance or send the 
additional information required. [23] [71] [72]
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 (aka Pre-Shared Key or PSK) used as a 
e if the security policy agreed requires to do 
g phase, when an ED (aka LBD) that 
-bit address, is a 1-hop distance of the PAN 
-hop distance of the LBD. [23]
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Figure 7.4. RADIUS Authentication procedure [103]
 
7.5.2 Bootstrapping procedure
 At the beginning of the Bootstrapping procedure, an ED (aka LoWPAN 
Bootstrapping Device or LBD) must launch an active channe
can start an active scan by invoking the ADPMDISCOVERY. request primitive, and 
specifying the duration of the scan. The adaptation layer then invokes the MLME
SCAN.request primitive of the MAC layer specifying the same parameters.
 The LBD sends a 1
Device in the Neighborhood should reply by sending a Beacon frame with its PAN 
identifier, short address and capabilities.
 Upon completion, the MAC layer issues a MLME
with the list of existing PAN in the PANDescriptorList parameter. In response, the 
adaptation layer generates an ADPM
the PANDescriptorList parameter provided by the MAC layer.
 At the end of the scan,
quality, association permit, PAN identifier and short address (according to a round robin 
algorithm). It may be either the PAN coordinator that play the role of LoWPAN 
Bootstrapping Server (LBS) or a
specifications for Smart Metering 
 
 
 
l scan. The higher layer 
-hop broadcast Beacon.request frame and any Full Feature 
 
-SCAN.confirm
-DISCOVERY.confirm primitive which contains 
 
 the LBD selects one of the Beacon senders based on link 
nother FFD. In the latter case, the FFD (aka LoWPAN 
 
 
-
 
 primitive, 
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Bootstrapping Agent or LBA) is in charge of relaying the LoWPAN Bootstrapping 
Protocol (LBP) frames between the LBA and the LBS.
 Then, the LBD sends an LBP JOINING frame to the LBA. This frame includes a
field that carries the EUI-64 address of the joining LBD. When received by the LBA, 
this frame is relayed by the LBA to the LBS. The LBA is supposed fully bootstrapped 
with the full capability to directly transmit any message to the LBS in a secure way. A
soon as the LBS gets the message, the EUI
and two possibilities follow it: the address does not fit the list and a LBP DECLINE 
message is sent back to the LBA. On the contrary, if the address fits the list and L
CHALLENGE message is sent back embedding an EAP.Request message asking for 
further data for identification. [23]
 
7.5.3 Authentication and Key distribution phase
 This phase is totally dependent of the EAP method used. In the case of EAP
PSK, methods are ordinary based on two round
• The first one is for mutual Authentication and initial exchange of 
ciphering material 
• The second one for mutual control of session keys derivation
 At the end of the process, the LBD should be provided with dif
keys: 
• Unicast session keys
messages 
• Group session keys
that have passed through the authentication stage. Its usage is for encryption and 
decryption of every MAC frame travelling in the PAN. For the security of the 
network these keys are refreshed not only timely but every time that a node is 
detached from the network.
• More specific keys
Application layer 
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-64 is compared with an Access Control list 
 
 
-trip exchanges: 
 that are timely refreshed for security of EAP 
 for the PAN security, which are shared by all nodes 
 
 to provide security on higher levels such as the 
 
s 
BP 
-
 
ferent groups of 
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7.5.4 Authorization and initial configuration phase
 After the authentication and key distribution phase there are two possible 
scenarios that may occur: 
• The process does not reach completion and an LBP DECLINE message 
is sent back by the L
• The process is completed and the LBS selects a 16
sends back an LBP ACCEPTED message, embedding an EAP.success message 
and the LBD activates the GMK key. A second LBP ACCEPTED mess
sent by the LBS embedding the address and various parameters. Now, the LDB 
owns all necessary session keys and can transmit messages securely end
[23] 
Figure 7.5. LBP and EAP Relaying capabilities [23]
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BS embedding an EAP.failure message reaching the LBD.
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7.5.5 Confidentiality and Integrity
 Confidentiality and Integrity services are implemented differently depending on 
the level: 
• At MAC level:
using a CCM* type of ciphering, in exception of control frames used during the 
Bootstrapping proces
receive a Group Master Key (GMK) securely using the EAP
Channel. 
• At EAP-PSK level:
provides Confidentiality and Integrity services to the me
between the EAP server and any peer. [23]
 
Figure 7.6. Confidentiality at MAC and EAP
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 All frames are encrypted and decrypted at every hop 
s. In order to support this service all nodes in the network 
 The EAP-PSK Protected Channel (PCHANNEL) 
ssages exchanged 
 
-PSK levels [23]
-PSK Protected 
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7.5.6 Cryptographic design of EAP
EAP-PSK uses three cryptographic parts:
• A key setup
(KDK) from PSK. 
• An authenticated key exchange protocol
communicating parties and derive session keys
• A protected channel protocol
authenticated parties [23]
 
7.5.7 Key Setup 
 During the key setup AK and KDK are derived from the PSK using the modified 
counter mode of operation of AES
increasing function that expands one AES
t≥2. This operation is done just once immediately after the PSK has been provisioned. 
As soon as the derivation is done, the PSK should be securely deleted. [23]
 
7.5.8 The Authenticated Key Exchange
 The authentication protocol used by EAP
consists in a one-and-a-half round trip exchange as the following:
Figure 7.7. AKEP2 round trip exchange [28]
 
EAP-PSK instantiates this protocol with:
• The server as A and the peer as B
• na and nb as 16.byte random numbers RAND_S and RAND_P
• A and B as their 
specifications for Smart Metering 
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 for communication between the mutually 
 
-128. The modified counter mode is a length 
-128 block into a longer t-block output where 
 
-PSK is inspired by AKEP2 that 
 
 
 
 
 
respective NAIs ID_S and ID_P 
 
-Derivation Key 
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• The MAC algorithm as CMAC with AES
tag length of 16 bytes
• The modified counter mode of operation of AES
derive session keys as a result of the exchange [28]
 
7.5.9 Protected Chann
 EAP-PSK provides a protected channel using EAX mode of operation for 
mutual authenticated parties to communicate over. It is used to exchange protected 
result indications and may have further usages in the future. Figure 7.8 shows how EAX 
is used to implement the protected channel (PCHANNEL). It encrypts a Plain Text 
Payload up to 960 bytes and provides replay protection.
 In the PCHANNEL, AES
used to provide cryptographic security to the encryption and 
as well as protection replay. The header H consists of the first 22 bytes of the EAP 
request or response packet and the Tag is a MAC that protects both the header and the 
payload. 
 The 2-bit R flag of the PCHANNEL field is sent i
EAP-PSK messages and it us used to provide result indications. Since it is 
communicated over the protected channel it is encrypted, integrity
protected against replays. It can take three possible values: 01 to 
to mean DONE_SUCCESS or 11 to mean DONE_FAILURE. Both the peer and the 
server remember about both values of R that have sent and they have received, and this 
conjuction indicates either the success or failure of the maintained EAP
[23] 
 
7.5.10 Key Hierarchy 
 The EAP-PSK method based on the EAP specification defines a key hierarchy 
as the following: 
 
Pre-Shared Key (PSK): This Key is shared between the EAP peer and the EAP server 
and it is assumed that they are the only ones tha
distribution the security properties are reduced as in all other symmetric key methods. 
The protocol also assumes that both the server and the peer identify the correct PSK to 
use with each other thanks to their respectiv
most one PSK shared between a server using a given server NAI and a peer using a 
given peer NAI. 
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
-128 using AK and producing a 
 
-128 using KDK, to 
 
el 
 
-128 is encrypted with the TEK key. The nonce N is 
data origin authentication 
n the third and fourth types of 
mean CONTINUE, 10 
t know it, because if it has wider 
e NAIs, which means that there must be at 
-protected and 
-PSK dialog. 
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 This key is used to derive two 16
the Authentication Key (AK) and 
done only once during the called key setup.
Authentication Key (AK)
EAP server. It is a static long
respective NAIs the peer and the server identify the correct AK to use, which means, as 
well as with the previous key, that there must be only one AK shared between an EAP 
server and an EAP peer given their NAIs. The EAP peer chooses the AK to use based 
on the first EAP-PSK message sent and it includes it on the second EAP
Key-Derivation Key (KDK)
the EAP peer and the EAP server, named TEK, MSK and EMSK. It is a static long
lived key derived from PSK. As well as with previous keys, there must be only one 
KDK shared between peer and server using their given NAIs. As it was done with the 
AK it is chosen from the first EAP
message. 
Transient EAP Key (TEK)
during authentication and the KDK. Its use is to implement a protected channel for both 
mutually authenticated parties to communicate over securely. EAP
bit TEK in collaboration wi
Master Session Key (MSK)
during authentication and the KDK. It is a 512
the application level. 
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
exchange during authentication and the KDK. As well as MSK, the EMSK is a 512
key. It is included on the EAP
not be generated. [23] [68] [69]
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the Key-Derivation Key (KDK). This derivation is 
 
: It is used to mutually authenticate the EAP peer and the 
-lived key derived from the PSK. Thanks to their 
: This key is used to derive session keys shared between 
-PSK message and included in the second EAP
: This key is derived from a random number exchange 
-PSK uses the 128
th AES-128 in EAX mode of operation as a cipher suite.
: This key is also derived from a random number exchange 
-bit key to be used to provide security at 
: This key is derived from a random number 
-PSK protocol but not used on OFDM CPL so it might 
 
 
-PSK message. 
-
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 In the following figure an overview of the Key Hierarchy of the protocol is 
shown, with the derivation process, the EAP
process: 
 
Figure 7.8. EAP
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-PSK message flow and the key exchange 
-PSK Key Hierarchy overview [23] 
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7.5.11 Group Master Key distribution
 The 128-bit GMK is generated by the EAP server and then, securely and 
individually delivered to the EAP peers via the PCHANNEL. It is assumed being 
random and its generation is considered as purely implementation dependant. It is 
distributed in two scenarios: during the bootstrapping process as a regular extension to 
EAP-PSK message 3 or during the re
PSK message 5. Its lifetime is rather long (several 10s years) due to the 4 byte counter
included in the nonce. The procedure with is dependent on each side:
•  Peer side procedure:
key in its respective slot and starts ciphering the messages with it as soon as it 
receives an EAP Success message.
•  Server side procedure:
new GMK and transmits a LBP Challenge message that contains it coupled with 
the preceding one to every formerly authenticated peer expecting for the success 
confirmation response of ev
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-keying process as a regular extension to EAP
 
 When a peer receives a new GMK it installs the 
 
 In case of re-keying, the EAP server generates a 
ery peer. [23] 
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7.6 Possible attacks to PLC G3
 
7.6.1 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
 Denial of Service (DoS) resistance has not been a design goal for EAP
Therefore, it is recommended that EAP
interleaved in its dialog to prevent potential DoS attacks. Indeed, since EAP 
notifications are not integrity protected, they can easily be spoofed by an attacker. Such 
an attacker could force a peer that allows EAP notifications to engage in a discussion 
that would delay his or her authentication or result in the peer taking unexpected 
actions. 
 It is up to the implementation of EAP
specify the maximum number of failed cryptographic checks that are allowed. Anyway, 
for the sake of simplicity and denial
include any error messages.  Hence, an invalid EAP
Although this makes interoperability testing and debugging harder, this leads to simpler 
implementations and does not open any venue for denial
 
7.6.2 Exposition of the PSK
 EAP-PSK does not provide Perfect Forward Secrecy. Compromise of the PSK 
leads to compromise of recorded past sessions, consequently, if this c
accomplished, this may enable an attacker to impersonate the peer and the server: 
compromise of the PSK leads to full compromise of future sessions.
 EAP-PSK provides no protection against a legitimate peer sharing its PSK 
with a third party. Such protection may be provided by appropriate repositories for the 
PSK. The PSK used by EAP
and the server. In particular, this PSK must not be shared by a group of peers 
communicating with the sam
 The PSK used by EAP
used by other protocols, otherwise the security of EAP
a rule of thumb in cryptography to use different keys for different applications. [68] [69
 
7.6.3 Identity protection
 Since it was chosen to restrict to a single cryptographic primitive from 
symmetric cryptography, namely, the block cipher AES
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
 
-PSK not allow EAP notifications to be 
-PSK or to the peer and the server to 
-of-service resilience, EAP-PSK has chosen not to 
-PSK message is silently discarded. 
-of-service attacks. [68] [69]
 
ompromise is not 
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e server. 
-PSK must be cryptographically separated from keys 
-PSK may be compromised. It is 
 
-128, it appears that it is not 
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possible to provide reasonable identity protection without failing to
goal. 
 If only symmetric cryptography is used, only a weak form of identity 
protection may be offered, namely, pseudonym management. In other words, the peer 
and the server agree on pseudonyms that they use to identify each other and u
change them periodically, possibly in a protected way so that an attacker cannot learn 
new pseudonyms before they are used.
 With pseudonym management, there is a trade
pseudonym resynchronization (thanks to a permanent iden
active attacks (in which the attacker forges messages simulating a pseudonym 
desynchronization). Because pseudonym management adds complexity to the protocol 
and implies this unsatisfactory trade
EAP-PSK. 
 However, EAP-PSK may trivially provide some protection when the concern 
is to avoid the "real-life" identity of the user being discovered. EAP
simply thwart this attack, merely by not providing users with a NAI t
recovery of their real-life identity. It is believed that when a NAI that is not correlated to 
a real-life identity is used, no valuable information leaks because of the EAP method.
 It is worth noting that the server systematically disclos
may allow probing attacks.  This may not be a problem as the identity of the server is 
not supposed to remain secret. On the contrary, users tend to want to know to whom 
they will be talking in order to choose the right network to at
 
7.6.4 Packet modification attacks
 While EAP methods may support per
integrity, and replay protection, support is not provided within the EAP layer.
 Since the Identifier is only a single octet, it is 
attacker to successfully inject or replay EAP packets. An attacker may also modify EAP 
headers (Code, Identifier, Length, Type) within EAP packets where the header is 
unprotected. This could cause packets to be inappropriately di
 To protect EAP packets against modification, spoofing, or replay, methods 
supporting protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual authentication, and key derivation, 
as well as integrity and replay protection, are recommended.
 Method-specific MICs may be used to provide protection. If a per
is employed within an EAP method, then peers, authentication servers, and 
authenticators not operating in pass
specifications for Smart Metering 
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validation failures should be lo
fatal error or not is determined by the EAP method specification.
 It is recommended that methods providing integrity protection of EAP packets 
include coverage of all the EAP header fields, including 
Type, and Type-Data fields. Additionally, since EAP messages of Types Identity, 
Notification, and Nak do not include their own MIC, it may be desirable for the EAP 
method MIC to cover information contained within these message
header of each EAP message. [68] [69]
 
7.6.5 Weak ciphersuites
 If after the initial EAP authentication, data packets are sent without per
authentication, integrity, and replay protection, an attacker with access to the media can 
inject packets, flip bits within existing packets, replay packets, or even hijack the 
session completely. Without per
packets. 
 To protect against data modification, spoofing, or snooping, it is 
recommended that EAP methods supporting mutual authentication and key derivation 
be used, along with lower layers providing per
integrity, and replay protection.
 Additionally, if the lower layer performs ciphersuite negotiat
understood that EAP does not provide by itself integrity protection of that negotiation. 
Therefore, in order to avoid downgrading attacks which would lead to weaker 
ciphersuites being used, clients implementing lower layer ciphersuite neg
protect against negotiation downgrading. [68] [69]
 
7.6.6 Separation of authenticator and backend authentication server
 In the case where the authenticator and authentication server reside on 
different machines, there are several implicati
• Authentication will occur between the peer and the authentication server, not 
between the peer and the authenticator. This means that it is not possible for the 
peer to validate the identity of the authenticator that it is speaking to, us
alone. 
• The authenticator is dependent on the AAA protocol in order to know the 
outcome of an authentication conversation, and does not look at the 
encapsulated EAP packet to determine the outcome. In practice, this implies that 
sses of telecommunication 
 
gged. Whether a MIC validation failure is considered a 
 
the Code, Identifier, Length, 
s, as well as the 
 
 
-packet confidentiality, it is possible to snoop data 
-packet confidentiality, authentication, 
 
ion, it should be 
 
ons for security: 
-packet 
otiation should 
 
ing EAP 
136 Theoretical analysis of security features and weaknesses of telecommunication 
 
the AAA protocol spo
must support per-packet authentication, integrity, and replay protection.
• After completion of the EAP conversation, where lower layer security services 
such as per-packet confidentiality, authenticati
protection will be enabled, a secure association protocol should be run between 
the peer and authenticator in order to provide mutual authentication between the 
peer and authenticator, guarantee liveness of transient session keys,
protected ciphersuite and capabilities negotiation for subsequent data, and 
synchronize key usage.
• An AAA-Key derived from the MSK and/or EMSK negotiated between the 
peer and authentication server may be transmitted to the authenticator. 
Therefore, a mechanism needs to be provided to transmit the AAA
authentication server to the authenticator that needs it. [68] [69]
  
7.6.7 Channel binding
 It is possible for a compromised or poorly implemented EAP authenticator to 
communicate incorrect information to the EAP peer and/or server.  This may enable an 
authenticator to impersonate another authenticator or communicate incorrect 
information via out-of-band mechanisms such as via a AAA or lower layer protocol.
 Where EAP is used in pass
verify the identity of the pass
through authenticator is trusted by the EAP server. This creates a potential security 
vulnerability. 
 An EAP pass-through authent
it attempts to impersonate another authenticator by various details such as sending 
incorrect NAS-Identifier, NAS
AAA protocol. However, it is possible for 
AAA client to provide correct information to the AAA server while communicating 
misleading information to the EAP peer via a lower layer protocol.
 For example, it is possible for a compromised authenticator to use
authenticator's Called-Station
peer via a lower layer protocol, or for a pass
client to provide an incorrect peer Calling
protocol. 
 In order to address this vulnerability, EAP methods may support a protected 
exchange of channel properties such as endpoint identifiers, including: Called
Id, Calling-Station-Id, NAS
[69] 
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7.7 Maxim PLC G3 solutions                         
 On the figure below, a smart meter block diagram is presented where the 
blocks painted on blue are the ones that can be implemented by Maxim solutions. The 
most important three are the meterin
Real-Time Clock (RTC). These blocks are the ones that can be identified as 
characteristic for an Automated Meter Reading (AMR) application. Their possible 
solutions are described on the following lines.
 
Figur
sses of telecommunication 
 
g SoC, the data communications block and the 
 
e 7.9. Smart meter block diagram [25] 
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7.7.1 Metering SoC 
7.7.1.1 71M6541D/41F, 71M6542F (single phase), 71M6543F/43H (polyphase)
 The Teridian 71M6541D/41F/42F (single phase) and 71M6543F/43H 
(polyphase) are highly integrated, flexible metering SoC
residential, commercial, and industrial meter applications with up to Class 0.2 accuracy. 
The devices incorporate a 5MHz 8051
engine , a low-power RTC with digital temperature comp
memory and 5KB RAM; and an LCD driver. The proprietary Single Converter 
Technology architecture includes a 22
linearity performance over a wide dynamic range and consumes less power t
multi-ADC implementation. Automatic switching between main power and three 
battery-backup modes ensures operational reliability.
 The 71M6541D/41F are packaged in a 64
71M6542F/43F/43H are packaged in a 100
71M6541D/41F/42F and 71M6543F/43H metering SoCs also feature a proprietary 
isolation technology. By using low
of the Teridian isolated sensors (71M6601*, 71M6103*), these metering solutions 
eliminate the need for expensive, bulky current transformers. This, in turn, reduces costs 
and casing size requirements. The metering design will also benefit from immunity to 
magnetic tampering and enhanced reliability. 
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Figure 7.10. 71M654
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3F/71M6543H polyphase metering SoCs diagram [25]
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Figure 7.11. 71M6541D/71M6541F single
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7.7.2 Real-Time Clock (RTC)
7.7.2.1 DS3231M 
 The DS3231M is a highly precise real
resonator technology. It meets the core requirements for accuracy, stability, power, and 
compliance testing for smart meters. This innovative RTC provides temperature
compensated timing accuracy of 
MEMS technology makes the DS3231M less sensitive to shock and vibration than 
traditional crystal-based clocks. It is also less sensitive to accuracy drift, which is quite 
common with aging quartz crystals. 
 The DS3231M is a low
Switching automatically between the main and battery power, it meets the industry 
requirement for dual-supply operation as a safeguard in the absence of main power.
 The DS3231M’s accuracy and stability make it particularly suitable for 
multitariff metering. With no crystal to consume space and add cost, it is a low
solution for time-based billing and rate charges directly at the meter. It is a viable option 
for metering networks that do not distribute time
but must maintain an accurate time base at the meter. 
 
Figure 7.12. DS3231M RTC block diagram [25]
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 }0.5s/day (< 5.0ppm) from -40°C to +85°C. The 
 
-power device (< 3.0µA) that prolongs 
-of-day information between mete
[25] 
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7.7.3 Data Communications
 The part of the system that explicitly works on the PLC G3 protocol is the 
Data Communications block. It consists on
(AFE) for signal conditioning. Two options are offered by Maxim as a solution for this 
block implementation: 
 
7.7.3.1 MAX2990/MAX2991
 The MAX2990 modem and the MAX2991 analog front
PLC chipset that achieves reliable long
highly rated SoC that combines the PHY and MAC layers using Maxim’s 16
microcontroller core. MAX2991 is a IC that implements two
control (AGC) with 62 dB dy
offset cancelation. They offer up to 100 kbps at 10 kHz to 490 kHz and up to 32 kbps at 
10 kHz to 95 kHz including forward error correction (FEC), CRC16 and CRC32. The 
traffic in multimode networks is ru
mechanism for data transmission reliability. In addition, they implement DES/3DES 
security protocols, in order to prevent tampering. [25]
Figure 7.13. MAX2990 and MAX2991 block diagrams [25]
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7.7.3.2 MAX2992 
 The MAX2992 modem improves the long
extending network capabilities to transmission over transformers. It is a highly rated 
SoC that combines the PHY and MAC layers using Maxim’s 32
microcontroller core. Two forms of
reliability over older PLC generations and it is compatible with older FSK
technologies. It operates in the CENELEC band frequency band among others. In 
combination with MAX2991 a full PLC modem can be real
 This modem offers many benefits in front of MAX2990. It provides up to 225 
kbps effective data rate at 10 kHz to 490 kHz and up to 44 kbps effective data rate at 10 
kHz to 95 kHz with a maximum data rate of 298 kbps
correction (FEC), CRC16 and CRC32. The traffic in multimode networks is ruled by 
CSMA/CA algorithm combined with an ARQ mechanism for data transmission 
reliability. In addition, it implements an AES
tampering and the 6LoWPAN adap
 
Figure 7.14. MAX2992 block diagram [25]
 
For further information on Maxim PLC G3 solutions please go to: 
ic.com/smartgrid 
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ized. 
 including forward error 
-128 fast engine in order to prevent 
tation layer supporting IPv6. [25] 
 
-bit MAXQ 
-based PLC 
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8. IEC 62056-21, FLAG Protocol
 
8.1 Introduction 
 IEC 62056-21:2002, also known as 
version of the originally IEC 1107:1990. It can be used for local data exchange using a 
HHU (Hand Held Unit) or for remote data exchange. In fact, when the need for a 
standard protocol for reading and programming 
the FLAG protocol appeared as the first standard protocol for meter data exchange and 
it has been always widely used. Three different physical interfaces may be 
implemented, infrared optical, current loop or V.24/V.28.
with ASCII characters is used with a baud rate from 300 to 19200 and both reading and 
programming of devices can be operated.
 
8.2 FLAG Manufacturers ID
 All manufacturers working with the FLAG protocol are integrated in the FLA
Protocol Association and are identified by the association with a three
list of all of them with their corresponding three
following link: http://www.dlms.com/organization/flagmanufacturesids/index.html
 
8.3 Characteristics of the FLAG Protocol
 Many advantages give FLAG an advanced position in front of other protocols 
for meter data exchange: 
• Flexible for configuring progra
• Low cost of the optical port
• Common HHU reading and programming
• Can allow for manufacturer
• Optical port is robust in residential applications
• Very low overhead which means low complex post
• Simplicity of hardware circuitry
• Can accommodate an unlimited scope in the security access to data, 
which means each manufacturer may use their own proprietary methods to 
secure the equipment
 
specifications for Smart Metering 
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complex metering devices was arising, 
 Asynchronous data exchange 
 
 
-
-letter code can be found in the 
 
mmable meters 
 
 
-specific functions and testing
 
-processing data
 
 
 
G 
letter code. The 
. [66] 
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 There are five different communications modes available to use with 
protocol which are previously negotiated between the meter and the HHU:
• Mode A: Supports bidirectional data exchange at constant 300 baud rate. 
It allows data readout and programming with optional data protection.
• Mode B: Supports bidirectional data e
allows data readout and programming with optional data protection.
• Mode C: Supports bidirectional data exchange with baud rate switching 
and permits data readout, programming with enhanced security and 
manufacturer-specifi
• Mode D: Supports unidirectional data exchange at a fixed baud rate of 
2400 baud and permits data readout only.
• Mode E: Supports usage of advanced metering protocols on the 
application and transport layers like DLMS/COSEM while on remote two
communication. On the data link layer, the HDLC protocol is used. [14]
 
8.4 Physical medium for data transmission
 There are three possible ways of physical communication connection between 
the Hand Held Unit (HHU) and the tariff equipment:
• Electrical interf
• Electricity V.24/ V.28 interface
• Optical interface
 
8.4.1 Electrical interface with current loop
 In this case a 20 mA electrical current loop is implemented, with 30 V DC for 
open circuit voltage and 30 mA loop current as absolute li
In the following table all electrical parameters operating values are shown:
Current 
Zero, without the current
loop, State A 
One, 20 mA the current 
loop, State Z 
The voltage drop 
One, 20 mA the current 
loop, State Z 
The maximum open circuit voltage
Figure 8.1. Electrical interface parameters
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mits for electrical parameters. 
Transmission (TX) Reception
 
≤ 2,5 mA ≤ 3 mA
≥ 11 mA ≥ 9
Transmission (TX) Reception
≤ 2 V ≤
 during operation 30 V DC
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-way 
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 (RX) 
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 Regarding connectors, polarity errors can dama
communication so it is something to take into account when operating with it. Four 
different circuit arrangements can be implemented which are: Two
with a single or more substations or a four
substations. [14] 
 
8.4.2 Electricity V.24/V.28
The relevant ITU-T recommendations:
• ITU-T V.24
(transmitted data) and 104 (
• ITU-T V.28
accordance with ITU
up to 20 kbps. [14] 
 
8.4.3 Optical interface
In the following figures the design of the optical probe head is shown:
Figure 8.2. Arrangement and dimensions of components of probe heads [14]
8.4.3.1 Optical characteristics
 Although it is not prescribed by
will be provided when the test conditions
the correct position (cable 
the infrared transmitter and infrared
directly to the infrared transmitter
position do not substantially
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ge device and prohibit 
-wire implementation 
-wire configuration either with one or more 
 interface 
 
: Use only the number of circuit 102 (signal ground)
received data). 
: Electrical characteristics of the coupling circuits
-T Recommendation V.28. These allow data transfer rates
 
 
 
 
 a mechanical adjustment, optimal
 are implemented, when the reading head is
down), infrared receiver devices in tariff are set
 sensing head scanning receiver in
 in the tariff device. Small deviation
 affect the characteristics. At larger deviations
 
, 103 
 must be in 
 
 
 
 data transfer 
 in 
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deterioration of optical characteristics. The wavelength
directions is between 800 nm
 
8.4.3.2 Transmitter and receiver
 The transmitter device
signal with a spectral width of
area) at a1 = 10 mm (± 1 mm)
following limits are defined for the transmitter radiation:
ZAP = ON, VYP = OFF 
ZAP-State (ZAP = State A = Binary 0): 500 
VYP-State (VYP = State Z (
 
 The transmitter, which is located 
mm) from the receiver in the
spectral width of E0/R defined
limits are defined for the receiver radiation:
ZAP = ON, VYP = OFF 
ZAP-State: receiver clearly
VYP-State: receiver clearly
Binary 1) [14] 
 
Figure 8.3. Testing for the transmitter and receiver arrangement [14]
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 of the emitted
 and 1000 nm (infrared). [14] 
 
 in the tariff, as well as the scanning head,
 radiation E0/T defined reference surface 
 from the surface of the tariff device or sensor head
 
≤ E0/T ≤ 5000 µW/cm2 
idle state) = Binary 1): E0/T ≤ 10 µW/cm2 
in the optical axis at a distance 
 tariff device or sensor head generates a signal
 reference surface (optically active area). 
 
 ZAP at E0/R  ≥ 200 µW/cm2 (ZAP = State A = Binary 0) 
 VYP at E0/R  ≤ 20 µW/cm2 (VYP = State Z (
 signals in both 
 generates a 
(optically active 
. The 
a2 = 10 mm (± 1 
 with a 
The following 
 
idle state) = 
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8.5 Character transmission
 Independently from the interfa
in the same way. Ii is an asynchronous serial bit (Start
with various possible established baud rates 300, 600, 1200, 2400, 4800, 9600 or 19200 
baud which can be restricted b
equipment or tariff restrictions establishes in ITU
 The character format defined according to IEC 1177:1985 is: 1 start bit, 7 data 
bits, 1 parity bit and 1 stop bit. Note that in p
transparency syllables and 1 data bit substitutes the parity bit. [14]
 
8.6 Data transfer protocol
 The protocol allows
E mode selection is a subset
 Data exchange protocol
initiates with the HHU transfer
acts as the main facilities 
works as a client device and the tariff
programming and reading out
 In protocol mode D operates
reading out meter features but not programming.
tariff device to HHU. Data transfer
devices on the tariff.  
 Mode protocol used by
identification. Protocol modes A
telegraph velocity. On the contrary,
meaning. Protocol E mode
measuring HDLC protocol.
 The data reading out can be performed with or without check digit block. 
Whenever used it is includes
detected SOH or STX character
including this character. Calculated
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ce used, the characters are all always transmitted 
–Stop) half-duplex transmission 
ecause of the optical scanning head, the interface 
-T recommendation V.26.
rotocol mode E is is possible to use 
 
 
 5 different modes that can use the tariff device
 of ISO / IEC 1745, management procedures
 is bi-directional in modes A, B, C and E, and
 request message. In protocol modes A to C the
and tariff acts as a subordinate. In protocol
 acts as a server. These modes provide
 meters. Protocol mode E can be transparent
 half-duplex exchange of data and allows
 Information is transmitted
 is initiated by pressing for example,
 tariff HHU device is indicated by 
 to D are determined by the identification symbol
 E mode protocol is designed by sequence
 allows you to use different protocols, one of which is the
 
 the area from the character immediately following
 after the terminating character ETX
 BCC is located immediately behind the
 
 
: A, B, C, D, 
 in Idle mode. 
 it always 
 HHU 
 mode E HHU 
 features for 
 two's regime. 
 only 
 through the 
 sensors or other 
messages with 
 for 
 change of 
 
 the first 
 this report, 
 ETX. [14] 
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Figure 8.4. Setting the block check character (block check character is determined by 
8.7 Security in IEC62056
 The standard defines 4 different levels of access that may be used by the 
metering data exchange system:
• Level 1, Basic:
needed by the user to gain entrance to th
inadvisable to have any operations which involve sensitive data. During normal, 
non-communications operation, most equipment will be at this level. One 
command that might be available is the automatic meter reading operati
which presents the operator non
billing data. The Hand Held Unit (HHU) sign
meter identification message must be used before any other kind of 
communications can happen. The 
 
And its corresponding reply, the meter identification message is:
 
 Where XXX
manufacturer and Ident
usually used for specifying the particular product.
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the grey area) [14] 
 
 
-21 (FLAG) 
 
 In this level only the knowledge of the FLAG protocol is 
e metering system and hence it is 
-sensitive data such as meter identification and 
-on message and its associated 
sign-on message has the following form:
/?! CR LF 
 
/XXX Ident CR LF 
 
 is the three letter code that identifies the equipment 
 is an specific identification code for the manufacturer, 
 
 
on, 
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• Level 2, Password:
passwords correctly which, if programmable, may be changed under one of the 
highest levels. Access to data w
to or greater than that available at the Base Level, but would still be limited. 
Examples might be security data (such as unauthorized access attempts or date 
of last attempt), time adjustment or maximum dema
• Level 3, Secure:
data (a seed) using a secret algorithm is the door to enable access to 
comprehensive read and write facilities. For added security, this secret algorithm 
can be dynamic and 
• Level 4, Internal:
some form of physical setting inside the metering system, such as installation of 
a bridging link. It may allow full uninhibited read/write 
resetting of any security registers.
[14] 
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 This level requires the user to enter one or more 
hich may be changed or retrieved would be equal 
nd reset. 
 Operation of sealable button or manipulation of certain 
changed under the internal access level. 
 This is the highest level available, involving changing 
operation, including 
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8.8 Possible attacks to IEC62056
 In the case of this protocol, the attacks that may be performed to its security 
issues depend on the security level used by the mete
range of communication between the optical infrared ports, which are the mainly used, 
is about ten meters, we must think on attacks performed to this protocol differently from 
others. In other words, in order to perform an at
communicating, the attacker has the need to be physically close to the meter. 
Consequently, there is no possibility for an attacker to perform any attack from 
somewhere where cannot be discovered.
 
8.8.1 Level 1, Basic 
 Since no security features are implemented in this basic level, the only thing that 
an attacker needs for getting access to the network is the knowledge about the protocol. 
Only a sniffer that scans the network communications may be needed for eavesdrop
information from it. However, since devices remain in this level of security basically 
while non-communications operation, the data that can be eavesdropped is meter 
identification and billing data which is regarded to be non
 
8.8.2 Level 2, Password
 In this level, since the barrier to get access to cleartext messages is one or more 
passwords, the kind of attacks that may be performed are the dictionary attacks or brute 
force attacks. [14] 
 
8.8.2.1 Dictionary attacks
 The most common method of authenticating a user in a computer system is 
through a password. It is used basically because it is the most convenient and practical 
way of authenticating users. However, this is makes the authentication process weaker, 
because users may use ordinary words as passwords. An attacker is able to take 
advantage of this weakness by using a dictionary attack. The attacker may get access to 
the system simply by trying all possible passwords until the correct one is found. Two 
ways for palliating this weakness are locking the access after several unsuccessful 
attempts and delay the system response so that it takes a lot more time to attacker for 
trying different passwords. 
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-sensitive information. [1
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 Dictionary attacks are not effective against systems that make use of 
word passwords, and also fail against systems that use random permutations of 
lowercase and uppercase letters combined with numerals.
 
8.8.2.2 Brute force attacks
 A brute force attack for obtaining an algorithm key or a password is performed 
by trying all possible combinations until the one grants the access to the system is 
found. Two factors of the password implementation have direct influence on the 
capability of the attacker to perform a brute force attack:
• The effort required to get to a succ
chance is 2n – 1 operations, where n is the length of the password.
• The number of possible characters that can be used to implement the 
password. If only numerical characters are used, it will be a lot easier for the 
attacker to obtain the password than if also letters can be used. As well, the 
length of the password is also a determining factor.
 Many countermeasures can be implemented to protect the network from brute 
force attacks such as  limiting the number of attempts
introducing time delays between successive attempts, increasing the answer's 
complexity by requiring answer or verification code sent via cellphone, and locking 
accounts out after unsuccessful login attempts.
 
8.8.3 Level 3, Secure 
 Protection of data is highly more implemented in this level than in the two 
previous ones. This security level is not implemented for reading out operations but for 
programming functions because programming data is what is considered as sensitive 
information. [14] 
 The first security feature which is the operation of a sealable button does not 
need any description about it can be attacked since it is a manual manipulation.
 Security algorithms are used also. Since the algorithm used is designed or 
chosen by the manufacturer, each network or even each meter may be implementing 
different security algorithms. This fact makes the possibility to attack the algorithms 
highly difficult. Moreover, as these secret algorithms can be dynamically changed under 
de upper security level, it makes even more difficult the access. It can be deduced that in 
order to brake through this security level, the best options is getting access into the 
upper internal security level.
specifications for Smart Metering 
 
 
 
essful search with more than 50 % 
 
 that a password can be tried, 
 
 
 
multiple-
 
 
153 Theoretical analysis of security features and weakne
specifications for Smart Metering
 
 
 If an attacker, either by trespassing the upp
other way, is capable of discovering which secret algorithm/ algorithms is/ are used, 
then he would be able to perform a set of attacks to it. These attacks may be oriented 
either to eavesdrop programming information or
in order to disturb its tariffying functions or to perform an overbilling attack to the 
power supplier customer. [14]
 
8.8.4 Level 4, Internal
 At the highest security available, attacking the meter requires complex man
manipulation as well as knowledge of how to update security registers. [14]
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8.9 Solutions for IEC62056
8.9.1 Single-phase electronic
 
 Enerlux meters belong to the category of operating measuring means and they 
are intended for the metering of active and reactive electric energy for the residential 
consumers and commercial agents that use multitariff systems for el
in single-phase low voltage networks. The meters enable the consumer 
connection/disconnection and communication either through an optional PLC modem or 
the data exchange protocol IEC62056
 
 The meter enables energy tariffying i
measured energies can be configured for tariffying in time zones. In the time zones 
tariffying program there can be defined two independent tariffying sequences.
 The metering program on time zones is yearly. In one year 
up to 12 seasons. Within each season is defined the weekly program made up of a 
sequence of 7 types of days chosen from the 24 types of days that can be defined. 
Within each type of day there can be defined up to 8 switchings for each 
daily sequences. The resolution of the programming is 30 minutes.
 The meter operates from 45 to 65 Hz 
frequency range within an environmental 
temperature range from 
accuracies defined for its measures are classes 1 
and 2 for active energy according to IEC62052
11, classes 2 and 3 for reactive energy according 
to IEC62053-23 and a time base accuracy of +/
0.5 s per each 24 hours according to IEC61
 The meter is provided with 8 demand 
registers and 8 demand cumulative registers; 
each of them can be programmed to be 
calculated from any type of energy with a time 
interval with 5, 10, 15, 20 ,30 or 60 minutes. 
The registers and demands are memorize
monthly when programmed reset occurs.
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 Within the tariffying program there also can be defined 64 groups of days of 
holydays. The duration of one group of days of holyday can be programmed from 1 to 4 
days. Each group of days of holydays can be defined with or without repetition.
 Billing purposes achieve the followings storage of energy quantities: storage of 
the recorded maximum power, storage of the cumulative maximum power, resetting to 
zero of the maximum power re
that the self reading was made The meter storages the values of the self readings from 
the last 12 self readings. 
 For communication functions two different accesses can be used, the optical port 
loop using IEC 62056-21: Direct local data exchange (3rd edition of IEC 61107). 
Optionally, the meter is provided with PLC built in modem. Transmission of the data is 
made via modem in band CENELEC
used protocol for data transmission EHS (logical level). The following data are read: 
Indexes, maximum power, load curve, events and weekly registers. [45]
 
 
For further information on the Enerlux 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
gisters (maximum power reset) and storage of the time 
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8.9.2 ACE6000 DC4 commercial and industrial multifunction meter
 
Energy while all directed connected versions are class B.
 The meter provides 8 tariff energy registers per measured value and up to 15 
registers per tariff for End of Billing (EOB) data. There are 32 tariff registers for energy 
in total and 24 for maximum demand. In addition, the meter provides per phase and 
total instantaneous values such as voltage and current per phase, power and power 
factor. Load profile data can be stored in up to eight channels.
 Up to six output relays and up to six control inputs are available to control the 
meter such as the tariff control and the 
from the meter to other devices like tariff information or pulse output. The auxiliary 
terminal is self arresting and without screws for easy installation.
 All time stamp functions are derived from a high preci
back up from an integrated battery and/or super capacitor. The battery can power the 
device clock for up to seven days of continuous total supply. The typical time derivation 
is better than 9 seconds per month.
 Regarding the commun
meter can be performed from two interfaces at the same time. The different interfaces 
that can be used are the following: optical port using the IEC62056
electrical CL0 interface and
attached to the meter via RS232/RS485 interface using the RJ45 connector. [40]
 
 
 
For further information on ACE6000 DC4 go to: 
 The ACE6000 DC4 meter provides integrated energy 
measurement in up to four quadrants for com
industrial applications. It has interoperable capabilities and 
has the advantage of being easy to implement in
future reading systems. 
 The innovative metrology concept of this meter offers 
accuracy and long-term stability. All transformer connected 
meters are available with accuracy up to class C for active 
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9. Comparisons betwee
 In this section, technologies described in previous sections will be compared to 
each other. GPRS will stay out of comparison since it is used to create wide area 
networks with meter networks but not for read out data from the meters itself
 
9.1 PRIME vs. PLC G3
 The physical layer main characteristics of both standards are very similar. Both 
use CENELEC A band by Cyclic Prefix (CP) OFDM combined with Differential Phase 
shift Keying (DPSK) which is assumed to be a robust technique for data 
over the Powerline channel. OFDM is efficiently implemented using FFT and DPSK 
modulation avoids receiver modules the necessity for channel estimation algorithms for 
signal reception. Focusing on detailed characteristics, many differences can 
All of them are presented in the following chart:
 
Frequency range 
Sampling frequency fs 
FFT size 
CP length 
Windowing 
Subcarrier spacing 
Carrier used 
FEC 
Interleaving 
Modulation 
Differential encoding 
Maximum packet size 
Maximum data rate 
Guard interval 
effective length 
Figure 9.1. PRIME vs. G3 physical layers [27]
 PRIME MAC layer has been designed by PRIME Alliance independently from 
other international standards. In opposition, th
France implements its Mac layer based on the 802.15.4
layer. This may be a consequence of the fact that PRIME was designed for LV networks 
and G3 for MV networks. 
 Although the MAC layers were design
many characteristics that can be found in common in the two MAC layer 
implementations. In both technologies the network structure is similarly implemented. 
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A Base Node (PRIME) or server (G3) is in charge of managin
(PRIME) and peers (G3). Besides, both technologies implement CSMA/CA algorithm 
for the purpose of controlling the channel access of all devices as well as similar 
implementations of the ARQ mechanism. 
 In addition, many differences ca
layers. Obviously there a lot a difference regarding the formats of data frames, beacon 
frames, check frames and MAC primitives, but these differences do not add any 
relevant difference between both MAC layers performanc
differences, the first one are the address formats used.
 PRIME uses EUI-48 IEEE universal MAC address combined with three network 
identifiers: the 8-bit Switch Identifier (SID) for identifying the switch to which a node 
attached, the 14-bit Local Node Identifier (LNID) to identify a node locally and the 9
bit Local Connection Identifier (LCID) to identify a specific connection to a node 
during connections establishment process. On the other hand, G3 uses for addressing 
either EUI-64 universal MAC address or 16 bits short address used for the LBP protocol 
of the 6LoWPAN layer. 
 Note that also many common and different characteristics between the two 
technologies can be found in the security features implemented in both MAC layer
they will be described below.
 In the convergence layer the differences are obvious since for the upper layer 
PRIME was designed for IPv4 and G3 for IPv6 so the adaptation layers are prepared to 
accommodate different versions of the same protocol. In th
clear advantage in front of PRIME. The IPv6 protocol will gradually substitute IPv4 in 
all networks worldwide since the IPv4 addressing system is going towards 
due to the fact that it is running out of possible addr
IPv6 and consequently the 6LoWPAN adaptation layer, gives G3 the possibility to use 
the Bootstrapping protocol before MAC security features proceed and keys are 
exchanged. 
 As this paper is mainly focused in security featur
here is where more differences between the two technologies can be found. One 
difference between them is that PRIME presents the possibility of using two different 
security profiles one implementing security procedures and th
From one side this gives an advantage to PRIME because it is possible not using 
security when not necessary which permits a higher data transmission. On the other 
side, an attacker may cause any node in the PRIME network to choose
security profile when security procedures are needed and data would be transmitted 
unencrypted. This kind of attack cannot be performed on G3 since there is no option for 
a not secured security profile.
 In both technologies a key hierarchy 
common as well as some differences. In both cases this key hierarchy is defined in order 
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to obtain a wide set of keys to be used in different aspects of security features and 
making them independent so if an atta
security system is broken. In order to secure it higher, these keys are renewed 
periodically so that if an attacker is capable of obtaining a key somehow, only during a 
short period of time he is able to eav
procedure of the network. 
 As mentioned above, G3 performs a more complex a secure system for the 
purpose of authentication. While PRIME guarantees the authentication of nodes in the 
network by the fact that eac
Base Node, G3 implements a much more complex procedure. In this case also, a pre 
shared key known only by the peer and the coordinator is used but it is used for deriving 
another key, an authentication key, using AES. The Bootstrapping process can be 
performed locally or even remotely with the support of a remote authentication server. 
Apart from the benefits is gives, the usage of a remote authentication server can create a 
security vulnerability by the fact that authentication will occur between the peer and the 
authentication server, not between the peer and the authenticator. This means that it is 
not possible for the peer to validate the identity of the authenticator that it is speaking 
to, using EAP alone. 
 After authentication procedures, both implementations use different keys for 
broadcast and unicast traffics so that each subnetwork has its own key and each 
connection between nodes has its own too. However, G3 implements one security 
feature for information exchange that PRIME does not, the Protected Channel. It 
provides data origin authentication and protection against replays.
 Finally, regarding to the data encryption, both technologies implement 128
encryption, which is assumed to be
broken until at least 2030. This way data integrity is supposed to be guaranteed.
 Since data integrity it supposed to be guaranteed, the most important security 
feature for these technologies is the protec
concluded that the exposition of keys from their key hierarchies to a third party is the 
most important weakness that this technologies present and one of the few that they 
have in common. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
cker is able to obtain one of them not the whole 
esdrop information or to disturb the correct 
h node has its own private key known only by itself and the 
 
 a high security algorithm that assures not to be 
tion of its shared secrets or keys. So it can be 
-AES 
 
160 Theoretical analysis of security features and weaknesses of telecommunication 
 
9.2 ZigBee vs. Raconet
 Focusing on the physical layer deployment, since we have not much information 
about Raconet physical layer there is not much we can compare. One thing is the 
frequency of operation. Both technologies operate in the ISM free license frequency 
band which represents a great advantage. Both operate using 868 MHz as central 
frequency of their bands which has a 1% duty cycle limitation and is only operable in 
Europe. Data rate that can be provided in this frequency band is usually about 20 kbps.
 As opposition, ZigBee specification is also able to operate on a different band 
inside the ISM band which is at 2.4 GHz frequency which can be used worlwide. In this 
band, there are 12 channels available while there only one in 868 MHz. It leads to 
providing a bit rate of about 250 kbps which is by far bigger than the rate that Raconet 
is able to provide. Consequently, most deployments of ZigBee appliances operate in the 
2.4 GHz frequency. 
 Finally, some words about power consumption must be said. Both technolo
can be classified inside the group of low power wireless PANs. In fact, very low power 
consumption is a design goal in ZigBee specification. On one side it must be regarded 
as a huge advantage for giving the battery of the network devices a longer lif
leads to a weakness that potential attackers may take advantage from.
 Regarding to the network topology, both technologies look very similar in this 
aspect. In ZigBee the Reduced Function Devices (RFD) or meters are coordinated by a 
Full Function Device (FFD) or router which acts as a data collector and manages its 
subnetwork. This FFDs are simultaneously coordinated by the ZigBee coordinator that 
manages the whole network and sends all collected data from the meters to the database 
management system, by using RS
In Raconet, the global network performance is very similar although it presents a few 
differences. There is only one data collector that coordinates and manages the network 
which can be parallelized to the ZigBee coordinator because it is as well in charge of 
sending all data collected to the power supplier facilities for billing purposes. Meters in 
the Raconet network can be considered to perform the same operations as RFDs in 
ZigBee network since they only operate metering purposes, except for those ones that 
are acting as a bridge to give connection with the Raconet data collector to those meters 
that cannot be reached by data collector’s range. Those that act as bridges may be 
parallelized with ZigBee FFDs.
 Some also mutual characteristics between two technologies refer to network 
start-up and attachment/detachment of devices. In both cases the network start
managed either by the ZigBee coordinator or by the Raconet data collecto
very quickly and so does the attachment/detachment of devices to/from the network. 
Also in both cases the subnetwork coordinator and which is either a ZigBee router or 
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the raconet data collector are capable of detecting new devices that appe
network area by broadcasting messages to invite them to join the network.
 Although no information about security features on raconet could be found, as it 
is a wireless technology operating on a well known frequency band and using low 
power transmission, the network is susceptible of suffering many different types of 
attacks which are very similar to the attack that ZigBee may also suffer. These attacks 
can be divided into two categories:
• Attacks that may take advantage from low power and radio l
wireless PANs which are: jamming, exhaustion, collision and unfairness. All of 
them are detailed in the ZigBee section of this paper.
• Attacks to the cluster tree network topology, such as route disruptions or 
loops which, as the previous ones, are 
paper. 
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9.3 Bluetooth vs. Raconet
 Starting with the physical layer deployment, since we have not much 
information about Raconet physical layer implementation there is not much we can 
compare. One thing is the frequency of operation. Both technologies operate in the ISM 
free license frequency band which represents a great advantage. However, Raconet is 
using 868 MHz as central frequency of its band while Bluetooth works at 2,4 GHz.
 Both technologies ca
PANs. In fact, low power consumption is a design goal in both specifications. On one 
side it must be regarded as a huge advantage for giving the battery of the network 
devices a longer life, but it lea
advantage from. 
 Regarding to the network topology, both technologies look very similar in this 
aspect. In Bluetooth the slaves or coordinated by the master of the piconet and sharing 
the same channel and the unit of various piconets can form a scatternet. In Raconet, the 
global network performance is very similar although it presents a few differences. There 
is a data collector that coordinates and manages the network which is in charge of 
sending all data collected to the power supplier facilities for billing purposes. As it can 
be seen the difference to the Bluetooth specification is that her there is only one master 
in the whole network. Meters in the Raconet network can be considered to perform the 
same operations as slaves in Bluetooth network since they only operate metering 
purposes, except for those ones that are acting as a bridge to give connection with the 
Raconet data collector to those meters that cannot be reached by data collector’s range. 
The main difference that can be found here is that in Bluetooth a device is capable a 
being part of more than one subnetwork (piconet), given by the fact of the another big 
difference that can be found which is that Bluetooth allows either point
point-to-multipoint connection which Raconet does not.
 Another difference that can be found is the ability of Bluetooth of providing 
either asynchronous or synchronous connections. However, this fact is not specially 
remarkable when we are dealing with sma
transmissions are not thought for data packets transferring but for voice 
communications. In addition, something that clearly makes the difference between the 
two specifications are the Bluetooth Profiles. Having a vi
capability of Bluetooth for accommodation a very wide range of difference profiles on 
its application layers, makes one think about the possibility of offering a wider range of 
services for smart metering customers in the future an
future development in front of Raconet for Bluetooth.
 Although no information about security features on raconet could be found, as it 
is a wireless technology operating on a well known frequency band and using low 
power transmission, the network is susceptible of suffering many different types of 
specifications for Smart Metering 
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attacks which are very similar to the attack that any other wireless network may also 
suffer. These attacks can be divided into two categories:
• Attacks that may take advantage 
wireless PANs which are: jamming, exhaustion, collision and unfairness. All of 
them are detailed in the ZigBee section of this paper.
• Attacks to the cluster tree network topology, such as route disruptions or 
loops which, as the previous ones, are detailed in the ZigBee section of this 
paper. 
 
 In the case Bluetooth, by taking advantage of its profile definition, a wide range 
of specific attacks can be directed to it. Additionally, a great weakness that Bluetooth 
shows is the usage of the SAFER+ based algorithms for its security purposes. It is 
hardly recommended for Bluetooth to adapt and get closer to other specifications 
security and use AES algorithm to defend itself from potential attackers.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
from low power and radio links at 
 
 
164 Theoretical analysis of security features and weaknesses of telecommunication 
 
9.4 ZigBee vs. Bluetooth
 These two specifications are both wireless technologies working on the ISM free 
license frequency band. Bluetooth is only working on the 2.4 GHz, ZigBee is capable of 
working also on the 868 MHz and 900 MHz frequency bands. However, working o
2.4 GHz is the best option if the main goal is to obtain the highest possible throughput 
for data transmission, and that is why most ZigBee applications are using this frequency 
instead of the others. 
 If we focus on the layer implementations it can 
implementations do not have much in common and does not really make sense two 
compare the layers between each other one by one. However, there are a few things that 
can be easily compared and a few points in common also. A similar 
used in both specifications based on the EUI
standards. Finally, regarding the application layers of both specifications a 
parallelization can be easily made. In both cases a wide range of possible
can be adapted to the technology. In Bluetooth by using the adequate service profile an 
application may be implemented, while in ZigBee the design of the final application is 
completely chosen by the customer since in its application layer a 
is implemented for every device in a ZigBee network and for every different customer 
for different applications. 
 A point that must be noticed to be different between the two specifications is the 
network topology. In ZigBee the Reduce
coordinated by a Full Function Device (FFD) or router which acts as a data collector 
and manages its subnetwork. This FFDs are simultaneously coordinated by the ZigBee 
coordinator that manages the whole network and se
meters to the database management system, by using RS
by the power supplier. In Bluetooth the network is organized differently although both 
point-to-point and point-to-
In the point-to-multipoint connection, the channel is shared among several Bluetooth 
units and forming a piconet
to 7 other units act as slaves. The channel access is cont
be parallelized to the ZigBee coordinator. Multiple piconets with overlapping coverage 
areas form a scatternet. Slaves can participate in different piconets on a time
multiplex basis. In addition, a master in one pic
The piconets shall not be frequency synchronized. Each piconet has its own hopping 
channel. By this procedure, Bluetooth is capable of forming a huge network at the same 
time formed by a huge amount of small networks
capable of creating a big network coordinated by one unique coordinator that manages 
the whole network. 
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 Focusing on the security procedures of both technologies the first thing that can 
be easily identified as a big diffe
uses the AES algorithm, Bluetooth is using various algorithms for its different security 
features based on the SAFER+ cipher block. This method was also presented to the 
contest for becoming the AES algo
to the conclusion that in Bluetooth actual AES encryption should be embraced to 
substitute SAFER+. Another disadvantage that Bluetooth presents in front of ZigBee is 
that it does not implement security p
does. In addition, ZigBee is able to optionally provide sequential freshness in the 
purpose of frame integrity, a service not provided by Bluetooth. Finally, the trust center 
is an entity that appears on the 
Bluetooth. It is an application trusted by all the devices in the network that distributes 
keys as part of network and end
is required to maintain a list of all the devices in the network, all the relevant keys and 
control the policies of network admittance.
 Although many differences have been noticed, many points can be found in 
common also. The first one is that both specifications are using a vario
its different security procedures to make each procedure independent from any other by 
using a different key. The usage of these sets of keys leads t avoid to use any kind of 
passwords in the security procedure which is regarded to be no
to guarantee the security of a network. Finally, another point that we can found in 
common are the security profiles. Both specifications present various security modes in 
order to use different security mechanisms depending on the 
operational circumstances of the moment. In addition, apart from global security 
profiles, Bluetooth incorporates also three different modes of data encryption.
 Although there are a lot of differences between these two specifications, as b
of them are wireless technologies operating on a well known frequency band and using 
low power transmission, their networks are susceptible of suffering many different 
types of attacks which are very similar and these attacks are described in the ZigBe
section of this paper. These attacks can be divided into two categories:
• Attacks that may take advantage from low power and radio links at 
wireless PANs which are: jamming, exhaustion, collision and unfairness. All of 
them are detailed in the ZigBee sect
• Attacks to the cluster tree network topology, such as route disruptions or 
loops which, as the previous ones, are detailed in the ZigBee section of this 
paper. In the case of Bluetooth, the network topology is not a cluster tree but 
piconets and scatternets, however, Bluetooth may suffer similar attacks to the 
ones that can be directed to ZigBee network topology.
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 In the case of Bluetooth, as described in the section dedicated to it in this paper, 
there is a wide range of attacks that are
advantage especially of the Bluetooth Profiles specification.
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9.5 PLC vs. RF 
 PLC and radiofrequency technologies must be regarded differently since their 
deployments have many differences.
installed everywhere infrastructure for energy supplying and there no need to install 
new wires. Besides, by the fact that it is a wired technology there no need to concern 
about power consumption while batt
technologies. On the other side, RF offers flexibility, design, easy portability of its 
devices and robustness against unexpected events such as an earthquake that may 
disable a wired network. It also brings 
advantages of mesh networking such a multiple paths for transmission to prevent 
disabling of a node on a path failure.
 Since these are complete different technologies, there no much common points 
in their physical layers implementation. The usage they make of the spectrum is 
completely different since they do not use the same media for transmitting data, 
however, we can find a point in common in the fact that all of them may use BPSK 
modulation, and another o
following the OSI model except for the case of Raconet which we do not know much 
about its layers implementation.
 There are many characteristics that can be found in common in the MAC layer 
implementations. In the two PLC technologies the network structure is similarly 
implemented. A Base Node (PRIME) or server (G3) is in charge of managing the 
Services Nodes (PRIME) and peers (G3). In opposition, ZigBee is capable of 
implementing different network to
or cluster tree. However, in Raconet the network topology is fixed by the fact that the 
data collector is at the top of it for managing the network and a tree topology is 
implemented below it. Besides, 
CSMA/CA algorithm for the purpose of controlling the channel access of all devices as 
well as similar implementations of the ARQ mechanism.
 In addition, many differences can be found between the three MAC layers
description we know in detail. Obviously there a lot a difference regarding the formats 
of data frames, beacon frames, check frames and MAC primitives, but these differences 
do not add any relevant difference between both MAC layers performances. Re
the significant differences, the first one are the address formats used.
 PRIME uses EUI-48 IEEE universal MAC address combined with three network 
identifiers: the 8-bit Switch Identifier (SID) for identifying the switch to which a node 
attached, the 14-bit Local Node Identifier (LNID) to identify a node locally and the 9
bit Local Connection Identifier (LCID) to identify a specific connection to a node 
during connections establishment process. On the other hand, G3 and ZigBee 
addressing are very similar since both MAC layers designs are based on IEEE 802.15.4 
they can use either EUI-64 universal MAC address or a 16
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of G3, the short address is specifically used for the LBP protocol of the 6LoWPAN 
layer. In ZigBee, the address format sent in a packet can be chosen and the 
correspondence between them two is checked at reception.
 Additionally, we can found a point in common between ZigBee and G3 but 
different in PRIME. In the first two, the MAC layer implements two separat
within the layer. The first entity is in charge of the transport of data units and the second 
one manages the layer and is capable of transporting commands to the lower and upper 
layers as well as controlling the channel access.
 Note that also many common and different characteristics between the three 
technologies can be found in the security features implemented in all three MAC layers, 
they will be described below.
 Since Raconet and ZigBee are fully independent technologies, they do not 
require the support of other protocols for implementing upper layers and applications. In 
opposition, PRIME and G3 technologies implement only the low layers of the OSI 
model and require upper layer protocols to implements applications. The one which is 
mostly used is DLMS/COSEM protocol, and also WiMAX and some IP technologies 
are used for these purposes. That is the reason why PRIME and G3 implement an 
adaptation/convergence layer for IPv4 and for IPv6 respectively and ZigBee and 
Raconet do not implement such
 Regarding security features, since we do not have information on Raconet 
security features, we will be focusing in comparing ZigBee against PRIME and G3. As 
previously said, radiofrequency networks presents many more weak points to be 
attacked than wired technologies. This fact leads to the obligation to try to implement 
higher security measures in wireless networks in order to be able to guarantee that they 
are as much secure as wired technologies that may be deployed for the same 
applications. What all of them have in common is the usage of AES encryption 
algorithm for data encryption.
 Different complexity levels can be found on the authentication procedures of 
these protocols. As mentioned in the comparison between PRIME and G3, the first one 
guarantees authentication between two nodes by the fact that there is a key known only 
by these two nodes. The second one, implements a much more complex procedure 
named the Bootstrapping protocol for authentication, implemented in the adaptation 
layer, which proceeds before MAC layer security runs. In ZigBee, authentication is 
guaranteed in MAC, network and application layers by using the AES CCM mode of 
operation. More specifically, in the application layer, the Mutual Entity Authentication 
protocol is used for procedures of authentication between to nodes base on a shared 
secret. 
 Different sets of keys are implemented by the three specifications for different 
usages. They are implemented in order to make all security procedures independent 
form each other and different keys are used for authentication, ciphering unicast traffic, 
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broadcast traffic, attach/detach of a device to/from the network, etc. In PRIME and G3 
theses sets of keys are implemented at MAC layer security level and in ZigBee it is 
implemented in the application layer security level. Note that some of these keys in all 
protocols are periodically renewed in order to avoid the fact that if one key is 
discovered security in the network or in a part of the network may be comprised 
permanently. 
 ZigBee is also incorporating an entity which is not present in PRIME or G3 
networks and it is the Trust Center (TC). The TC is and application which is trusted by 
all the devices in the network. It distributes keys as part of network and end
application configuration management. It can operate in either high or standard security 
modes. In the high security mode, the TC is required to maintain a list of all the devices 
in the network, all the relevant keys and control the policies of network admittanc
a result, the required memory of the TC grows with the number of the devices in the 
network in this mode. 
 There is security implementation which is only present in G3, the Protected 
Channel. It is implemented using EAX mode of the AES ciphering bloc
data origin authentication and protection against replays.
 There is also an important implementation to take into account that is present in 
ZigBee and in PRIME but not in G3. The previous two are capable of implementing 
different levels of security. In PRIME two security profiles, secured and not secured, are 
defined and a negotiation of security profile is performed before any communication 
occurs. In ZigBee, there is a wide range of combinations for security profiles. There are 
8 possible security suites that can be chosen in the MAC layer security, depending on if 
the application implements requests security or not, the size of the AES ciphering block 
or the security services that may be requested. In G3, only one security profile is 
defined. 
 Finally, is it important to note that the attacks that may be performed to each one 
of these technologies are different since, as mentioned before in this section, the 
wireless networks present much more weak points to be attacked than the wired ones
the sections dedicated for description of each specification, some attacks that may be 
performed to the specification are described. In can be easily identified that is much 
easier for an attacker eavesdropping packets or interfere in wireless communi
taking advantage from the radio links and the low power transmission policies of the 
wireless networks. 
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9.6 PLC vs. IEC62056
 The PowerLine Communications systems have been used by energy supplying 
companies for smart metering since late 1990
technology in Europe with many deployments already out there. France ERDF with G3 
and Iberdrola with PRIME have been developing its own deployments for testing their 
respective new technologies. The main advantage of PL
no need for implementation of the wired network is required. The already existing 
network for energy supplying is used. In the case of smart metering, that fact makes that 
smart grids can reach anywhere that smart metering m
mentioned before in this section, these two technologies only implement the lower 
layers of a system and other protocols are requested for implementation of upper layers. 
In the case of PRIME IPv4 or IEC61334 may be used for 
with G3, IPv6 is used. In both cases DLMS/COSEM is usually chosen for the 
application layer implementation.
 In a similar position IEC62056
an optical port interface or an electrica
data exchange. It is highly useful for on
the energy supplying company. Besides, it can be used for implementing smart metering 
applications. By using the Mo
HDLC protocol for the data link layer and usually DLMS/COSEM for the application 
layer, although other protocols may be used for the application layer, smart grid 
applications can be deployed. This techn
effectiveness, simple transmitters and receivers because of their simple circuitries, 
robustness of the optical port in residential applications and very low data post
processing. 
 Regarding security features, data
taken into account since data protection is very important in smart metering. For this 
aspect, both PLC technologies use 128 bit AES encryption, and it may be used in the 
third level of security of IEC62056
and selected by the meter manufacturer. For the implementation of these data 
encryption and also other security measures such as authentication or replay protection, 
the two PLC technologies define a set of d
renewed to reinforce protection. Their nodes choose which key to use depending on the 
type of traffic transferred or the security procedure taking place. In IEC62056
standard there are not such tools defined, how
third level of its security the security procedures to be used can be chosen by the 
manufacturer. 
 Different levels of security are implemented in PRIME and IEC62056
in G3. They are used depending on the 
application is taking place and whether or not the information transmitted requires any 
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kind of protection as well as if more security procedures such as node authentication are 
required. 
 By terms of authenticatio
PRIME and G3. To make a parallelization with IEC62056
procedure that it implements is operated in the second level of security of it. It is the 
introduction of one or more security pas
unfortunately leads to a weakness that most smart metering protocols avoid by not using 
passwords which is the possibility to attack it by using brute force and dictionary 
attacks. 
 As the security features for
third level of security not much more comparison can be done between it and the PLC 
specifications security operations and the PLC specifications have been already 
compared in the previous section dedicate
level of security in IEC62056
and modifications of security registers as well as changing some form of physical 
setting inside the metering system, such a
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9.7 RF vs. IEC62056
 Both radiofrequency and optical infrared (IEC62056
systems but some differences can be found in each way on wireless transmission. The 
first one, which is obvious, is that they operate in different frequency ranges. The 
ZigBee and Raconet operate at 868 MHz (ZigBee can do it also at 2.4 GHz) while 
infrared operates inside a range from 800 nm to 1000 nm wavelength. The range of a 
wireless link between two devi
radiofrequency the range of radio link can be up to 100 meters while in infrared is up 
ten meters. Note that, in infrared is also necessary line of sight between devices, a fact 
which is no required in radiofrequency networks, whose signal can pass through walls 
and opaque objects. It is also important to note at the physical level, that both 
technologies perform very low consumption (it is actually a design goal in ZigBee), 
gives its devices battery longer life and independence.
 Regarding to interferences there are big differences between the two 
technologies. It is a very important issue of concern in radiofrequency. There might 
interferences between devices in the same network, from electromagnetic 
generated by other devices such as the ones using microwaves and obviously from other 
radiofrequency systems that might operate in the same area. On the other side, in 
infrared optical communications the only thing that can cause interferences is su
fact that makes infrared inadequate for applications outdoors.
 In addition, radiofrequency networks can be planned with a wide range of 
different network topologies such as mesh, ad
two we are dealing with implement cluster trees providing the network even with a 
wider range. In opposition, connections with infrared optical technology are always 
point to point which leads to requiring support from other technologies at upper level 
for implementing a complete network with numerous devices. However, this is not such 
an important fact since the main goal of IEC62056
effective local data exchange which is what it provides. It is mainly used for on
meter reading and the smart meters are mostly equipped with other technologies such a 
PLC deployments or GPRS to incorporate them to smart grids.
 As mentioned before, IEC62056
technology, although line of sight is required for co
fact that this technology best fits into residential applications and for those applications 
requiring specific privacy. It also better suites for using Hand Held Unit (HHU) for 
manufacturer specific programming and tes
 On the other side, both ZigBee and Raconet (radiofrequency technologies) best 
suite for either industrial or commercial networks for smart metering without the need 
of support from another technology. These technolo
coordinator that is able to send all data to the database facility of the energy supplier.
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 Regarding security features, as we do not know much about security 
implementations in Raconet combined with the fact that the weaknesses
present are similar to the ones that ZigBee presents, we are directly comparing security 
implementations in ZigBee with the ones in IEC62056
 Since the range and the application of both technologies are sensitively different 
its security features must be regarded differently. ZigBee is implemented with a wide 
range of security features all along its layers since in radiofrequency high security 
measures must be deployed due to it has a wide range of weak points that might be 
attacked as it has been described in ZigBee section of this paper. ZigBee counts with 
security measures implemented in its MAC, network and application layers. AES 
encryption is applied in all of them and a set of different keys is defined at the 
application layer in order to use them independently for different operations in the 
network such as authentication, device updating or device detaching among others. In 
the MAC layer, different security suites can be used depending on the needs of the 
communication that is taking
sequential freshness can be guaranteed if necessary.
 In IEC62056-21, there not as much complexity implemented regarding those 
security features. Access control is provided by a passwords or a se
must be introduced at second level of security which is sensitively much less complex 
implementation that the one in ZigBee since for accessing a device using this protocol 
on-site presence is necessary which does not happen with radiof
As well as in ZigBee, data encryption algorithms can be implemented by manufacturer 
choice at the third level of security level of IEC62056
seems to be choice that most manufacturers take. Furthermore, in hi
security of this protocol, manual tampering of the meter is required to get through 
security barriers which mean on
both technologies are able for not using security measures when it i
because it is not requested in the environment where the protocol is working or because 
the frames or information that  are being transmitted are not considered as sensible and 
do not need any encryption or protection.
 Regarding the weaknesses that these technologies present, not much divergence 
can be found. Since all of them are wireless technologies, all of them share the 
weaknesses that this type of technologies present, taking into account that it is more 
difficult for an attacker to eavesdrop from IEC62056
highly shorter. 
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10. Tools for performing the attacks
 
 An enormous range of tools can be found on the internet for the purpose of 
attacking networks, either hardware or software. Despite
purpose of attacking networks but to be tools for security professionals to test security 
in networks and improve this security, owning this kind of tools, specially the hardware 
ones, is illegal in some countries. In this 
can be found on the net are presented as well as some practical example of how to 
perform attacks with these tools.
 
10.1 Back Track 
 Back Track, today in its fifth version already, is one of the most useful to
hacking. It is a Linux Live distribution focused on security with over 300 different tools 
a user friendly interface. It is available in the Back Track Linux website for no charge. It 
is regularly used in two opposite ways. It gives the possibility
attack servers, networks or any terminal, actually Back Track 5 is widely used, even by 
unexperienced users for cracking Wi
internet. On the other hand, it is a highly used for security
security testing and security study and improvement of already existing specifications.
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 they are meant not only for the 
section some of the most important tools that 
 
 to hackers to use it to 
-Fi passwords and obtaining free access to the 
 professionals for network 
Figure 10.1. Back Track 5 
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 The tools that comprise Back Track are all open
are also available separately
them to security professionals and hackers. Back Track tools are organized into 12 
categories: 
• Information Gathering:
web and network analysis. Among a
there are two that are highly useful for hackers which are Nmap and Wireshark.
 
Figure 10.2. Network analysis menu in Back Track 5
 
  Nmap is a sophisticated scanning tool used to discover ports, services 
 and hosts on a network. It can be used to determine what type of operating 
 system is running on a target machine as well as what version of a service is 
 running on a specific port which may assist hackers in determining what 
 vulnerabilities a target may be s
sses of telecommunication 
 
-source and free. All of the tools 
 if needed. Back Track integrates the tools and organizes 
 In this category we can find several tools for 
ll tools that can be found in this section 
 
usceptible to. 
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  Wireshark is a open
 to troubleshoot network problems or eavesdrop on both wired and wireless 
 network traffic. Wireshark can assist hackers in performing man
 attacks and is a key component for many other attacks.
• Vulnerability Assessment:
used mainly for searching for vulnerabilities in networks. These tools first use 
network scanners to study the configura
exploitations to the ports that they have found. One of the most powerful ones is 
Nessus. 
• Exploitation Tools:
of vulnerability exploits that can be used for hackers to 
remote targets and check if these targets are susceptible to the exploits tested. 
The Metaexploit Framework is a powerful tool here. Another one that is 
interesting for us here is the freeradius
attacking RADIUS remote authentication servers as in the case of PLC G3 
specification. 
• Privilege Escalation:
tools in which highlight networks sniffers such as wireshark, tools for network 
spoofing and tools f
specifications for Smart Metering 
-source packet analyzer (sniffer) which can be used 
 
Figure 10.3 Wireshark 
 In this section tools that can be found are 
tion of the network and then try some 
 Here there can be found tools for the development 
test these exploits to 
-wpe, a tool that may be used for 
 In this section we can find a various collection of 
or passwords attacks such as John the ripper the most well
 
-in-the-middle 
 
-
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known tool to perform dictionary and brute force attacks to security passwords. 
The John the ripper tool is deployed in the figure on the next page.
Figure 10.4 John the ripper password cracker
• Maintaining Access:
Backdoors and a few more for tunneling protocols can be found in this section.
• Reverse Engineering:
device functionalities. It is widely used for ant
improvement. IT may be used to figure out the operational functionalities of 
proprietary technologies such as Raconet.
• RFID Tools:
this section. 
• Stress testing:
networks are comprised in this section. The goals of such tests may be to ensure 
the software does not 
DoS attacks. 
• Forensics: Recovery file tools and mailbox scanner applications are 
included in this section. These tools are used for avoiding corrupted files and 
scanning files for hacker tools.
• Reporting Tools:
MagicTree can be found in this section. 
• Services: Very different applications can be found in this section. One 
that highlights here is Snort a network intrusion detection system, a very useful 
sses of telecommunication 
 
 
 A set of tools for exploiting OS and Web 
 A set of tools for system analysis to discover 
i-tampering systems 
 
 A wide range for attacking RFID devices can be found in 
 A set of tools for high load test on various types of 
crash in conditions of insufficient computational resources 
 
 Several tools for penetration testing such as 
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tools for security professiona
and anomaly-based inspection, Snort is the most widely deployed IDS/IPS 
technology worldwide.
• Miscellaneous:
are situated in this section. Tools w
such as the MAC changer, an application for changing the MAC address. [87]
 One of the best issues of the Back Track software is its development community. 
In the Back Track web site, a big amount of forums are organized with tutorials for all 
aspects of Back Track and there is a lot of interaction between users. Additionally a nice 
amount of books are also available for learning on how to use all tools that are 
comprised in Back Track. There is also an extensive online training and a certification 
track for the people who are capable of mastering in all aspects of Back Track.
Offensive Security provides a certification cal
Professional, where would-
certain number of test systems in Offensive Security's test lab. [87] [93] [96]
 After having described utilities and applications th
we will see two examples of attacks that can be performed with Back Track. The first 
one is a DoS attack to networks using IP technology on its network level. In this 
category there can be found two of the technologies of smar
paper which are PRIME and G3. The second attack that will be described is a Man
specifications for Smart Metering 
ls. Combining the benefits of signature, protocol, 
 
 Tools that are not included in other more specific section 
ith very different utilities can be found here 
Figure 10.5 GNU MAC Changer 
led the Offensive Security Certified 
be-hackers / security pros must prove themselves and hack a 
at can be found in Back Track 
t metering described on this 
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the-Middle attack that may be performed to a wireless network, a category in which we 
may comprise all other smart metering specifications analy
 
10.1.1 Denial of Service (DoS) attack with Back Track
 To perform a Denial of Service attack with Back Track two applications are 
requested: 
• Lbd.sh, Load Balancing Detector:
domain uses load balancing.
workload across multiple resources in the network to optimize the utilization, 
data rate and time response. It is usually provided by the DNS (Domain Name 
Server). 
• Slowloris.pl:
There are other applications to perform DoS attacks in Back Track such as dos6.
• Zenmap: This tool is used to scan a network obtaining MAC and IP 
addresses of network hosts and open ports of these hosts.
 
 First of all the attacker needs to hack and get access to the network where the 
attack is to be performed. Once the access is obtained in the network, to perform the 
sses of telecommunication 
 
zed in this paper.
 
 This application checks if a given 
 The load balancing is a methodology to distribute 
 This application is the one that performs the DoS attack. 
 
Figure 10.6 Zenmap network scan 
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attack, the network is firstly scanned by Zenmap. This way the attacker obta
addresses, open ports of hosts and topology of the network. This way the attacker is able 
to identify the server of the network to attack it and shut it down, or a single host if it is 
the purpose. Afterwards, load balancing at the server is checke
balancing is found, the attacker is able to perform the DoS attack by using slowloris.pl 
application. 
 
10.1.2 Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack with Back Track
 The MitM attack is performed in order to eavesdrop by an attacker that
independent connections with the victims and relays messages between them, making 
them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection, when 
in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker. The attacker must be ab
intercept all messages going between the two victims and inject new ones, which is 
straightforward in many circumstances.
 Once an attacker has been able to gain access to a network the attack can begin. 
The target's IP and operating has already been
address. The test computer, the target as well as the gateway are all on the same subnet. 
The attack begins with a basic MITM (Man
against a single target on a network.
 The network traffic, will be intercepted by the test computer, and an iframe will 
be injected. This iframe will point back to the test computer which will be hosting 
packets with malicious payload (via the Meta
execute the malicious content hosted on the test computer in the victim equipment. The 
end result will be admin\root access to the targets computer via a meterpreter session. 
The attack follows the following instructions:
 
/usr/bin/start-network 
cd /pentest/exploit/framework3
svn update   
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
ec-uid = 0 
ec_guid = 0 
if (ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 80) {
if (search(DATA.data, “Accept
replace (“Accept-Encoding”,”Accept
msg(“zapped Accept-Encoding!
} 
} 
specifications for Smart Metering 
d and if not load 
 
 
 discovered as well as the gateway IP 
-in-the-Middle) ARP poisoning attack 
 
-sploit framework). This iframe will 
 
 
             Metaexploit commands
 
 
-Encoding”)){ 
-Rubbish!”); 
\n”); 
 
ins the 
 makes 
le to 
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if (ip.proto == TCP && tcp.src == 80){
replace(“(/title)”,”(/title>)iframe src =
height=0>(/iframe)”); 
msg(“iframe Filter Ran.\n”);
ettefilter iframe.txt –o iframe.ef
cd /pentest/exploit/framework3directory
msfconsole 
Use windows/browser/ms10_xxx_helpctr_xss_cmd_exec
Set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
Set LHOST youripaddress 
Set SRVHOST youripaddress
Set SRVPORT 80 
Exploit 
Ettercap –i wlan –F iframe.ef 
 
 
 The attack is performed by using the above written commands using two 
applications in Back Track:
• Metasploit Framework:
code against a remote target machine. It also includes 
tools. It offers many types of 
enables users to run collection scripts or run commands against the host o
meterpreter which enables attackers to control the victim’s screen and to upload 
or download files. 
• Ettercap: It is a network sniffer that can not only log packet data but can 
use filters to inject or replace data within the packets. When used in a MITM 
attack ettercap filters can drop packets, or inject code into packets that will be 
forwarded to the target machine.
 Once the attack has been runned, the victim’s box is compromised. The attacker 
is able perform a wide range of actions on the victim such a
shell on the target by entering shell into meterpreter, upload or download files, grab 
password hashes, send over a secure backdoor program like netcat or edit victim’s 
registry. [88] 
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http://youripaddress” width=0 
 
 
 
          Metaexploit commands
 
 
–TQM arp:remote /targeip/ /gatewayip/ -P autoadd
 
 It is a tool for developing and executing 
anti-forensic
payloads, including such as command shell, that 
 
s dropping commands to a 
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10.2 Specific attacks to GPRS
 
 In order to perform an attack to the GPRS network, the following are the tools 
an attacker may need: 
• Any kind of laptop or computer running on Unix OS
• An internet uplink connection
• A Power over Ethernet adapter such as D
• A hub or a switch
• A Base Transcei
• OpenBTS, which is a Unix application that uses software radio to present 
GPRS air interface to standard 2G GSM and uses SIP softswitch or PBX to 
connect calls. It gives the possibility to implement a low cost cellular
compatible with handsets in the market.
• OpenBSC, a free software GPL
and elements. It includes functionality normally performed by a BSC, MSC, 
HLR, AuC, VLR or EIR.
• OsmoSGSN, a software application included i
is a free software implementation of the GPRS Serving GPRS Support Node 
(SGSN). It connects via the Gb interface to the BSS and via the GTP protocol to 
a Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN).
• OpenGGSN, a Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGS
interface between the internet and the mobile network infrastructure.
• A mobile phone jammer [97] [98]
 
 Various attacks may be performed by using the previously described tools, one 
of them is a Man-in-the-Middle attack (MitM). To perform it
attacker location meanwhile, the mobile phone jammer is used to jam the regular BTS 
that the victim may connect to so the victim connects to the attacker’s BTS who by 
following several steps for frequency selection and impersonat
Once this connection is established, the attacker gets full access to the IP connection 
between the victim and the internet and is able to eavesdrop the traffic in cleartext, alter 
this traffic, redirect the outgoing connections of
victim’s vulnerabilities. [90]
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10.3 Specific attack to wireless networks 
 An attack which can be easily performed to the wireless networks is a jamming 
attack. It is simple because it does not require a wid
network to be attacked and it does not deal with cracking passwords or breaking an 
encryption algorithm. It simply takes advantage of one of the main goals of wireless 
technologies and wireless networks deployments which is t
for battery life enlargement.
 A wide range of jammers can be purchased on the internet within a wide range 
of prices. Its range goes from just a few up to distances of hundreds of meters. There 
exist jammers designed to jam specif
Bluetooth, CDMA or 3G but the most useful ones are capable of jamming a wide range 
of frequencies. Many of the ones that can be purchased are capable of performing 
jamming attacks in the range from 900 MHz to 2.5 GH
tools used by military for disabling enemy’s radio communications. Something 
important that must be taken into account is that in many countries it is illegal to own or 
use one of these devices. In the figure below some of them
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Figure 10.7. Jammers [99] 
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10.4 Specific attacks to ZigBee 
 In October of 2010, developer Joshua Wright presented an open source 
collection of Linux tools called KillerBee with the intention for testing the security of 
ZigBee networks. The developer thought is that 
security seriously due to the lack of attack tool availability and it was not going to get 
better until a practical attack surface was implemented.
framework and tool set for exploring and exploiting the security of ZigBee and IEEE 
802.15.4 networks. Using KillerBee tools and a compatible IEEE 802.15.4 radio 
interface, you can eavesdrop on ZigBee networks, replay traffic, attack cryptosystems 
and much more. Using the KillerBee framework, a potential attacker may be able to 
build your own tools, implement ZigBee fuzzing, emulate and attack end
routers and coordinators. [62]
 The hardware and firmware tools needed for using the KillerBee appl
the following: 
• Two AVR RZ Raven USB sticks, one for sniffing and one for injecting
• AT90USB1287 uC with AT86RF230 802.15.4 transceiver
• 4 LED’s, PCB antenna
• A free development IDE supporting gcc
• KillerBee firmware
• AVR JTAG ICE mkl
Figure 10.8. AVR RZ Raven USB sticks, AT90USB1287 and AT86RF230 [82] [83] 
 
 A wide range of various applications are included in KillerBee in order to sniff 
out ad performing attacks to ZigBee security which are:
specifications for Smart Metering 
- KillerBee 
to date, vendors have not taken ZigBee 
 KillerBee is a Python bas
 
 
-based compilers 
 
l programmer [62] 
 
[84] 
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• Zbid: Obtains a
area. 
• Zbdump: Commercial Daintree SNA savefile format. It is used for 
recording data stream form the wireless network. Recordings can be afterwards 
analysed in Wireshark without difficulties. Wireshark
protocol analyzer for Linux and Windows.
• Zbconvert: 
• Zbreplay: It can replay recorded data streams. Using this application, 
replay attacks can be performed. Packets eavesdropped from the netw
stored are resent to the network and the response is observed.
• Zbdsniff: This application is capable of searching of captures sniffed 
from transmission over the air for network keys sent.
• Zbfind: A GUI for ZigBee location tracking.
• Zbgoodfind:
developed by Travis Goodspeed to crack stored keys.
• Zbassocflood:
Figure 10.9. Zbdsniff network key capture [62]
Figure 10.10. Zbreplay performing a replay attack 
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Used to convert captured file formats. 
 
 
 
 It uses a memory dump generated using sniffer hardware 
 
 ZR/ZC association flooder. [62] 
 
 
[62] 
 
ork and 
 
 
186 Theoretical analysis of security features and weaknesses of telecommunication 
 
Figure 10.11. Zbfind searching ZigBee devices [85]
 On the following link, a video of a presentation of KillerBee by the developer 
Joshua Wright can be found:
http://blip.tv/source-boston
framework-3586816  
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10.5 Specific attacks to Bluetooth
 
10.5.1 Blooover 
 Blooover, a Java application for mobile phones, was develope
Group. It is available for some mobile phones and requires J2ME (
Micro Edition). Blooover is able to do security audits on mobile phones, checking 
known vulnerabilities. Additionally, it is capable of executing a 
BlueBug attack. Roughly, BlueSnarfing enables an attacker, to retrieve private data from 
the targeted device, while BlueBugging aims at taking remote control over an attacked 
device. 
Figure 10.12. Blooover II settings [101]
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10.5.2 BTCrack 
 BTCrack was published at 23C3, a German hacker congress. It serves a 
graphical interface for a passive attack, which aims at eavesdropping messages in a 
pairing process between two devices, in order to retrieve the Bluetooth PIN and 
generated link key. 
Figure 10.13. BtCrack example [86]
 An attacker is able to enter previously discovered Bluetooth device addresses, in 
order to enforce re-pairing between the two target devices. Subsequently, the whole 
pairing communication is eavesdropped, allo
search on the Bluetooth PIN used within the pairing process. This attack is described on 
the section about Bluetooth of this paper.
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11. Conclusion 
 
 On smart meter reading technologies there is still a lot way 
many deployments have been established already, the goal of these technologies has to 
be the entire deployment over metering system either in residential or industrial 
facilities all over the world. These technologies are capable of provi
of services to the client of power supplying enterprises as well as to the enterprises and 
energy billing is eased for both parts. This is why it must be incorporated in all metering 
systems. 
 Regarding to security features of these tech
they are implemented in very different ways depending on the specification. First thing 
that must be said is about encryption algorithms. AES algorithm is regarded to be the 
most secured algorithm and although most spe
that do not which is the case of GPRS or Bluetooth, and these technologies should 
incorporate it in the future. Another thing that various technologies do not incorporate is 
replay protection and it is a securit
as well as a highly security authentication procedure or ciphering. Additionally, and 
despite the fact that it is not exactly a security feature, the IPv6 technology should be 
also incorporated as well as the 6LoWPAN Adaptation Layer, features that are present 
in PLC G3 specification and are some of the strong points of the security 
implementations of these technology.
 One of the most important issues that developers have to deal with is potential 
attacks and tampering of the smart metering systems. As described over all this paper, 
although a wide range of security features are implemented in smart metering 
technologies there are still many weak points to cover. However, it must be assumed 
that it is almost impossible to guarantee a 100 % security as potential attackers are 
always working to find weaknesses on any kind of communication networks security 
features. 
 Through all work developed in this paper, it can be easily deducted that wireless 
networks present by far a lot more weaknesses that wired network since there no need 
for a physical connection to the network to gain access to it and transmissions are 
performed over the air. This is the reason why wireless networks developers are 
obligated to present a lot more security protections to wireless specifications.
 Finally, if we focus on the different types of attacks, there are specially three 
types that may be considered as the most dangerous and feared ones. The first type are 
the DoS attacks. This type of attacks are capable of disabling, in most of the cases 
temporally, entire networks by attacking its coordinators or servers. By this fact, a high 
risk of service disabling and data lost is present. The second type of attacks that must be 
considered highly dangerous are Man
sses of telecommunication 
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because of the fact that victims are totally relaying to the attacker, a lot of confidential 
data can be eavesdropped by the attacker as well as the behavior of the victim devices 
can be easily modified by the attacker to perform malicious actions against the victims 
or even the networks that victims are part of. In the end, the third type of attacks that 
may be considered as highly dangerous are the exposition of pre shared keys. No
passwords is a great advantage against password crackers and that is why using pre 
shared keys is a good security method. However, the exposition of these keys may 
compromise the security of a whole network temporally or even sometimes 
permanently. This is why avoiding the exposition of these keys to a third part is a 
extremely important issue to guarantee the security of the network. As easily deducted 
since these three types of attacks are highly more dangerous that other types, protection 
against them should be of first concern of security professionals working to improve 
security implementations of smart metering specifications or any other type of 
technologies that implies communication networks either through wired connections or 
using over the air interface.
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13. Glossary of terms
 
6LoWPAN  IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Are
AAA   Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
ACK   Acknowledge
ACL   Access Control List / Asynchronous Connection
AES   Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-CBC-MAC AES 
AES-CCM  AES 
AES-CTR  AES 
AGC   Automatic Gain Control
AFE   Analog Front End
AKEP   Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
AMM   Automated Meter Management
AMR   Automated Meter Reading
APS   Application Support sublayer
ASCII   American St
BCC   Block Check Character
BPSK   Binary Phase Shift Keying
BSEG   Bluetooth Security Expert Group
COSEM  Companion Specification for Energy Metering
CRC   Cyclic Redundance Check
CSMA-CA  Carrier Sense Multiple Acc
DES   Data Encryption Standard
DLL   Data Link Layer
DLMS   Device Language Message Specification
DBPSK  Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying
DQPSK  Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
DoS   Denial of Service
DSSS   Direc
EAP   Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAP-PSK  EAP-
ECDH   Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
EEPROM  Electrical Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EOB   End Of Billing
ETX   End of Text
EUI   Extended Unique Iden
FCH   Frame Control Header
FEC   Forward Error Correction
FFD   Full Function Device
FFT   Fast Fourier Transformation
GMK   Group Master Key
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GPRS   General Packet Radio Service
GSM   Global System for Mobile communications
GTS   Guaranteed Time Slo
HCI   Host Controller Interface
HDLC   High Data Link Control
HHU   Hand Held Unit
HMAC  Keyed
HSNK   High Security mode Network Key
IEEE   Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IETF   Internet Engineeri
IMEI   International Mobile Equipment Identity
IMSI   International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISM   Industrial, Scientific and Medical
IP   Internet Protocol
K   Key Generator
L2CAP  Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
LAI   Location Area I
LAN   Local Area Network
LBP   6LoWPAN Bootstrapping Protocol
LC   Link Controller
LCD   Liquid Crystal Display
LED   Light Emitting Diode
LFSR   Linear Feedback Shift Register
LK   Link Key
LMP   Link Manager Protocol
LSB   Least Significant Bit
MAC   Medium Access Control
MEA   Mutual Entity Authentication protocol
MitM   Man in the Middle
MK   Master Key
MS   Mobile Station
MSB   Most Significant Bit
MSISDN  Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number
MSRN   Mobile Station Roaming 
OFDM  Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
PAN   Personal Area Network
PCT   Permission Configuration Table
PDU   Packet Data Unit
PDP   Packet Data Protocol
PFS   Perfect Forward Secrecy
PIB   PAN Information Base
PIN   Personal Identificati
PLC   PowerLine Communications
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PPDU   Physical Protocol Data Unit
PRIME  PoweRline Intelligent Metering Evolution
QoS   Quality of Service
RADIUS  Remote Authentication Dial in User Service
RAM   Random Access Memory
RFD   Reduced Function Device
ROM   Read Only Memory
RSSI   Received Signal Strength Indication
RTC   Real Time Clock
SCO   Synchronous Connection
SIM   Subscriber Identity Module
SKKE   Symmetric Key Key Exchange
SoC   System on Chip
SOH   Start Of Header
SRES   Signed Respo
STX   Start of Text
TC   Trust Center
TCLK   Trust Center Link Key
TMSI   Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
UDP   User Datagram Protocol
VPN   Virtual Private Network
WAN   Wide Area Network
WCDMA  Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
ZDO   ZigBee
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